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 ii 
Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Accounting. 
Abstract 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 
by 
Raziah Bi Mohamed Sadique 
 
The recent failures of corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and HIH Insurance, to name but 
a few, have heightened investor awareness of the need to not only evaluate company 
performance, but also to consider the possibility that financial statements may not be a true 
reflection of company results, as fraudulent activities may have occurred during the reporting 
period. Since parties who are external to the firm do not have access to pertinent information, 
they have to rely upon published financial and non-financial data in order to form an opinion 
regarding performance and/or the risk that fraudulent activities may have occurred. The 
objective of this study is to determine if published information contains critical factors that 
could indicate if a company is at risk of fraud. The prior literature shows a relationship 
between weak corporate governance and the occurrence of earnings management and/or 
fraudulent activities, although most if not all of this research relates to Western economies. 
The differences in institutional setting e.g. cultural values and legal environment in Malaysia 
would not give the same findings with the study in western economies. Composing of many 
ethnic, Malaysian is a multicultural country. With each ethnic group upholding its own 
culture, values and belief, business are conducted according each ethnic‘s culture. The results 
of this study could shed some light on the influence of institutional setting on corporate 
governance and earnings management practices. There is not much research on corporate 
fraud in Malaysia; therefore, this study will focus on the Malaysian economy and examine the 
relationship between corporate governance, earnings management and corporate fraud. 
Companies that were charged with accounting and auditing offences from year 2003 to 2007 
were selected as the fraudulent sample. Data were collected for the year companies were 
charged with fraud and the year prior to that. Both univariate analysis and logistic regression 
analysis were carried out to determine the significant differences between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies with respect to corporate governance characteristics and earnings 
 iii 
management indices. The results indicated that the size of the board and the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings had significant relationships with the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences consistently across the two-year period studied. The results on earnings 
management showed only that the gross margin index had a significant relationship with the 
likelihood of corporate fraud consistently over the five-year period studied. The study also 
found that fraudulent companies adopted income increasing method in time of difficulty 
which is consistent with past study in other countries for gross margin (lower gross margin 
index). The results of this study will assist public, corporate and accounting policy makers in 
formulating more effective corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
systems. 
Keywords: Corporate fraud, fraud, economic crime, corporate governance, earnings 
management 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Study 
1.1 Introduction 
Corporate fraud has significant financial and non-financial impacts on businesses. A 
survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2007a) covering the 2005 to 2006 
period showed that the average financial loss from fraud in Malaysia was US$173,303 
per company. In addition to financial losses, the survey described non-financial losses 
resulting from corporate fraud, including damage to companies‘ brands or goodwill, 
loss of employee morale, damage to business relations with external parties 
(especially regulators) and decreases in the value of companies‘ shares. The 
repercussions of corporate fraud affect not only the companies and their shareholders, 
but also employment, social stability and the public at large. The reverberations of 
corporate fraud can be clearly seen in the cases of Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat and 
many others. Among those that suffer from corporate fraud are those that rely on 
published information to assess company performance and make investment 
decisions, such as stockholders and the general public. The serious consequences of 
corporate fraud have prompted strong control and monitoring mechanisms to be 
enacted, with the goal of overseeing corporate and management activities. 
The separation of control and ownership increases the need for effective monitoring 
and control over management in order to protect the interests of investors and 
stakeholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Investor and stakeholder interests are usually 
protected using a three-tier system (Ramaswary, 2005). The first tier is the company‘s 
code of corporate governance; among others, the objectives of the code are to ensure 
that company policies are enforced, goals are met, performance is monitored and 
disclosures of company activities are adequate. The second tier is the company‘s 
internal control system. Here the objectives are to provide reasonable assurance of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of company operations, the reliability of financial 
reporting, and compliance with laws and regulations. The third tier is the regulators 
(e.g. the Securities Commission). Regulators are responsible for overseeing the 
company‘s reporting system and ensuring compliance with disclosure standards, 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
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auditing standards, procedures and independence, ethical standards, and quality 
control standards.  
Debates on the integrity of financial reporting have broken out as the number of 
reported corporate bankruptcy and fraud cases increases (Rezaee, 2005). This has 
become an issue that concerns regulators as well as users of financial reports (AICPA, 
1993; Treadway Commission, 1987). Deficiencies in internal controls resulting from 
weaknesses in corporate governance structures have contributed to the increase in 
fraudulent activities (Beasley, 1996; Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 2000). The pressure to 
maintain the company's performance can become the motivation for managers to 
manipulate financial reports (Ramaswary, 2005). Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2000) 
indicate that management‘s ability to override internal controls is another contributing 
factor to fraud. As concerns about fraud increase, companies are being urged to fortify 
their internal control systems by strengthening their corporate governance.  
The components of corporate governance include internal accounting controls, the 
board of directors, institutional investors, independent auditors and contracts with 
management (Archambeault, 2000). Studies on fraudulent financial reporting have 
found a significant relationship between certain corporate governance characteristics 
and incidence of fraud. Among those characteristics are: the independence of the 
board of directors, the chairman‘s dual role, the number of board members, the 
number of board meetings, the independence of the audit committee members, the 
number of audit committee meetings, institutional shareholding and multiple 
directorships held by directors (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2002; Basilico, Grove & 
Cook, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Grove & Basilico, 2008). Fraud occurs when incentives 
(or pressures), opportunities and the ability to rationalize fraud co-exist (i.e. the fraud 
triangle) (Alvin Arens et al., 2007). Pressure to meet earnings forecasts and 
performance targets, as well as executive stock option schemes, become incentives to 
manipulate earnings (Ramamoorti & Olsen, 2007). This has been empirically 
established through studies on the relationship between earnings 
management/manipulation and fraudulent financial reporting (Beneish, 1999a; 
Dechow, Ge, Larson & Sloan, 2009; Grove & Basilico, 2008).  
Most studies on the relationship between corporate governance, earnings management 
and corporate fraud were carried out in the United States. Therefore, the models, 
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characteristics and variables that were significant in those studies might not be 
significant in the Malaysian context due to differences in culture, the complexity of 
the economic environment and legislation (Coffee, 2005; Geiger & Laan Smith, 2010; 
Guan, Pourjalali, Sengupta & Teruya, 2005; Han, Kang, Salter & Yong, 2010; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002, 2005; Shu-Hui, 2006). Therefore, this research aims to 
establish whether the models, characteristics and variables of corporate governance 
and earnings management are significantly related to corporate fraud in Malaysia.  
There have been few studies on corporate fraud and its relation to corporate 
governance and earnings management in Malaysia. One such study was by Hasnan, 
Abdul Rahman and Mahenthrian (2008), who analysed the management 
predisposition, motives, opportunities and earnings management involved in 
fraudulent financial reporting. Their study included certain corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings accruals as variables, and analysed factors that 
contributed to fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. Past studies on the 
relationship of the corporate governance and earnings management with respect to 
corporate fraud has yielded mixed results. This shows that the different settings or 
nature of the samples are influencing the characteristics, and the purposes of the 
governance and earnings management motives leading to inconsistent results. The 
nature of a sample refers to its characteristics, e.g. the country or industry, while the 
purpose of the governance refers to the role of corporate governance with respect to 
performance, audit fees, managing earnings or corporate fraud. Much of the research 
on this topic was carried out in Western countries and other Asian countries. Studies 
in the field of corporate fraud in particular are still lacking in Malaysia. Given 
Malaysia‘s unique environment (differences is cultural, legal and historical) and 
background, studying these characteristics in this country is important as the results 
could highlight differences in corporate governance characteristics between fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies. Such a study could reveal which corporate governance 
characteristics have a significant relationship with the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences in Malaysia. 
This study differs from Hasnan et al. (2008) in that it examines the effectiveness of 
certain key corporate governance characteristics in corporate fraud deterrence, as well 
as earnings management practices involved in corporate fraud (instead of using 
discretionary accruals, this study analysed earnings management through earnings 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
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indices). Thus, the findings of this study could highlight the effectiveness, or 
ineffectiveness, of corporate governance characteristics and the relationship between 
earnings management and incidence of corporate fraud. Further, the findings of this 
study will highlight weather the corporate-published information is useful (in fraud 
detection), be it financial or non-financial information. Among the consumers of 
corporate-published information are minority shareholders who have to bear the cost 
of company losses (as a result of fraud) more than other users (Graham, Litan & 
Sukhtankar, 2002). Therefore, it is crucial for these users to know what published 
information could help them to assess if companies are at risk of corporate fraud. 
Certain corporate governance characteristics (i.e. non-financial information) and 
earnings management indices (i.e. financial information) were examined to fulfil the 
objectives of the study. Both sets of variables were tested to check for any significant 
differences between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies and their relationship 
with corporate fraud occurrences.  
This chapter continues with a discussion of the research problem and the significance 
of this study. This is followed by the research objectives and research questions. The 
final part of the chapter outlines the organization of the study.  
1.2 Research Problem 
This study was motivated by the following factors. First is the growing concern over 
the increase in fraud cases in Malaysia. The PricewaterhouseCoopers and KPMG 
economic crime or fraud surveys from 2000 to 2009, as well as the reported cases in 
the Malaysian Securities Commission Enforcement Releases, have indicated the 
seriousness of this issue statistically. This trend becomes more problematic as the 
losses suffered threaten the ability of fraudulent companies to continue their business 
activities and be profitable. Thus, it affects the shareholders and stakeholders‘ wealth, 
as well as the stability of society as a whole. The PwC (2007) crime survey for the 
period of 2003 to 2007 shows that fraud remains a serious problem in every country 
around the world. The survey indicates that the five most common frauds committed 
are asset misappropriation, accounting fraud, corruption and bribery, money 
laundering, and IP infringement. In terms of the frequencies of these crimes, the 
survey shows that asset misappropriation has the highest reported rate (30%), 
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followed by IP infringement (15%), corruption and bribery (13%), accounting fraud 
(12%), and money laundering (4%).  
In terms of average losses suffered due to fraud, the survey indicates that average 
losses from IP infringement are the highest, with a value of US$1,900,993, followed 
by accounting fraud (US$1,477,775), asset misappropriation (US$1,280,325), 
corruption and bribery (US$882,303), and money laundering (US$253,746). In 
addition, the PwC (2009) global economic crime survey shows a significant increase 
in the frequencies of reported fraud, except for IP infringement in the 2007 PwC 
survey. The PwC 2009 survey indicates that asset misappropriation remains the most 
reported fraud at 67%, followed by accounting fraud (38%), bribery and corruption 
(27%), IP infringement (15%), and money laundering (12%). The KPMG fraud 
survey 2009 gives a similar result, showing that fraud remains widespread throughout 
the world. These statistics show that the financial impacts of fraud are made far more 
damaging by financial reporting fraud. Corporate fraud, in particular accounting or 
financial reporting fraud, is at the centre of attention in this study. 
Secondly, increasing concern is being expressed over the integrity of financial reports 
and the quality of reported earnings when a company is being charged with fraud. 
Market participants such as shareholders, stakeholders and investors rely upon 
companies‘ financial reports when making decisions about their investments. The 
results of the Malaysia Securities Commission Enforcement Releases (MSCER) 
highlight the fluctuating trend in financial statement fraud committed by insiders who 
provide the information published in annual reports. Since the only information 
available to outsiders is that which companies provide in published annual reports, 
they have to make the best use of this source of information.  
The third factor is the concern over the fact that many fraud cases were detected by 
accident or through tips from whistle-blowers (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007b; 
Ramaswary, 2005), which casts doubt on the effectiveness of auditing in detecting 
fraud. This has increased misgivings about the effectiveness of corporate governance 
structures and the consequences of their inefficiency. The main objective of corporate 
governance is to govern and monitor the company‘s activities and decision making to 
ensure it acts responsibly and efficiently. A good and effective corporate governance 
structure instils confidence in investors; if it fails in this objective, it has lost its 
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purpose. By identifying which corporate governance characteristic that is effective in 
governance, the public could use it as indicator of company good governance that lead 
to better control and monitoring of company‘s financial reporting, thus reduces the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997-1998 had an impact on Malaysian business partly 
due to weak corporate governance (Khas, 2002; Kim, 1998). As concluded by 
scholars, weak governance systems have also contributed to the increase in fraud 
cases (Basilico et al., 2005; Beasley, 1996; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson & Lapides, 
2000). The Asian economic crisis prompted the development of the Malaysian Code 
of Corporate Governance, which dictates mandatory practices for public companies. 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was largely culled from the UK 
Cadbury Report 1992 and the Hampel Report 1998 (Ow-Yong & Guan, 2000). 
Adopting a system from another country is not without its issues. The business, 
cultural and legal environment in Malaysia is different from the UK, particularly in 
terms of shareholding ownership. This may alter the effectiveness of governance on 
corporate performance in Malaysia (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), as governance 
characteristics that are effective in the UK may not be effective in the Malaysian 
context. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the adopted system, 
specifically in respect to fraud deterrence. Differences in a country‘s business 
environment and culture can have various effects on its financial reporting (Nobes & 
Parker, 2008). The way earnings are managed and reported also differs between 
countries (Desender & Castro, 2008; Doupnik, 2008; Geiger & Laan Smith, 2010; 
Guan et al., 2005; Han et al., 2010).  
Research on the connection between corporate governance, earnings management and 
corporate fraud in Malaysia is still lacking. Researchers in this area are concentrated 
in the Western world, and some Asian countries such as China have presented mixed 
results on the relationship of corporate governance characteristics and earnings 
management with corporate fraud. Therefore, there is a need to study this topic in a 
Malaysian setting. Thus, this study analyses the relationship of certain key corporate 
governance characteristics with corporate fraud occurrences in Malaysia to better 
understand the effectiveness of these characteristics in reducing the likelihood of 
fraud, as well as the ability of earnings management variables to indicate if a company 
is at risk of fraud. Once they understand which corporate governance characteristics 
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are effective, companies could structure better and more efficient corporate 
governance. Effective and efficient governance would reduce the likelihood of 
corporate fraud and earnings manipulation.  
Significance of the study 
The increase in the number of fraud cases in Malaysia has seen more rules and 
regulations being imposed on the market, as well as rigorous enforcement actions by 
regulators. Corporate governance has been identified as an important control and 
governance mechanism in the capital market; hence, it was made mandatory for all 
companies to incorporate the adopted corporate governance framework. Therefore, 
this study is significant in examining the effectiveness of corporate governance at 
reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud, and the ability of earnings management 
indices to indicate if company is at risk of fraud. This study will add to the literature 
in this field and provide a unique multicultural dimension. The study will contribute 
important information for regulators on the effectiveness of adopting another 
country‘s framework, as well as recommendations for enhancing such a framework to 
suit the local environment and better detect what works and what does not. Moreover, 
this study will help the external users of published information detect which 
companies are at-risk of corporate fraud, thus assisting them in making better 
investment decisions. For company shareholders and other stakeholders, this study 
could assist in evaluating a company‘s performance and activities that are essential to 
protect their interest or investment. To auditors, this study could be considered a tool 
for evaluating the risk of corporate fraud.  
Overview of the study 
The main focus this study is to evaluate the usefulness of published information in 
highlighting the likelihood of corporate fraud. Information publish is vast and at times 
it too technical for the general users to understand and evaluate the impact on future 
performance. Therefore, it is impossible to study and analysed all of the information 
presented in the published report. The selection of corporate governance information 
is due to the role of governance in monitoring and controlling business activities. 
Thus, good and effective governance means good control and monitoring over 
business activities which extended to lowering the risk of likelihood of corporate 
fraud. Furthermore, the information is easily accessible and understood by the general 
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users. Financial information is the important to the users of financial statement. Hence 
the financial information is also selected for the analysis of this study. Calculating 
indices with not too complicated formula is much easier for the general users to 
understand, therefore this study analysed earnings management indices. 
In evaluating the usefulness of this published information in highlighting the 
likelihood of corporate fraud, the information selected for this study (variables) is 
analysed to see its relationship to corporate fraud occurrences. This would highlight 
the variables that could indicate the risk of corporate fraud occurrences. For corporate 
governance variables, the analysis would indicate which variable decreases the 
likelihood of corporate fraud and which variable did not. This result would help in 
determining the effectiveness of the variables in fraud deterrence. These effective 
variables could become a tool in evaluating the risk of fraud which further could 
highlight the reliability of company‘s published information. The ineffective 
variables, though it does not reduces the likelihood of corporate fraud could also be 
used by the users of financial statement in assessing the healthiness of the published 
information. The ineffective variables could indicate a characteristic fraudster, which 
can be used as a guideline for assessing the reliability of information published. A 
majority of corporate fraud committed trough managing earnings, when the earnings 
is manage until it is no longer true and fair representation of company‘s performance. 
This study analysed earnings management indices with its relation to corporate fraud 
occurrences. The indices that indicate significant relationship with the likelihood of 
corporate fraud could be used is assessing the effectiveness of company‘s governance 
which would increases the reliability of information published. 
In order to achieve the objective, the variables are analysed for both fraudulent and 
non-fraudulent companies (consistent with other study corporate or financial 
statement fraud). Fraudulent companies (company charge with fraud by Malaysian 
Securities Commission) from year 2003 to 2007 were selected for this study as well as 
non-fraudulent companies during the stipulated years. For corporate governance 
variables, data were collected for the year of fraud (the year company is charged with 
fraud) and the year prior to the year of fraud. Meanwhile, for earnings management 
data is collected from 4 years prior to the year of fraud to the year of fraud. The 
impact of earnings management to company does not happen overnight. The impact 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 9 
can only be seen after some period of time (Dharan B.G. 2003). Therefore, this study 
analysed five years of financial data. 
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
The results of the PwC (2005, 2007b) fraud survey highlighted the problem of fraud 
in Malaysian business. The failure of auditors to detect fraud (Saksena, 2003) and the 
increasing number of company collapses resulting from fraud have put the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, as well as the integrity and reliability of 
financial reports, in question. This has decreased the usefulness of corporate-
published information. It was hoped that the implementation of the Malaysia Code of 
Corporate Governance, which was made mandatory for all companies, would 
strengthen the integrity and reliability of financial reports. However, the problems 
remain, leading to doubts about the effectiveness of the adopted governance 
framework. 
As discussed is the previous section, the implementation of a governance framework 
in a Malaysian context might face challenges due to the country‘s unique socio-
economic, legal and cultural background. This study intends to address this issue by 
analysing key corporate governance characteristics and earnings management indices 
to determine the differences between fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent 
companies, as well as the relationship of the variables with corporate fraud. Thus, 
there are two main objectives in this study: to analyse the effectiveness of certain key 
corporate governance characteristics at reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud; and 
to examine the ability of earnings management indices to indicate if a company is at 
risk of corporate fraud. 
Effective governance increases the relevancy and reliability of corporate reports. 
When determining the usefulness of reports, the information obtained must be 
relevant and reliable. To allow for an analysis of the usefulness of corporate-published 
information, two types of information were selected for this study: corporate 
governance and earnings. In order to distinguish between healthy and unhealthy 
practices of corporate governance and earnings, a control group (healthy companies) 
will also be studied (this data became the ‗benchmark‘ of healthy practices). Both 
groups‘ data were empirically tested and regressed; first to highlight the significant 
differences between both groups‘ practices, then to determine the significant 
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relationship between the practices and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. 
Thus, the main study objectives will be met through the following sub-objectives:  
i. Determine the significant differences between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to corporate governance characteristics. 
ii. Determine the significant relationship between corporate governance 
characteristics and corporate fraud occurrences. 
iii. Determine the significant differences between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to earnings management indices. 
iv. Determine the significant relationship between earnings management indices 
and corporate fraud occurrences. 
These objectives are addressed through the following research questions: 
i. Are there any differences in the corporate governance characteristics of 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies? 
ii. Which corporate governance characteristics have significant relationships with 
the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences? 
iii. Are there any differences in the earnings management indices of fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies? 
iv. Which earnings management indices have significant relationships with the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences? 
1.4 Chapter Organization 
The subsequent six chapters of the study are organized as follows: 
Chapter two presents information on Malaysia‘s socio-economic background, capital 
market and financial reporting legislation. This chapter also presents an overview of 
corporate fraud in Malaysia. 
The third chapter reviews the extant literature on issues of corporate fraud, corporate 
governance and earnings management. This chapter starts with a discussion of 
corporate fraud, which includes an examination of business risk and agency cost. This 
is followed by a definition of fraud and information on the nature and types of fraud, 
plus an exploration of issues relating to management fraud. The chapter continues 
with an overview of corporate fraud in Malaysia. The examination of corporate 
governance literature begins with an overview of corporate governance in Malaysia, 
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before moving on to past research on corporate governance. This section is followed 
by a description of the earnings management issue in Malaysia and past research on 
this topic.  
The fourth chapter lays out the research framework and explains how the hypotheses 
were developed. This chapter defines and elucidates the variables selected for this 
study, which are corporate governance and earnings management. 
The fifth chapter discusses the methodology and data used in the study. The focus of 
this chapter is on how the research was conducted in order to arrive at the findings 
and conclusions. The research process, including the settings, measurement 
procedures and data analysis methods, is described. The sampling method and 
selection of fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies are explained. A thorough 
discussion of the data selection, measurements and statistical analyses used to 
examine and test the variables is also included in this chapter. A description of the 
empirical testing of the univariate and logistic regression analyses closes out the 
chapter. 
Chapter six discusses the findings of the research. This is the crux of the study, which 
lays out what was found by addressing the objectives and research questions stated in 
chapter one.  
Chapter seven concludes the study with a summary of the significant findings, their 
implications, the study limitations and directions for future research. 
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    Chapter 2 
The Malaysian Socio-economic and Financial 
Reporting Environment 
This chapter briefly covers the Malaysian socio-economic background to enhance 
understanding of how and why things are done in certain ways in Malaysia. The 
chapter then continues with a discussion on financial reporting, which looks at the 
Malaysian capital market environment and legislation, as well as the regulatory and 
enforcement agencies involved. The chapter continues with an overview of corporate 
fraud in Malaysia, while the last part focuses on Malaysian corporate governance. 
2.1 Socio-economic Background 
Malaysia, a well-diversified country with a population of 28.3 million,1 is 
characterised as a multi-ethnic country. Only 8.2% of the total population is made up 
of non-citizens. The citizens of Malaysia are divided into two main groups known as 
the Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera.2 The Bumiputera are the majority in Malaysia 
(67.4%), followed by Chinese (24.6%) and Indians (7.3%). Malay is the predominant 
ethnicity in the Bumiputera group. The three main ethnicities that shape the culture 
and socio-economy of Malaysia are Malays, Chinese and Indians. 
Each ethnicity carries with it unique culture, values and beliefs. Malays are much 
influenced by Islam, while Chinese are influenced by the teachings of Buddha and 
Indians by Hinduism. These clear separations of culture, values and beliefs have 
major impacts on the way people conduct themselves, including in business and 
economic affairs (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
During the colonial era, Malaysian business and economics were controlled by 
Europeans and Chinese, while the Malays were more involved in administration and 
community establishments in villages. Indians were confined to working on plantation 
estates. The consequences of this clear stratification can be seen in the wealth of the 
Chinese, compared to the relative poverty of the Malays and Indians (Jesudason, 
                                                 
1 Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Report 2010 by the Malaysia Department of 
Statistics (http//www.statistic.gov.my). 
2 Bumiputera refers to the Malay and other indigenous ethnic groups. Other than this the ethnic groups 
are non-Bumiputera, of which the majority are Chinese or Indian. 
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1989). The differences in cultural values and economic status have created social 
tension among the ethnic groups in Malaysia, which led to riots and conflict between 
Malays and Chinese in 1969. As a result of the riot the government launched the 
National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971. The NEP aimed to create a Bumiputera 
commercial and industrial community in order to increase the Bumiputera economy. 
The NEP has seen Bumiputera given concessions in terms of grants, trade, education 
and jobs (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). This is long term policy to increase the economics 
of Bumiputera and Non-bumiputera as a whole. The NEP has seen the government 
embarking on the export-oriented strategy by implementing the ―Look East policy‖ 
and ―Malaysian Incorporated policy‖. NEP reduces the social tension amongst the 
races in Malaysia through the process of eliminating the identification of race with 
economic function and reducing the poverty level through increasing income level 
and jobs creation. It is the target of NEP to ensure that 30% of Malaysian economy is 
controlled by Bumiputeras but it did not attained its target. The NEP ended in year 
1999. The government continue with its Second Outline Perspective Plan (OPP2) 
from 1999 to 2000 which sees the establishment of National Development Policy 
(NDP) to continue the objectives of NEP. The NDP vision among others is to develop 
knowledge based society. Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020) was introduced in February 
1991 that aims to achieve the status of developed country by the year 2020. 
Nevertheless, despite the government‘s efforts to help the Bumiputera, Chinese 
remain the major market players in the economy and continue to dominate the 
management and professional positions in Malaysia (Rowley & Bhopal, 2005).  
2.2 Financial Reporting 
As a business grows more complicated, a more comprehensive annual report is 
needed to fulfil the needs of the external users of financial and non-financial 
information. To protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders, published 
financial statements and annual reports should be reliable and relevant, as well as 
providing full and fair disclosure. Jonas and Blanchet (2000) state that approaches to 
assessing the quality of financial reporting can be classified into two categories: user 
needs and investor protection. The user needs category assesses the quality of 
financial reporting through its usefulness in decision making. On the other hand, the 
investor protection category assesses the ability of financial reports to provide 
shareholders with as much information as possible. In order to ensure full and fair 
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disclosure in corporate financial reports in Malaysia, the authorities have established 
rules, regulations and laws to govern financial reporting. 
Corporate financial reporting in Malaysia is governed by the Malaysian Companies 
Act 1965, specifically the Ninth Schedule of the Act. Paragraph 3, section 166(A) of 
the Companies Act (1965) requires directors of companies to ensure that the 
preparation of accounts complies with accounting standards. Under section 169(15c), 
directors are required to state this compliance in their report. Section 174 of the Act 
requires auditors to state that the preparation of the company‘s accounts complies 
with Malaysian accounting standards. The aim of the Malaysian financial reporting 
environment is to provide relevant, reliable, fair and full disclosure of companies‘ 
finances for the benefit of the shareholders, minority interests and other stakeholders, 
and therefore compliance with the accounting standards was made mandatory by the 
Act.  
To ensure compliance with the rules, regulations and Acts, regulatory agencies were 
set up to govern the conduct of companies and financial reporting in Malaysia. The 
agencies are: Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia Central Bank); Company Commission 
of Malaysia; Malaysia Accounting Standard Board (MASB) and Financial Reporting 
Foundation (FRF); Malaysia Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) and 
Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA); and Royal Malaysia Police (Commercial 
Crime Department). Each of these agencies has its own responsibilities in governing 
financial reporting in Malaysia. The following sections introduce these agencies. 
Bank Negara Malaysia 
Bank Negara Malaysia is the central bank of Malaysia. It was established on 26 
January, 1959, under the Central Bank of Malaysia Ordinance 1958. The functions of 
the bank are carried out within the context of the broader goals of promoting 
economic growth and a high level of employment; maintaining price stability and a 
reasonable balance in the country‘s international payments position; eradicating 
poverty; and restructuring society. The bank issues currency keeps international 
reserves and safeguards the value of the ringgit. It is the banker and financial adviser 
to the government, the agency responsible for monetary policy and management of 
the financial system, and banker to the banks. Bank Negara Malaysia governs the 
conduct of the Malaysian banking and financial industry. (Source: www.bnm.gov.my) 
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Company Commission of Malaysia 
The Company Commission of Malaysia is a statutory body that governs companies 
and businesses in Malaysia. It commenced operation on 16 April, 2002, as a result of 
the merger of the Registrar of Business and the Registrar of Companies Malaysia. 
The Company Commission of Malaysia is responsible for the management and 
enforcement of the following acts: 
 Companies Act 1965 (Act 125) 
 Business Registration Act 1956 (Act 197) 
 Companies Trust Act 1949 (Act 100) 
 Akta (Larangan) Kumpulan Wang Kutu 1971 (Act 28)3 
 Any other subsidiary laws under any of the abovementioned acts, such as 
Companies Regulations 1966 and Business Registration 1957. 
Section 17 of the Companies Commission of Malaysia Act 2001 provides that the 
functions of the Commission shall be as follows: 
a) To ensure that the provisions of the Act and the laws specified in the First 
Schedule are administered, enforced, given effect to, carried out and complied 
with. 
b) To act as an agent of the government and provide services including 
administering, collecting and enforcing payment of prescribed fees or any 
other charges under the laws specified in the First Schedule. 
c) To regulate matters relating to corporations, companies and businesses in 
relation to the laws specified in the First Schedule. 
d) To encourage and promote proper conduct amongst directors, secretaries, 
managers and other officers of a corporation, and self-regulation by 
corporations, companies, businesses, industry groups and professional bodies 
in the corporate sector in order to ensure that all corporate and business 
                                                 
3 Akta (Larangan) Kumpulan Wang Kutu (Wang Kutu Collection (Prohibition) Act: Wang kutu is 
traditional money collection normally practiced by housewives. They collect a certain amount of 
money each month for a certain period depending on the number of contributors/members. Each month 
the money is collected by the contributor whose turn it is. 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 16 
activities are conducted in accordance with established norms of good 
corporate governance. 
e) To enhance and promote the supply of corporate information under any laws 
specified in the First Schedule, and to create and develop a facility whereby 
any corporate information received by, or filed or lodged with, the 
Commission may be analysed and supplied to the public. 
f) To carry out research and commission studies on any matter relating to 
corporate and business activities. 
g) To advise the minister generally on matters relating to corporations, 
companies and businesses in relation to the laws specified in the First 
Schedule.  
h) To carry out all such activities and do all such things as are necessary or 
advantageous and proper for the administration of the Commission or for such 
other purposes as may be directed by the minister. 
The Company Commission of Malaysia works together with other regulatory bodies 
and authorities such as the Insolvency Department of Malaysia, Bank Negara 
Malaysia, the Securities Commission of Malaysia and related government agencies to 
ensure that good corporate governance is practiced by the market players. (Source: 
www.ssm.com.my) 
Malaysia Accounting Standard Board and Financial Reporting Foundation 
Established under the Financial Reporting Act 1997, the MASB and the FRF became 
the new financial reporting regime. The MASB is an independent technical body 
whose primary objective is the setting of accounting standards and conceptual 
frameworks. The MASB is strongly influenced by the government through the 
Malaysian Finance Ministry. The body engages in the due process of standard setting, 
which is similar to the arrangement in other developed countries, particularly the US. 
The approved accounting standards are based on the international accounting 
standards and are customized to fit Malaysia‘s unique environment. In addition, the 
board also focuses on the implementation of Islamic financial reporting in Malaysia. 
All companies registered under the Malaysian Companies Commission are required to 
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prepare financial reports in accordance with the Malaysian financial reporting 
standards; this is mandatory under the Malaysian Companies Act 1965. 
The FRF is a trustee body that oversees the performance of the MASB. The FRF is 
not responsible for standards setting, as this is the responsibility of the MASB. The 
important function of the FRF is providing feedback to the MASB on the 
development of accounting standards. Among the important members of the FRF are 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Bank Negara Malaysia, the Securities 
Commission, the Company Commission of Malaysia, Bursa Malaysia, the Malaysia 
Institute of Accountants and the Malaysia Accounting Standards Board. (Source: 
www.masb.org.my) 
The Malaysia Institute of Certified Public Accountants and Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants 
The MICPA, formerly known as the MACPA (Malaysia Association of Certified 
Public Accountants), is a professional accounting body established in 1958. The 
MICPA played a significant role in the research and development of accounting and 
auditing standards before the establishment of the MASB. The MICPA does not have 
the authority or power to regulate the accounting profession. The MIA was formed in 
1967 under the Accounting Act 1967. In its early years the MIA‘s main function was 
simply to register accountants. In 1987, the MIA was reactivated and thereon started 
to have a role in issuing accounting standards. However, both bodies lack the power 
to enforce the standards. (Source: www.micpa.org.my) 
Royal Malaysia Police (Commercial Crime Department) 
The Royal Malaysia Police are actively involved in commercial crime investigation. 
When any fraud that falls under commercial crime occurs, the Royal Malaysia Police 
Commercial Crime Department will become involved. The main function of this 
department is to investigate, catch and prosecute white collar criminals who commit 
fraud, corruption or any type of commercial falsification, and cybercrime. Under this 
department there are a few important units, namely: anti-laundering unit, forensic 
accounting unit, financial investigation unit, corporate investigation unit, multimedia 
and cyber investigation unit, and forgery unit, which include credit card forgery. This 
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department has played its role effectively side by side with the Securities Commission 
in combating fraud. (Source: www.ccid.my) 
2.2.1 Capital market legislation 
According to Shim (2006), the Malaysian capital market has the following features: 
i. The principle of corporate governance is similar to the UK Code of Corporate 
Governance. 
ii. It recognizes the need for self-regulatory practices. 
iii. A single-tier or unitary board model (no separation between the board‘s 
supervisory and management functions). 
iv. The securities market is founded on corporate law in order to protect minority 
rights. 
v. Company shares are mostly owned by families or by a few individuals. 
The Malaysian capital market is very much concentrated on family-owned businesses. 
Lim (1981) and Zhuang, Edwards and Capulong (2001) indicate that in Malaysia 
company shares are largely owned by families. Often, the managers of these 
companies come from families that own a large percentage of shares. This has both 
positive and negative consequences for the other shareholders/stakeholders. One 
positive impact is that the manager will always strive to increase the value of the 
company, as it reflects in their family‘s earnings. However, a negative impact could 
be the issue of insider trading, in which the managers have more knowledge of the 
business performance, and would likely be the first to act upon any indication that the 
company is not performing well. In many cases, these insiders will sell off their shares 
before a market collapse, and the minority group‘s interest will be sacrificed, leading 
to them having to shoulder the losses. Thus, Malaysian capital market legislation has 
to make sure the interests of other shareholders, especially minority shareholders, are 
protected (Tam & Tan, 2007). 
The Malaysian corporate sector has grown rapidly since the 1990s. The total market 
capitalisation of companies listed on the main and second boards of the Malaysian 
Stock Exchange growth annually is 40% on the average in the 1990s (KLSE, 2002). 
To date, the number of listed companies is still increasing, and therefore proper 
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regulation and legislation is needed to govern the capital market. In terms of 
legislation, the Malaysian capital market is governed by the Capital Market and 
Services Act 2007, Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 1991, Securities 
Commission Act 1993, Companies Act 1965, Offshore Companies Act 1990, and 
Labuan4 Offshore Securities Industry Act 1995. 
A number of regulatory agencies are responsible for ensuring all companies comply 
with legislation. Each of these agencies has its own duties and responsibilities in 
making sure the market runs smoothly and shareholders and other stakeholders‘ 
interests are not compromised. Figure 1 shows the regulatory framework of the 
Malaysian capital market. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for controlling the 
market, which is actively represented by the Malaysia Securities Commission and the 
Labuan Offshore Financial Service. The Labuan Offshore Financial Service is only 
responsible for governing the Labuan International Financial Exchange. The 
Securities Commission plays a more important role in the Malaysian capital market. It 
governs the Malaysian Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia Berhad) and enforces capital 
market rules and regulations.  
Figure 2-1 The Regulatory Framework of the Malaysian Capital Market 
Source: Bursa Malaysia (2009) 
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4 Labuan is the name of an island in Sabah, Malaysia where offshore trading is conducted.  
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 20 
Malaysian Securities Commission 
The Malaysian Securities Commission was established on 1 March, 1993 under the 
Securities Commission Act 1993. It is a self-funding statutory body with investigative 
and enforcement powers. It reports to the Minister of Finance and its accounts are 
tabled annually in parliament. It has jurisdiction over Bursa Malaysia. The Securities 
Commission‘s ultimate responsibility is to protect investors. Apart from discharging 
its regulatory functions, it is also obliged by statute to encourage and promote the 
development of the securities and futures markets in Malaysia. It has direct 
responsibility to supervise and monitor the activities of market institutions and 
regulate all persons licensed under the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007. The 
securities commission administers the Securities Commission Act 1993; Capital 
Market and Services Act 2007; and Securities Industry (Central Depositories) Act 
1991. Before the establishment of the Securities Commission, the Malaysian capital 
market was regulated by the Capital Issues Committee; Ministry of Finance; Prime 
Minister‘s Department Panel on Take-overs and Mergers and Foreign Investment 
Committee; Malaysia Companies Commission; Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry; and Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia Central Bank). 
The Securities Commission has the power to enforce securities laws and the duty of 
disclosure under the abovementioned acts. It‘s investigative and enforcement powers 
allow it to do the following: 
i. Initiate investigations. 
ii. Commence criminal prosecutions with the consent of the Attorney 
General. 
iii. Initiate civil proceedings to recover monetary damages from offenders. 
iv. Impose compounds for certain minor offences. 
v. Apply to the court for a restraining order in relation to the activities of 
a licensed person. 
vi. Impose and compound penalties. 
vii. Issue public or private reprimands to defaulting issuers and/or 
directors. 
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viii. Suspend or revoke licenses of licensed persons. 
ix. Apply to the court for an order to remove directors who breach the 
securities laws. 
The Securities Commission is the regulatory agency with the most power, authority 
and jurisdiction in enforcing all rules, regulations and laws regarding Malaysia‘s 
capital market and the financial reporting environment. (Source: www.sc.com.my) 
Bursa Malaysia 
Bursa Malaysia, formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, is the main 
Malaysian Stock Exchange organization. It was established in 1973 to provide a 
central marketplace for Malaysian listed companies to transact business in shares, 
bonds and various other securities. This is a self-regulated organization, which 
governs the conduct of its members and members of stock broking companies when 
dealing with securities. Bursa has established its own listing requirements, which 
contain the listing and disclosure standards to be maintained by public listed 
companies (Ibrahim, Ayoup & Che Ahmad, 2002). Bursa Malaysia, in its effort to 
ensure that public listed companies maintain its standards and abide by the 
regulations, established Practice Notes for distressed companies. This was done to 
monitor companies and maintain the quality of the marketplace. Bursa Malaysia has 
the function of prescribing listing requirements, guidelines and practice notes; it also 
has the power to enforce them. Failure to comply with Bursa Malaysia‘s listing 
requirements may result in a company being fined, reprimanded or both under section 
11 of the Securities Investment Act. Bursa Malaysia has the power to reprimand, fine, 
issue caution letters, suspend stock broking companies or dealers, and delist issuers 
from the official list of the exchange. (Source: www.bursamalaysia.com) 
2.3 Overview of Corporate Fraud in Malaysia 
The PwC (2005a) economic crime survey indicates that 23% of Malaysian 
respondents reported economic crime for the years 2003 and 2004. Out of these 
reported cases, more than half (57%) involved asset misappropriation. The report also 
indicates that 70% of reported fraud cases are committed by people inside the 
companies, of which 21% were committed by the management team. The number of 
reported cases of economic crime committed by company employees in Malaysia is 
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higher than any other country in the world (PwC, 2005). The PwC (2005a) survey 
also highlighted the following issues: 
i. Companies in Malaysia are more vulnerable to corruption and bribery and 
suffer more from these issues compared to companies in other countries. 
ii. The perception of Malaysian companies that suffered from corruption and 
bribery is that these issues had little or no effect on the companies‘ image. 
iii. Malaysian companies are willing to invest in extended internal controls and 
risk management. However, only 25% are willing to strengthen internal 
auditing, compared to 49% around the world. 
A later survey by PwC (2007a) indicates that 48% of Malaysian companies have been 
the victims of economic crime. This is considerably higher than the figure reported in 
the 2005 survey, when only 23% of companies reported such crimes. However, the 
PwC (2007a) survey indicates a decrease in the number of perpetrators among senior 
and middle management, but an increase in perpetrators from other groups of 
employees. The PwC (2006, 2007c) survey result for Malaysia showed that fraud is 
committed more by people inside businesses, including management, which puts the 
shareholders‘ wealth at stake. Alarmingly, fraud is also one of the contributing factors 
to the financial distress of companies. Anwar (2006)5 states that based on the 
Malaysian Securities Commission investigation, many of the losses suffered by 
financially distressed companies were largely caused by mismanagement, fraud and 
other unethical practices. Corporate fraud in Malaysia is on the rise and has become a 
major problem for business in the country (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2006, 2007c).  
An analysis of the MSCER from the period 2002 to 2007 (see Table 2-1) shows a 
fluctuating trend in the number of fraud cases according to the four categories of 
enforcement action. These enforcement powers are divided into four categories of 
enforcement actions, as follows: 
i. Criminal prosecution: investigation and prosecution of offenders in the 
criminal court. 
ii. Civil action: initiation of civil proceedings to recover money from offenders. 
                                                 
5 Zarinah Anwar is the current chairman of the Malaysian Securities Commission. 
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iii. Administrative action: application to the court for restraining orders based on 
offenders‘ activities; suspension or revocation of offenders‘ licenses; or 
removal of directors. 
iv. Cases compounded: imposing compounds or penalties on offenders for certain 
types of offences. 
The results of the analysis showed a decreasing trend in the number of cases from 
2002 to 2004 and a fluctuating trend for 2005 to 2007.  
Table 2-1 Number of Cases for Each Class of Enforcement from 2002 to 2007 
 
The cases were further analysed according to the nature of the offences, as presented 
in Table 2-2. The offences were divided into two categories: accounting and auditing 
offences (AA) and others (O). Accounting and auditing offences were those offences 
that directly impacted on the company‘s financial reporting, such as false financial 
statements, abuse of accounting principles and failure to disclose material financial 
information, as well as the six financial reporting fraud schemes explained by Rezaee 
(2005). Other offences that do not fall under the accounting and auditing offences 
criteria were included in the other offences category. Yet again, the results for 
accounting and auditing offences show a fluctuating trend from 2002 to 2007.  
Table 2-2 Nature of Offences from 2002 to 2007 
Offences/Year 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AA O AA O AA O AA O AA O AA O 
Criminal actions 4 11 3 9 2 2 2 6 3 3 5 3 
Civil actions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 2 
Administrative actions 1 8 1 4 0 2 1 3 0 1 2 2 
Cases compounded 4 3 4 2 3 4 1 5 3 1 1 2 
Total 9 22 8 15 5 8 5 14 6 6 10 7 
Legend: AA – Accounting and auditing offences, O – Other offences 
 
 
Enforcement 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Criminal prosecutions 15 13 4 8 6 8 
Civil actions  - - - 1 1 4 
Administrative actions 9 4 2 4 1 2 
Cases compounded 7 6 7 6 4 3 
Total 31 23 13 19 12 17 
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The perpetrators of fraud for cases under MSCER are shown in Table 2-3. The 
analysis divides the perpetrators into two groups: management team and others. The 
management team is defined as middle and senior management, such as the chief 
executive officer, chief financial officer and the board of directors. Others are those 
who do not meet the management team criteria, such as general employees and 
outsiders (not company employees). The analysis shows a fluctuating trend in the 
number of perpetrators from the management team. Fraud or misconduct committed 
by the management team has a far greater impact than that committed by other 
perpetrators. 
Table 2-3 Fraud Committed According to Groups of Perpetrators 2002 to 2007 
Group 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Management team 7 13 7 9 6 8 
Others 24 10 6 10 6 9 
Total 31 23 13 19 12 17 
 
The results of this analysis highlight a few important facts, such as the highest number 
of fraud cases occurred in 2002. Even though the number of fraud cases shows a 
fluctuating trend, there was an increase in the number of cases in 2007 over 2006. In 
addition, the number of accounting and auditing offences is higher than other offences 
in 2007. Moreover, the results also indicate the involvement of management in 
committing fraud. 
Both of these results from the economic crime survey by PwC and the enforcement 
statistics released by the Malaysian Securities Commission indicate cases where the 
companies were the victims of fraud, and were the perpetrators. Due to the limited 
number of published fraud cases in Malaysia, this study did not attempt an in-depth 
investigation into whether companies were the perpetrators or the victims of corporate 
fraud. Failure to detect fraudulent reports that a company was the victim of corporate 
fraud indicates either the perpetrators were very good at covering their crimes; there 
was a failure (weakness) in the company‘s internal control and governance system, or 
both. Being the perpetrator of fraud also indicates that a company‘s internal control 
and governance system is weak and the cover up was expertly done, as auditors failed 
to discover the fraud. The impact of fraudulent reporting whether committed by the 
company or not is devastating for those who rely on the reported information. 
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Therefore, the sample selected for this study is made up of companies that were 
charged with accounting and auditing offences by the Malaysia Securities 
Commission. Despite the corporate governance revamp in order to strengthen the 
effectiveness of governance in companies, fraud, bribery and corruption remains a 
serious issue and increasing issues in Malaysia (as stated in PwC fraud survey 2011, 
2014, 2016 and KPMG fraud, bribery and corruption survey 2011) 
The Malaysian capital market is moving towards a ‗disclosure-based regime‘, which 
will ensure that investors are aware of the risks involved in investing in securities. In 
order to guarantee full compliance, rules and regulations are imposed. Statutory 
disclosure has become the starting point for communication between companies and 
shareholders/investors. Malaysian listed companies‘ statutory disclosures are based 
on: the Companies Act 1965; Financial Reporting Act 1997; Capital Markets and 
Services Act 2007; approved accounting standards; mandatory professional reporting 
requirements; listing requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad; the Securities 
Commission‘s issued guidelines; the Banking and Financial Institution Act 1989; and 
the guideline directives issued by Bank Negara Malaysia (Malaysia Central Bank). 
All of this is to ensure adequate disclosure and proper reporting by listed companies.  
The Companies Act 1965 provides a comprehensive statutory guideline for the 
conduct of companies in Malaysia, including the duties of directors, which directly 
impact on corporate governance practices in Malaysia. There are two major aspects to 
directorial duties: fiduciary duties and the duty to use reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. Fiduciary duties include the duty to act in good faith, proper exercising of 
power, appropriate discretion and avoidance of any conflict or self-dealing. Using 
reasonable care, skill and diligence includes compliance with the securities legislation 
and listing rules. The Bursa Malaysia listing requirements provide some mandatory 
minimum guidelines for the corporate governance of listed companies.  
The financial reporting of Malaysian listed companies is highly regulated by the 
Companies Act 1965, Financial Reporting Act 1997, Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989 (for finance-based companies) and approved accounting 
standards, as well as mandatory professional reporting requirements. The subjective 
nature of accounting treatments and reporting has resulted in different measures and 
formats being used for calculating and presenting financial information. This, to some 
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extent, has opened the way for manipulation of numbers, which in extreme cases 
becomes a breeding ground for corporate fraud. The Capital Market and Service Act, 
Bursa listing requirements, and Securities Commission regulations and guidelines 
ensure compliance with all rules and regulations by Malaysian listed companies. The 
key responsibilities of the audit committee with regards to financial reporting are: to 
assess risks and the control environment, oversee financial reporting, evaluate the 
audit process, and review conflicts of interest and related party transactions. The 
overseeing of financial reporting includes reviewing the company‘s earnings and 
financial reports. As a result of the complicated nature of accounting treatments, audit 
committees need to be effective and efficient in fulfilling their responsibilities. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
The Malaysian capital market‘s products and techniques for raising capital are 
becoming more sophisticated, so new, modern methods of market surveillance are 
needed in order to detect economic crime and promote a fair and orderly capital 
market (Shim, 2006). The Asian financial crisis in 1997 raised much concern over 
corporate transparency and good corporate governance practices in Malaysian 
companies. The economic downturn resulting from the financial crisis exposed poor 
corporate governance practices in Malaysia and led to the establishment of the High 
Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) in 1998. The FCCG is 
responsible for comprehensively reviewing and reforming corporate governance in 
Malaysia. The committee comprises senior representatives from the government, 
regulatory agencies, industry bodies and professional associations. In March 1998 the 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was established under the 
Companies Act 1965 with the objective to represent, express and give effect to the 
opinions of members of the MICG regarding issues related to corporate governance, 
and to promote awareness of corporate governance. The members of the MICG are: 
the Federation of Public Listed Companies, Malaysian Institute of Directors, 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Malaysian Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators, and Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants. In 1999 a 
regulation requiring directors and CEOs to disclose interests in publicly listed 
companies was introduced.  
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 27 
The corporate governance initiatives and reforms in Malaysia do not stop there. The 
FCCG investigations relating to the 1997 financial crisis came out of the Report of 
Corporate Governance 1999, which highlighted the vital role of boards of directors as 
a mechanism of governance that protects shareholders‘ interests. Following this report 
the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was introduced in March 
2000, covering the principles and best practice of good governance and describing 
optimal corporate governance structures and internal processes. An effective and 
efficient internal control system should be maintained by the boards of directors. An 
internal control report is also required and should include information on risk 
management. In January 2001, all companies in Malaysia were required to comply 
with the corporate governance code of practice in order to strengthen the quality of 
Malaysian financial reporting and the capital market. The MCCG is similar to the UK 
Codes of Corporate Governance (Cadbury and Hampel reports). In August 2000, the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established. The MSWG is 
responsible for protecting the interests of minority shareholders. This group is 
represented by the five largest institutional funds in Malaysia: the Employee 
Provident Fund, Permodalan Nasional Berhad, Social Security Organization, 
Lembaga Tabung Haji and Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera.  
In another response to the Report on Corporate Governance 1999, the Capital Market 
Plan (CMP) was launched by the Securities Commission in February 2001. Included 
in the CMP recommendations was a 10-year (2001 to 2010) institutional and 
regulatory framework for the Malaysian capital market, which focused on issues of 
corporate governance.  
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of good corporate governance, the MCCG 
(2001) stresses the following:  
i. Duties, obligations, rights and liabilities of directors, company officers and 
controlling shareholders. 
ii. Adequacy of disclosures of conflicts of interest. 
iii. Enhancing the quality of general meetings. 
iv. Efficacy in the provision of shareholder remedies. 
v. Enforcement of good corporate governance. 
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In order to strengthen and improve corporate governance in Malaysia, many 
initiatives were put in place, including the establishment of the Corporate Law 
Reform Committee in August 2003 and the introduction of a legal provision for 
whistle-blowers in the Securities Industries Act in January 2004. The Guideline of 
Best Practices in Corporate Disclosure was introduced by Bursa Malaysia in 2004 to 
strengthen corporate governance and increase shareholder protection and investor 
confidence in the Malaysian capital market. 
The Code of Corporate Governance was revised in 2007 with the aim to strengthen 
boards of directors and audit committees, as well as ensure that the boards of directors 
and audit committees carry out their duties and responsibilities effectively. The key 
amendments are: 
i. The details of the eligibility criteria for appointment of directors and the role 
of the nominating committee. 
ii. The details of the eligibility criteria for appointment as an audit committee 
member, composition of audit committees, the frequency of meetings and the 
need for continuous training. 
iii. All public listed companies are required to have internal audit functions and 
the reporting line for internal auditors should be clarified. 
Under the requirements of Bursa Malaysia, all listed companies need to report on their 
corporate governance practices as stated in the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance and provide reasons in cases of non-compliance. 
In 2011, the Malaysian Securities Commission published the Corporate Governance 
Blueprint, which consists of 35 new recommendations under 8 principles of corporate 
governance to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance in Malaysia. This 
recommendation was implemented in 2012 and its effect will be reviewed after five 
years. The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) includes the 
recommendations from the 2011 Corporate Governance Blueprint as well as some 
relevant parts from the 2007 Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance. Table 2-4 
present the new amendments to the Code. 
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Table 2-4 MCCG 2012 New Amendments 
Principle Recommendations 
Board to establish clear roles 
and responsibilities 
- Establish clear functions for the board and 
management. 
- Establish clear roles and responsibilities with 
respect to fiduciary and leadership functions. 
- Establish ethical standards and ensure compliance. 
- Ensure company‘s strategies encourage 
sustainability. 
- Have procedure in place allowing members to 
obtain access to information and advice. 
- Have qualified and competent company secretary. 
- The board charter needs to be formalised, made 
public and reviewed periodically. 
Strengthen composition - Establish nominating committee, which should be 
comprised exclusively of nonexecutive directors, a 
majority of whom must be independent. 
- Nominating committee should develop, maintain 
and review the criteria to be used in the 
recruitment process and annual assessment of 
directors. 
- Establish formal and transparent remuneration 
policies and procedures to attract and retain 
directors. 
Reinforce independence - Undertake an assessment of its independent 
directors annually. 
- The tenure of an independent director should not 
exceed a cumulative term of nine years. 
- Upon completion of the nine years, an independent 
director may continue to serve on the board 
subject to the director‘s re-designation as a non-
independent director. 
- The board must justify and seek shareholders‘ 
approval in the event it retains as an independent 
director a person who has served in that capacity 
for more than nine years.  
- The positions of chairman and CEO should be 
held by different individuals, and the chairman 
must be a non-executive member of the board.  
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- The board must comprise a majority of 
independent directors where the chairman of the 
board is not an independent director. 
Foster commitment - The board should set out expectations on time 
commitment for its members and protocols for 
accepting new directorships.  
- The board should ensure its members have access 
to appropriate continuing education programmes. 
Uphold integrity in financial 
reporting 
- The audit committee should ensure financial 
statements comply with applicable financial 
reporting standards.  
- The audit committee should have policies and 
procedures in place to assess the suitability and 
independence of external auditors. 
Recognise and manage risk - The board should establish a sound framework to 
manage risks.  
- The board should establish an internal audit 
function that reports directly to the audit 
committee. 
Ensure timely and high-
quality disclosures 
- The board should ensure the company has 
appropriate corporate disclosure policies and 
procedures in place. 
- The board should encourage the company to 
utilize information technology for effective 
dissemination of information. 
Strengthen relationship 
between company and 
shareholders 
- The board should take reasonable steps to 
encourage shareholder participation at general 
meetings.  
- The board should encourage poll voting.  
- The board should promote effective 
communication and proactive engagements with 
shareholders. 
Source: MCCG 2012 
 
 
 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 31 
2.5  Summary 
This chapter provided a basic overview of Malaysian financial reporting; the capital 
market‘s environment, structure, regulation and enforcement; and corporate 
governance in Malaysia. The Malaysian capital market is moving towards a 
‗disclosure-based regime‘ so that investors will be fully informed of the risks involved 
in investing in securities. In order to ensure full compliance, certain rules and 
regulations have been imposed. All in all, in terms of rules and regulations Malaysia 
was ranked second out of 10 countries by the Asian Corporate Governance 
Association Conference 2005 (Allen, 2005). However, in terms of enforcement, the 
country was ranked fourth. Perhaps due to the highly regulated environment, the level 
of compliance, especially meeting the minimum requirements, is very high for 
Malaysian listed companies. However, even though it is number two in the 
compliance ranking, Malaysia is not free from non-compliance and violations of 
corporate practice (including corporate fraud). The country is also quite weak in 
enforcement. Therefore, the regulatory bodies need to improve enforcement to curb 
these issues, in particular corporate fraud. The following chapter will elaborate on 
past studies/literature that relate to this study.  
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    Chapter 3                                                          
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into three parts: The first part focuses on the main theme of 
corporate fraud. The second part provides a discussion of corporate governance and 
the final part covers earnings management literature. 
3.2 Corporate Fraud 
No discussion of corporate fraud can proceed without first establishing the definition, 
nature and types of fraud. This section explores the issues of business risk and agency 
cost, explaining why fraud exists. This is followed by the definitions of fraud in 
general and corporate fraud specifically. The section then moves on to consider the 
nature and types of corporate fraud. A brief overview of corporate fraud in Malaysia 
is also included. 
3.2.1 Business risk and agency problem 
The ultimate goal of an investment is a high return, but this is associated with high 
business risk. As stated by Bettis and Mahajan (1985, p. 785) ‗the conventional 
wisdom of economic theory is that it is necessary to assume increased risk in order to 
increase the expected profit‘. It is vital for every investor and shareholder to 
understand the type of risk involved in a business. Business risk varies according to 
the environment, and this includes factors such as business activities, markets, 
financial structures and the legal environment. All risk can be categorized into three 
groups (Huntington, 1992): 
i. Inherent industry risk: This is the risk of fraud that is present in every aspect of 
the industry or business. There are two types of fraud associated with inherent 
industry risk: management fraud and employee fraud. Management fraud can 
occur in any business sector or industry. The risk of management fraud 
depends on a few key characteristics: the financial structure, secrecy policy, 
and transaction volume, access to credit, new and complex products, and 
market conditions. Employee fraud can also occur in any type of business. 
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Companies that are most at risk are those that give authority to their 
employees (that are not senior management) to deal with large business 
transactions in an ever-changing market. 
ii. Environmental risk: This type relates to the organization or business structure, 
the social and cultural environment, performance evaluation, financial 
conditions, and managerial structure and quality. 
iii. Business risk: This risk is associated with the market and customers.  
As there is risk in every aspect of a business, shareholders and investors should be 
careful when deciding where they invest. Inherent risks are quite difficult to tackle. 
Inherent risk is more likely when there is a separation of management and ownership, 
which denies the owner full control over the management of their assets. This 
principal (owner) and agent (managers) relationship is widely known as agency 
relationship. Jensen and Meckling (1976) define agency relationship as: 
An agency relationship as a contract under which one or more 
persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent. (p. 5) 
The agent is the management team in charge of the firm‘s managerial activities. It is 
assumed that if left alone the management will act out of self-interest (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). With decision-making authority and 
vital internal information, including confidential information, managers have the 
opportunity to do what is best for them. Therefore, there will be a conflict of interest 
between the management team and the shareholders. In order to reduce this problem 
the principal creates incentives for the managers and incurs the cost of monitoring 
their activities and decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This agency cost is defined 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as: 
i. The monitoring costs incurred by the principal. 
ii. The bonding costs incurred for the agents. 
iii. The residual loss. 
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Past researches have shown that shareholders have incurred agency cost in order to 
reduce the problem of agency and protect their wealth. Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Rozeff (1982) and Crutchley, Jensen Jahera and Raymond (1999) indicate that 
dividend payments reduce the agency problem as they reduce the discretionary funds 
available to managers. Rozeff (1982) states that in firms where insiders hold a lower 
fraction of the management positions and a greater number of stockholders own the 
outside equity, the dividend payouts will be higher. In order to control agency cost 
arising from inefficiencies, managers make financial policy trade-offs (Crutchley et 
al., 1999). Dividend policy could also mitigate agency cost of free cash flow (Sulong 
and Mat Nor, 2016). Sulong and Mat Nor (2016) analysed the dividend policy, 
ownership structure and board governance on firm value in Malaysian companies 
found that dividend has positive significant effect on firms value. Good governance 
enhance (higher percentage of independent directors and size of board) monitoring 
role of dividends in reducing agency cost. The study found that duality role has 
significant relationship with company‘s dividend policy while ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership is not significant. 
 
The stewardship theory was proposed as an alternative to the agency theory; it arose 
from the psychology and sociology fields, unlike agency theory, which is based on an 
economic model (Albrecht, Conan & Chad, 2004). Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) 
state that stewardship theory uphold the stewards concept, by which managers are 
believed to put shareholders‘ interests over their own, despite personal motivations or 
incentives. Self-interest is not the main motivator under the stewardship theory, but 
rather gaining satisfaction through success and challenges motivates the stewards 
(Albrecht et al., 2004). Donaldson and Davis (1991) state that gaining recognition 
from peers and board members is also a motivation for stewards to carry out their 
responsibilities properly. The stewardship theory emphasises enabling managers, 
rather than controlling them. Stewardship is all about trust (Albrecht et al., 2004), and 
therefore Donaldson and Davis (1991) propose that CEO duality can enhance 
company performance, and CEOs work best when they are also chairman of the 
board. However, past literature has shown mixed results relating to CEO duality and 
fraud, resulting in the agency theory prevailing over the stewardship theory. All 
companies have a corporate structure based either on agency theory, with control 
mechanisms to curb the opportunistic behaviour of management, or on stewardship 
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theory, with more trust being given to management. In a normal business setting with 
inherent risk involved, the stewardship structure provides more opportunity for fraud 
as compared to the agency structure with control mechanisms in place (Albrecht et al., 
2004).   
Stakeholder theory perceived managers to make decision by taking into account the 
interest of all the stakeholders in the company which include the financial claimants, 
employees, customers, communities and government (Jensen, 2001). Jensen (2001) 
states that it is not possible for managers make decisions when the theory did not 
specify on how to fulfil the interest of all those stakeholders. It is difficult to actually 
meet all the interest of the different stakeholders. Effective corporate governance 
should address all the theories on social relationships as well as the rules, legislation, 
cultural, political and historical environment. However, agency theory remains the 
basis of governance framework. As for Malaysia, all the three theories mentioned is 
embedded in the development of Malaysia corporate governance. 
 
This section continues with a discussion on the term ‗fraud‘ and its types, as well as 
the issue of fraud control. 
3.2.2 Definition of fraud 
It is essential to have a sufficient understanding of what corporate fraud is before its 
related issues can be discussed any further. This section will provide definitions of 
fraud from two perspectives: the lingual perspective and the legal perspective.  
Lingual perspective  
The Longman Dictionary (2005, p. 640) defines fraud as: ‗(1) The crime of deceiving 
people in order to gain something such as money or goods; and (2) Someone or 
something that is not what it claimed to be‘. In common understanding, fraud means 
deception or intentional misrepresentation of material fact (Bologna, 1984). From an 
auditing point of view, fraud can be defined as an ‗intentional wrongful act with the 
purpose of deceiving or causing harm to another party‘ (Arens et al., 2007, p. 96). 
Another definition by Comer (2003, p. 4) states that fraud is ‗any dishonesty to which 
one person intends to get an advantage over another‘. From a commerce and 
economics perspective, O‘Gara (2004, p. 1) indicates that fraud includes 
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‗irregularities and illegal acts with intentional deception‘, which are committed for a 
company‘s benefit or detriment by a person on the inside or outside.  
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) refers to fraud as an economic crime in their fraud 
survey and uses the terms ‗crime‘ and ‗fraud‘ interchangeably. PwC (2005b, p. 28) 
defines economic crime or fraud as ‗wrongful or criminal activities to or in an 
organization, intended to result in the gain of money or benefits for the perpetrator(s)‘. 
Another definition of corporate crime by Clinard and Quinney (1973, p. 188) is ‗the 
offences committed by corporate officials for their corporation and the offences of the 
corporation itself‘. Bologna (1984) describes corporate fraud as acts of deception or 
cheating with intent, committed by, for or against a business corporation. The 
Malaysian Approved Standards on Auditing (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, 
2001, p. 193) AI No. 240 defines fraud as ‗an intentional act by one or more 
individuals among management, those charged with governance, employees, or third 
parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or illegal advantage‘.  
From these definitions, the general understanding of fraud can be seen as: 
misrepresentation of facts to make others believe what is not true, with the fraudster 
having the intention to gain an advantage (financial or non-financial) in the dealing. 
Legal perspective  
The Black Law Dictionary (Garner & Black, 2009) defines fraud as: 
i. A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a material fact to 
induce another to act to his or her detriment is usually a tort, but in some cases, 
especially when the conduct is wilful, it may be a crime.  
ii. A misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth to induce another 
person to act. 
iii. A tort arising from knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact or 
reckless misrepresentation made to induce another to act to his or her detriment.  
English common law defines fraud as cheating or deceit, which is considered a crime 
(Bologna, 1984). Bologna (1984, p. 6) summarizes the legal view on fraud as: ‗(1) A 
tort (civil or private wrong) where assets or monetary recovery are sought for 
damages; (2) A contract law or Uniform Commercial Code violation where it sought 
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to end an agreement and return of money or property; and (3) A criminal offense 
(public wrong) where fine and/or imprisonment can be imposed‘.  
In the Malaysian legal system, there is no single legal definition of fraud. The act of 
fraud falls under a particular branch of the law based on its nature. First is statutory 
fraud; various statutes address fraudulent acts as an offence and the express definition 
may be provided by the specific statute. In the absence of any definition, then case 
law provides the definition. Malaysian statutes concerned with fraud include: the 
Companies Act 1965 (Malaysia Companies Act 1965 (Act 125), 2007), which does 
not define fraud under s4 interpretation, but does cover instances of fraud in the 
various sections, e.g. the newly amended section 174 refers to powers and duties of an 
auditor to report acts of fraud; and section 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 (Malaysia 
Contracts Act 1950 (Act 136) 2006) gives extensive instances of fraudulent acts.  
Second is criminal fraud, where the fraud is a crime under the Malaysian Penal Code 
(Malaysian Penal Code (Act 574) 2006). Whilst fraud per se is not defined, under s25 
the act defines ‗fraudulently‘ as ‗a person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does 
that thing with intent to defraud, but not otherwise.‘ This goes back to the meaning of 
‗defraud‘, which is based on a layman‘s definition or any established definition of 
fraud in case law. The third is fraud as tort, where ‗torts‘ refers to the branch of law 
that deals with civil wrongs. In torts, fraud is legally classified as ‗intentional torts‘, 
which is a civil wrong resulting from an intentional act on the part of the tortfeasor 
(the person who committed a tort). It may be dealt with specifically under an 
established branch of torts; for instance, when a fraudulent act is committed by an 
agent of a principal, it may be dealt with under the tort branch ‗vicarious liability‘, as 
well as under contract law.  
Though the wording of the definitions differs, it can be concluded that fraud is an 
intentional act to deceit or cheat with the desire to obtain an advantage or cause harm 
to another party. In the legal perspective, fraud can be a civil wrong, a tort or a crime. 
Thus, the act of fraud committed by corporations or companies, or a person or persons 
in the companies, can be defined as an intentional wrongful act by a corporation or 
company with the purpose of deceiving or causing harm to another party.  
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3.2.3 Nature and types of fraud 
The nature of corporate fraud varies widely, encompassing accounting fraud, asset 
misappropriation, corruption and bribery, money laundering, and intellectual property 
infringement. Accounting fraud, or financial statement fraud, is at the top in terms of 
the damage and losses it causes to the economy and society as a whole; therefore, the 
main focus of this study is corporate accounting fraud. 
Financial statements should be free from material misstatement. Material 
misstatement can result from any intentional error that is made by the company. When 
an error is made on purpose, it signifies the intention to commit fraud (Huntington, 
1992). From the accounting point of view, Arens et al. (2007, p. 76) define fraud in 
general as ‗an intentional wrongful act with the purpose of deceiving or causing harm 
to another party‘. The Malaysian Approved Standards on Auditing (Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants, 2001, p. 193) AI No. 240 states that fraud is ‗an intentional 
act by one or more individuals among management, those charged with governance, 
employees, or third parties, involving the use of deception to obtain an unjust or 
illegal advantage‘. This definition is consistent with the US Auditing Standards SAS 
No. 54, AICPA 1988 (SAS No. 82), AICPA 1997, which defines fraudulent financial 
reporting as fraudulent acts that cause material misstatement. Going further, PwC 
(2005b) defines fraud individually according to the type of fraud committed. The 
three important types of fraud and their PwC (2005b, p. 28) definitions are as follows: 
i. Economic crime or fraud is defined as ‗wrongful or criminal activities to or in 
an organisation, intended to result in the gain of money or benefits for the 
perpetrator(s)‘. 
ii. Asset misappropriation (including embezzlement by employees) is defined as 
‗the theft of company assets (including monetary assets/cash or supplies and 
equipment) by company directors, others in fiduciary positions or an employee 
for their own benefit‘. 
iii. Financial misrepresentation is defined as ‗company accounts are altered or 
presented in such a way that they do not reflect the true value of financial 
activities of the company‘. 
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Fraudulent financial reporting can be classified into two major groups: misstatements 
arising from fraudulent financial reporting and misstatements arising from 
misappropriation of assets. Going further, KPMG (2006) breaks financial fraud down 
into the following categories: 
i. Fraudulent financial statement reporting: most fraudulent financial reporting 
schemes involve earnings management, arising from improper revenue 
recognition and overstatement of assets or understatement of liabilities. 
ii. Misappropriation of assets: this category involves external and internal 
schemes such as embezzlement, payroll fraud, external theft, procurement 
fraud, royalty fraud and counterfeiting. 
iii. Expenditures and liabilities (avoided or incurred) for improper purposes: this 
refers to commercial and public bribery, tax fraud, wages abuse, falsifying 
compliance data provided by regulators, and other improper payment schemes.  
iv. Fraudulently obtained revenue and assets: such as over-billing customers, 
deceptive sales practices, and accelerated or bogus revenue. 
v. Other misconduct: such as conflicts of interest, insider trading, discrimination, 
theft of competitor trade secrets, antitrust practices and environmental 
violations. 
There are many ways to commit financial fraud, but revenue recognition and 
misstatement are the most common (Beasley, Carcello & Hermanson, 1999). 
Kessler‘s (2001) survey indicates that fraud haunts companies and forensic 
accountants. Squires (2003) states that economic crime and fraud do not leave clear 
footprints, and therefore forensic accountants have to look beyond the figures to see 
the reality. Brief, Dukerich, Brown and Brett (1996) conducted a study on chief 
financial officers and the pressure to shift expenses between periods for income 
smoothing; they found that 87% of the respondents were willing to do so. 
There are three elements common to all fraudulent acts: perceived pressure, perceived 
opportunity and rationalization (Albrecht, Albrecht, Albrecht & Zimbelman, 2009). 
Perceived pressure is when one thinks there is a need to commit fraud. Perceived 
opportunity is the perception that there are chances or conditions to commit fraud 
without being detected. Rationalization is when one believes that the act of fraud is 
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justified and in line with their ethical beliefs. Some examples of perceived pressures 
that cause people to commit fraud are: financial needs, work frustration and a desire to 
beat the system. When there is an opportunity to commit fraud, combined with a 
control system that is weak or absent and the perception that the crime is ethically 
acceptable, fraud can easily be committed. 
 
The PwC (2007) survey indicates two types of fraud triggers: individual and corporate 
causes. Individual causes are the perpetrators‘ personal reasons, e.g. incentives and 
the ability to rationalise the crime. Corporate causes are organizational reasons that 
allow fraud to occur, e.g. the levels of control and the ethical culture of the 
organization. The results from the PwC survey list the following reasons for fraud: 
Individual causes: 
i. Financial incentives (greed) 
ii. Low temptation threshold 
iii. Lack of awareness of wrongdoing 
iv. Expensive lifestyle 
v. Denial of financial consequences 
vi. Career disappointment 
vii. Potential redundancy 
 
Corporate causes: 
i. Low commitment to brand 
ii. Insufficient control 
iii. Ability to use authority to override control 
iv. Staff anonymity is too high 
v. High company target 
vi. Unclear corporate ethics 
The consequences of corporate fraud are very damaging, going beyond monetary loss. 
PwC (2003, 2007b) indicates that the collateral costs of fraud includes business 
relationships, staff morale, share prices, brand image and reputation. These collateral 
costs are more damaging when the fraud is committed by the management. 
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Management fraud 
According to Zahra, Priem and Rasheed (2007), fraud constitutes deliberate actions by 
management at any level to deceive, con, swindle or cheat investors or stakeholders. 
While Bologna (1984) states that: 
Managerial fraud is the intentional overstatement of corporate or 
unit profits, inspired, perpetrated or induced by employees serving 
in management roles who seek to benefit from such frauds in terms 
of coveted promotions, job stability, larger bonuses or other 
economic incentives and status symbols. (p. 20) 
Some decisions made by managers do not take into consideration the future 
sustainability of the company; instead, decisions are based on perceived personal 
benefits. For example, during the increase of economy (good time), some managers 
decided to commit their companies to large debts to finance various projects. 
Undergoing many projects reflects the company‘s growth and increase in 
performance, which results in the company showing good performance and high 
return. Expecting the economy to remain healthy, the company increases borrowing as 
the forecasted future return is high. But when the economy starts to decline, the 
demand for projects or products will decline as well. Thus, the company will have 
difficulty paying back its debts due to the decrease in income or sales. 
Barnes (2004) states that senior managers and directors will do anything to make the 
company look like its performing well to avoid mergers or takeovers, as their 
livelihoods are at stake. The same conclusions were made by Jensen (1986), Franks 
and Mayer (1996). Williamson (1984) argues that managers‘ motivations principally 
include salary, security, prestige and power, which may be seen through expense 
accounts, luxurious offices, company cars, number of assistants, professional 
excellence and others. Studies conducted by McKenna (1990) and Brief et al. (1996) 
draw the same conclusion: managers are willing to smooth out income or 
misrepresent accounting information when under pressure. There are indeed many 
motivations for managers to fall off track and commit fraud. Hence, managers‘ acts 
need to be controlled and monitored. Two sets of control mechanisms are employed 
by companies: external control mechanisms (compulsory audits by an external 
auditor) and internal control mechanisms (corporate governance). 
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As Saksena (2003, p. 21) explains, ‗despite an increase in responsibility, access to 
inside information and applying audit procedures, audit firms have not been 
successful in detecting and reporting management fraud‘. The author gives four 
reasons for the failure to detect and report management fraud: 
i. Auditing standards: these increase the role of auditors in detecting and 
reporting management fraud; however, the standards state that if the audit has 
been performed according to generally accepted auditing standards, then the 
auditor has done their job (SAS 53, AICPA, 1988). 
ii. Deliberate action: management fraud is a deliberate action by the management 
to misrepresent or misstate financial information. As auditing involves testing 
a sample, the management may participate in well-concealed fraud that the 
auditor cannot detect (AICPA, 1988; Arens & Loebbecke, 1988; Bintliff, 
1993; Campbell & Parker, 1992; Hanson, 1977; Kapnick, 1977). 
iii. Litigation: the increase in litigation against auditors, large settlements by 
auditors and negative press against auditors as a result of management fraud 
(Palmrose, 1991, 1987) are evidence of auditing firms‘ inability to detect 
management fraud (Park, 1989; Welch, Reed & Strawser, 1995). 
iv. Training: auditors are neither trained nor are necessarily able to detect 
violations of the laws that govern corporate conduct (Cressey, 1987). 
External audits are one of the external control mechanisms that are compulsory for all 
public companies. The auditors‘ responsibility in detecting fraud increases in spite of 
their inability to do so. The users expect the auditors to be able to detect fraud; 
therefore, there is a gap between the expectations of users of financial statements and 
the auditing profession. One way to narrow this gap would be for auditors to improve 
their ability to detect and report management fraud (Saksena, 2003). In order to 
prevent acts of fraud, the regulatory and professional bodies have introduced many 
control mechanisms.  
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Control mechanisms and fraud 
The separation of ownership and management creates the agency problem. The 
expectation that managers will carry out their stewardship duties for the shareholders 
remains just that: an expectation. Therefore, to reduce the agency problem, 
shareholders and other stakeholders have to incur agency costs to control and monitor 
management activities and decisions. The collapses of big corporations such as Enron, 
Worldcom, Xerox, Parmalat and many others were linked to weaknesses in the 
companies‘ control systems, both internal and external. Enron‘s case provided clear 
proof that weaknesses can be present in companies‘ control systems and top 
management can easily override controls (Free, Macintosh & Stein, 2007). Sargent 
(2002, September 13) states that the four basic control mechanisms developed over 
the last century aimed at protecting investors and curbing managerial fraud are failing. 
These mechanisms are: corporate transparency, corporate monitoring, stock option 
compensation and SEC enforcement. These failures lead to increases in fraud. Cohen, 
Gaynor, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2007) state that weaknesses in internal controls 
indicate that companies‘ control systems are weak, which may lead to the 
management managing or manipulating earnings. They also note that a board that 
monitors effectively is more likely to emphasise the quality of the company‘s internal 
controls. This is consistent with the findings of Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright 
(2007), who showed that the auditor‘s control risk assessment is lower when the board 
is effectively monitoring the company‘s financial reporting process.  
Companies‘ internal control systems are important in managing business risk (Vinten, 
2001). Weaknesses in internal controls and the ability of management to override 
controls have been cited as providing opportunities for fraud (Riahi-Belkaoui & Picur, 
2000). The KPMG 2000 Fraud Survey (2001) highlights poor management and 
controls as contributing factors to fraud in Malaysia. The PwC Economic Crime 
Survey (2005b) also shows that weaknesses in control mechanisms contribute to 
fraud. An empirical analysis of corporate crime determinants in Malaysia by Voon, 
Voon and Puah (2008) found that internal controls are at the highest ranking of 
corporate crime determinants. Ernst and Young (2006) report that 70% of their senior 
manager respondents believed that fraud is more likely to occur in emerging markets 
as compared to developed markets, as internal controls are weak. Skousen and Twedt 
(2009) found that the risk of fraud varies among countries and industries. Corporate 
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governance is part of the control mechanism developed to monitor and control 
management and company activities. 
3.3 Corporate Governance 
The literature on corporate governance is ample, so it is not the aim of this chapter to 
cover it all. Instead, the focus will be on the literature on corporate governance and its 
relationship with fraud and weak internal controls. The next section will highlight the 
importance of the key corporate governance characteristics selected for this study. 
Also, the research gap will be discussed at the end of the section. 
The role of corporate governance is to monitor and control the management and 
business activities, which includes controlling and monitoring the financial affairs of 
companies. Beasley (1996) indicates that weak corporate governance structures result 
in weak internal controls, which contributes to mismanagement, fraud and unethical 
decision making by managers. Studies on the effectiveness of independent board 
members in reducing earnings management have shown mixed results. A higher 
number of independent board members help in reducing the incentive for earnings 
management, which means better control (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Borokhovich et al., 1996, 2002; Mulgrew & Forker, 2006). However, Bradbury, Mak 
and Tan (2006), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), and Hashim and Susela (2006) found a 
positive relationship between the number of independent board members and earnings 
management practices. 
Weak corporate governance in South East Asian companies was a significant 
contributing factor to the economic crisis of 1997 (Kim, 1998). Good corporate 
governance should direct the board and management to act in the company‘s and 
shareholders‘ interests and enhance effective monitoring. Unfortunately, there is no 
single model of good corporate governance (Chen, Kao, Tsao & Wu, 2007). However, 
there are a few basics of good corporate governance, as stated by Chen et al. (2007): 
…the basic principles of good corporate governance are to promote 
transparent and efficient markets, to protect and facilitate the exercise 
of shareholders‘ rights, to ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, and to ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters. (p. 251) 
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Corporate governance frameworks depend on the legal, regulatory and institutional 
environments that companies are in. A good corporate governance mechanism would 
minimize agency cost and reduce the company‘s market value loss resulting from 
potential conflict between the managers and the owners (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (2004) gives the 
corporate governance principles as: 
i. Corporate governance is one of the important factors for improving the 
efficiency and growth of the economy and increasing investor confidence. 
ii. It involves the relationship between a company‘s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
iii. It provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set 
and the means to achieve it and determine how performances are monitored. 
iv. It should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
the companies‘ objectives and shareholders‘ facilitation of effective 
monitoring. 
v. An effective corporate governance structure should give confidence that the 
market is functioning well. 
vi. Cost of capital will be lower and resources of the firms will be used 
efficiently, hence stimulating growth. 
This explanation clearly shows the importance of corporate governance in companies. 
The benefits that companies receive will ensure business growth and a more stable 
and secure market/economy. 
Corporate governance is a system that governs the best practices of individuals in a 
company, especially the management team, so that they carry out their duties in the 
best interests of all shareholders and stakeholders. In Oman‘s (2001) words: 
Corporate governance refers to the private and public institutions, including 
laws, regulations and accepted business practices, which together govern the 
relationship, in a market economy, between corporate managers and 
entrepreneurs (‗corporate insiders‘) on one hand, and those who invest 
resources in corporations, on the other. Investors can include suppliers of 
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equity finance (shareholders), suppliers of debt finance (creditors), suppliers of 
relatively firm-specific human capital (employees) and suppliers of other 
tangible and intangible assets that corporations may use to operate and grow. 
(p. 13) 
The High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (1999, p. 52) defines 
corporate governance as ‗the process and structure used to direct and manage the 
business and affairs of the companies towards enhancing business prosperity and 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long term shareholders value, 
whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders‘. Showing more brevity, 
Monks and Minow (2001) state that corporate governance is the ‗relationship among 
various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations‘. 
Therefore, corporate governance is a mechanism of control and guidance used to 
improve the management of companies for the benefit of all stakeholders. 
3.3.1 Past research on corporate governance 
The need for an effective corporate governance system in companies is undeniable. 
Much research has empirically shown the significant relationship between corporate 
governance and fraud. Beasley et al. (1999, 2000) and Beasley (1996) conducted 
studies of financial statement fraud within three industries (technology, health care 
and financial services). The studies found that corporate governance factors differ 
between fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent companies, with the corporate 
governance of the fraudulent companies being very weak. Cullinan and Suttom (2002) 
found that 70% of the fraud in companies involves CEOs and 20% involves senior 
managers. The study also included a claim by an external auditor that fraud is not easy 
to detect as it is often effectively covered up by senior management and the audit 
methods used are not designed to detect fraud. 
Bell and Carcello (2000) found that the significant risk factors of fraud are: a weak 
internal control environment; rapid company growth; inconsistent or inadequate 
probability; an undue management focus on meeting earnings projections; an overly 
evasive or lying management; private ownership status; and an interaction factor 
between weak controls and aggressive management attitude towards financial 
accounting. Beasley‘s (1996) study on fraud risk factors found that non-fraudulent 
firms have significantly higher percentages of outside members than fraudulent firms. 
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Outside members on the board could reduce the tendency of fraud activities to 
happen, as control and monitoring are more effective. Grove and Basilico (2008) 
studied fraudulent financial reporting detection and concluded that an all-powerful 
CEO, weak system of management control, senior management turnover, insider 
stock trading and questionable business strategies with opaque disclosure are 
significant red flags for fraudulent companies. Grove and Cook (2004) come to the 
same conclusion in their analysis of the financial statements of Enron, WorldCom, 
Qwest and Global Crossing. Some of the red flags are corporate culture, a lack of 
internal controls and problems with companies‘ auditors in terms of high consultation 
fees as compared to audit fees. Beasley et al. (2000) also find that a weak governance 
system is associated with fraud occurrences. The following sections discuss the 
corporate governance literature on board of director characteristics, board chairman 
characteristics, audit committee characteristics and activity, as well as the block 
holders‘ roles as part of the companies‘ governance. 
3.3.1.1 Boards of directors’ characteristics and activity 
The board of directors has been identified as one of the important ways to control 
managers‘ actions (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Many past studies have 
shown that the board is an essential component of the corporate governance structure 
(Mace, 1986; Monks & Minow, 2001). A board of directors‘ characteristics are 
divided into two parts: board characteristics in general and characteristics of the board 
chairman. This study analyses four board characteristics, which are: independence of 
board members, number of board members, number of board meeting per year and 
director‘s shareholdings.  
Studies on the effectiveness of independent board members in reducing earnings 
management have shown mixed results. A higher number of independent board 
members help in reducing the incentives for earnings management, which results in 
better control (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Borokhovich, Parrino & Trapani, 1996; 
2002; Mulgrew & Forker, 2006). Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found 
that a board with a higher percentage of independent directors will provide better 
decision control and monitoring of management activities. Beasley (1996) examined 
the relationship between board of director composition and financial statement fraud; 
in particular, he examined outside directors, independent directors and audit 
committees. Outside directors are defined in the study as directors who are not 
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employees of the company, while independent directors are ‗a director who has no 
affiliation with the firm other than the affiliation from being on the board of directors‘ 
(Beasley, 1996, p. 448). The study found that the difference between outside directors 
and independent directors did not affect the analysis and non-fraudulent companies 
have a significantly higher percentage of outside directors.  
Xie et al. (2003) found a significant negative relationship between the percentage of 
outside directors and earnings management activities, which means that the higher the 
percentage of outside directors the better the control over management‘s ability to 
manage earnings. Similarly, Petra (2005) found that outside and independent directors 
do strengthen corporate governance. Beasley (1996) and Saksena (2003) found that 
more independent directors on the board significantly reduces the likelihood of 
financial statement fraud. A higher percentage of independent directors will provide 
better control and monitoring of management activities and reduce the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. Carcello and Nagy (2004) found that non-fraudulent companies have 
a higher proportion of outside directors than fraudulent companies, and this is 
consistent with the findings of Beasley (1996). In examining the relationship between 
the credibility of financial reporting systems and the quality of corporate governance, 
Farber (2005) found that the fraudulent companies in the study showed weak 
governance as compared to control firms. In particular, fraudulent companies had a 
smaller number of outside board members and audit committee meetings, a small 
percentage of ‗Big 4‘ auditing firms, and a higher percentage of CEO duality. A study 
by Mohd Salleh and Othman (2016) on boards attributes as deterrence to corporate 
fraud in Malaysia found that the frequencies of board meeting can be used to monitor 
the company. The study indicates that more frequent the board meet the better control 
over the company activities. The study also found that size of board and duality is not 
significant in fraud deterrence.  
Abdullah, Yusof and Mohamd-Nor (2010) study on financial restatement and 
corporate governance in Malaysia indicate that board independent, audit committee 
independent, managerial ownership and and CEO duality did not have significant 
effect on the likelihood of financial misstatement. However, the study found that 
institutional ownership or shareholding do have significant effect on the likelihood of 
financial misstatement. The study found that the higher percentage of institutional 
ownership reduces the event of financial misstatement. Malaysian company is highly 
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concentrated as a majority of the company in Malaysia is family-owned company and 
having outsiders holding some ownership could increase control and monitoring of 
company‘s activities.  
In a study on the impact of board composition and ethnicity on audit quality in 
Malasyaia by Salleh, Steward and Manson (2016) found that board independent 
promote the appointment of higher quality of auditors which indicates better 
assurance of audit quality. The study conclude that higher percentage of independent 
directors on the board promote the appointment of quality auditors which resulted in 
higher audit fees. Having a higher quality of auditors, instil confident in shareholders 
regarding the quality of company‘s financial report. The study also found that 
ethnicity and duality of directors has no significant impact on audit quality. Another 
study by Wan Abdullah, Wan Ismail and Jamaluddin (2016) found a consistent result 
with Salleh et al. (2016) that independent of board directors promote higher audit 
quality. Wan Abdullah et al. (2016) also found that Institutional ownership promote 
the appointment of quality auditors. The study indicates that higher percentage of 
institutional ownership promote higher quality of audit. Consistent with Salled et al. 
(2016), the study found that duality is not significant in promoting higher audit 
quality.  
On the other hand, Li and Ang (2000) found that a greater number of outside directors 
does not affect the effectiveness of directors‘ performance in monitoring and 
controlling management activities. The findings here are similar to those of Bradbury, 
Mak and Tan (2006), and Mak and Kusnadi (2005). A study carried out in Malaysia 
and Singapore by Hashim and Susela (2006) found a positive relationship between the 
number of independent board members and earnings management practices; this 
raises a question as to whether the independence of board members is effective in 
monitoring management activities. A study conducted in China by Chen, Firth, Gao 
and Rui (2006) on the relationship between company ownership structure, corporate 
governance and fraud found that the proportion of outside directors is negatively 
related to fraud, which means that companies that have a higher proportion of outside 
directors are less likely to commit fraud. On the contrary, Hasnan et al. (2008) 
conclude that outside directorship or independent directors do not have a significant 
relationship with fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. This calls for the role of 
independent directors into question. Did the independent directors fail to carry out 
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their duties? And were they really independent, free from any relationship with the 
company? Could this governance characteristic be a weak characteristic in fraud 
deterrence in the Malaysian setting given the differences in law, culture, business and 
ownership structure? To answer these questions it is important to study this 
characteristic in the Malaysian context and gain understanding of the role of 
independent directors in fraud deterrence.  
For a board to effectively control and monitor managers, the number of board 
directors should be seven or eight (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). The 
smaller the number of directors on the board (fewer than 10) the more effective the 
board is at carrying out their function (Yermack, 1996). Chen et al. (2006) studied 
corporate fraud in China and found that board size is not significant in deterring fraud; 
this is consistent with Uzun, Szewczyk and Varma (2004), Carcello and Nagy (2004), 
Faber (2005), Bradbury et al. (2006), and Samili and Labelle (2009). However, 
Beasley (1996) found that a larger board increases the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud as it reduces the effectiveness of the controls. Xie et al. (2003), on the 
other hand, found that having a larger board is associated with less earnings 
management activities. Clearly the results for this characteristic are mixed. The 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance best practices do say that the number 
should be suitable according to the company‘s needs: not too small, not too big. 
According to the MCCG 2011 Blueprint between seven and nine members is 
effective, but this depends on the company‘s operation and size; the number can be 
more or less. Since there is no established perfect number for this characteristic, it is 
important to study it. This is especially true for Malaysia given the differences in how 
the country conducts business. 
The importance of frequent board meetings is highlighted in the Malaysia Code of 
Corporate Governance best practices. The Code suggests the board should meet 
regularly, at least four times per year. The more frequently the board meets the more 
effective it will be at monitoring and controlling management activities (Abbott, 
Parker & Peters, 2004; He, Labelle, Piot & Thornton, 2009; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). 
Having frequent meetings means that the directors will review the company‘s 
activities more often and will be kept updated on the company‘s performance. A study 
by Chen et al. (2006) in China found that more frequent board meetings reduced the 
likelihood of fraud occurring. This indicates that effective monitoring and controlling 
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of management activities will reduce the likelihood of fraud activities. In contrast, 
Jensen (1993), Uzun et al. (2004), and Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found 
that the frequency of board meetings does not necessarily lead to effective monitoring 
of management. These mixed results trigger the question: what about Malaysian 
companies? Does holding more meetings contribute to better monitoring and control 
or not? This study analyses this characteristic to shed more light on it and answer the 
aforementioned questions.  
Directors’ shareholdings refer to the percentage of shares owned by the board 
members in the company. When managers have a large interest in a company, most 
likely they will try to increase the value of the company, which results in a decrease in 
agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The managers will not put the company at 
risk of fraud, and therefore will reduce the likelihood of such criminal practices. On 
the other hand, Loebbecke, Eining and Willingham (1989) note that having a 
significant ownership in a company is a motivational factor for fraud. Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) investigated the relationship between insider trading and fraud and 
found that managers, i.e. insiders, will reduce their shareholding in the event of fraud.  
Kim, Al-Shammari, Kim and Lee (2009) carried out a study on the relationship 
between CEO duality and corporate diversification in the US. They found that a high 
concentration of board or directors‘ shareholding reduces the positive relationship of 
duality and corporate diversification. This indicates that with a higher percentage of 
directors‘ shareholding the role of duality can be controlled, whereby is reduces the 
likelihood of the company diversifying into unrelated business sections, which shows 
that the company is being monitored and controlled. 
It is important to examine this factor in the Malaysian environment due to the 
ownership composition seen in the country. Zhuang et al. (2001) indicate that family 
shareholders are the largest shareholders in Malaysian companies, as many of the 
companies started out family owned then went public. Most East Asian companies are 
controlled by family owners (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999), which 
means the managers come from the families that hold large shares in the companies. 
A recent study by Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009) found that the higher 
the percentage of managerial ownership in companies the lower the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting incidences.  
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 52 
Now that the four characteristics of the board of directors have been covered, 
attention will move to the board chairman‘s characteristics. 
Chairman’s characteristics 
A high concentration of family ownership (Zhuang et al., 2001) often sees the roles of 
CEO and chairman taken by family members. CEOs have been found to be quite 
influential in companies‘ decision-making processes (Dunn, 2004), which therefore 
has become the motivation for analysing chairman characteristics in relation to 
corporate fraud incidence. Thus, this section will explore the literature relating to the 
three chairman characteristics analysed in this study: chairman‘s duality, chairman‘s 
tenure and chairman‘s ethnicity. 
Duality occurs when a company‘s CEO is also the chairman of the board of directors 
(Che Haat, Abdul Rahman & Mahenthiran, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Past 
research has established that the effectiveness of monitoring management activities is 
reduced when a company‘s CEO is also its board chairman (Fizel & Louie, 1990; 
Lorsch & Maclver, 1989; Persons, 2005).  
Dunn (2004) investigated the relationship between top management team duality and 
the decision to release false financial information in the period 1992 to 1996. It was 
found that companies that have more insiders on the board are more likely to produce 
false financial information. This happens when the executive managers also sit on the 
company‘s board, including the CEO who, being the chairman, has control over the 
board‘s decisions. Instead of the board controlling the management, it is the reverse. 
This is consistent with Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney‘s (1996) discovery of a positive 
relationship between CEO duality and violations of the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). Also, a study carried out by Carcello and Nagy (2004) found that 
fraudulent companies are more likely to have the CEO as the board‘s chairman. 
Similarly, Chen et al. (2006) found that in China CEO duality is not a significant 
fraud deterrent. Saksena (2003) found that CEO duality is positively significant with 
management fraud; the existence of a dual role on the board increases the CEO‘s 
power over the board, increasing the likelihood of fraud. This is consistent with the 
study conducted by Bliss (2011) in Australia, which indicated that dual roles reduce 
the effectiveness of the board‘s independence in carrying out their responsibilities. 
Kim et al. (2009), in their study on the relationship between CEO duality and 
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corporate diversification in the US, found that there is a positive relationship between 
duality and unrelated corporate diversification. This indicates that the CEO‘s duality 
has a significant influence over the board, and as a result the CEO is able to pressure 
the board into agreeing to unrelated corporate diversification. The study also found 
that a higher concentration of board equity ownership and institutional ownership 
reduces this positive relationship, while CEO tenure and the board‘s independence 
increase the positive relationship between duality and unrelated corporate 
diversification. The findings of this study show that having a higher percentage of 
director shareholding and institutional shareholding increases the ability of the board 
to monitor and control the company‘s activities, especially in the presence of a dual 
CEO/chairman. 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found that duality is negatively related to company 
performance, and this supports the argument that if the CEO has too much power in 
decision making they may end up pursuing their own interests (Jensen, 1986). 
Blackburn (1994) argues that the board of directors should be able to discuss company 
matters independently, without the CEO as chairman, so they can effectively monitor 
the CEO‘s plans. Therefore, it is important for the CEO and board chairman roles to 
be separate. 
However, Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that CEO duality can benefit the 
company, as management‘s compensation is based on company performance and 
therefore the CEO could carry out the company‘s strategic plans to increase 
performance without much interference from the board (the CEO as chairman will 
have the power to defend the company‘s strategy and action). This finding is 
consistent with Dey, Engel and Liu‘s (2011) discovery that compensation pay for 
CEO‘s with a dual role is significantly higher compared to CEOs without a dual role. 
This study therefore tests the relationship of dual roles with the likelihood of 
corporate fraud occurrences to determine whether duality does or does not contribute 
to corporate fraud. 
Chairman’s tenure is defined as the number of years the chairman has held their post 
in the company. Daboub, Rasheed, Priem and Gray (1995) found that the longer the 
tenure, the less likely fraud is to be committed. Chen et al. (2006) found that the 
shorter the chairman‘s tenure, the higher the likelihood of fraud, which may be due to 
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a short tenure meaning less experience and knowledge of the company‘s business 
activities. Saksena (2003) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and management fraud and found that CEO tenure is not statistically significant, 
which means tenure does not have a significant relationship with management fraud. 
The study also found that the quality of audit firms is not significantly related to 
management fraud. 
Hill and Phan (1991) note that the longer the CEO is on the board the more influence 
they have over the board‘s decision-making process. Mace (1986), Patton and Baker 
(1987), and Vancil (1987) state that even though there is a nominating committee on 
the board, the CEO has the strongest influence over board selection; therefore, the 
CEO has the power to control the board. An established CEO, that is, a CEO who has 
been on the board for a long time, will be more effective in influencing the board as 
compared to a new CEO (Hermalin, 2005; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988;). A CEO 
with a dual role and a long tenure has been found to have more influence over the 
board (Kim et al., 2009). Thus, this study analyses the relationship between 
chairman‘s tenure and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Chairman’s ethnicity: Malaysia is a multicultural country, composed of many 
different ethnicities. Among those present are Malays, Chinese and Indians. Every 
ethnicity has its own unique cultural values and beliefs. Studies on culture have found 
that differences in cultural practices have influences over business practices, 
organizational structure, managerial style, accounting disclosure practices, auditing 
services and governance structures (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Hofstede, 1980; Yatim, Kent & Clarkson, 2006). As indicated by 
Hofstede (1980), culture determines institutional practices and how they are formed. 
He defines culture as ‗the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the 
members of one human group from another‘ (p. 25) and defines value as ‗a broad 
tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others‘ (p. 19). From these definitions 
culture can be described as a set of collective values or societal values (Gray, 1988). 
Sendut (1991) states that the study of race could be of import in a multicultural 
country like Malaysia as it is highly likely that each race would like to maintain their 
ethnic values. The common values that can be seen in a multicultural country do not 
necessary represent the culture of the whole country, especially if every race prefers 
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to maintain their own culture. Thus, chairman’s ethnicity has been selected as one of 
the corporate governance characteristics for this study. 
 
The notion that a powerful chairman has a strong influence over the board of 
directors‘ decisions has become the motivation for studying how power influences 
people in different cultures. Accounting involves both human and non-human 
resources; therefore, it is very much influenced by human behaviour and culture 
(Violet, 1983). Haniffa (2006) states that auditing practices may be influenced by two 
cultural aspects: ideology and socio-economic structure. Ideology refers to societal 
norms and values, including collectivism, fatalism, and attitudes towards time, 
professionalism, innovation, flexibility, religion, sentiment, ethical principles, 
worldview, ethos and everyday preferences. Socio-economic structure refers to factors 
such as the political and legal systems, the power of the profession, the tax system, 
and the education system (Haniffa, 2006). Chuah (1995, as cited in Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002) states that Malaysian managers are likely to be influenced by race, education 
and the type of organization they work for. Therefore, race was selected as a suitable 
proxy for culture in this study (consistent with Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  
 
In Malaysia, the different cultural characteristics of the Chinese and Malays have a 
significant influence over managerial style. Chinese have been found to be secretive 
in their disclosures, while Malays are transparent, which may be due to the influence 
of their religious beliefs (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Haniffa and Cooke‘s results are in 
contrast with Hofstede and Gray‘s hypothesis,6 which postulates that Malays are less 
transparent and more secretive. 
 
Countries‘ accounting systems differ due to differences in culture, legal system, 
providers of finance, taxation and other external influences (Nobes & Parker, 2008). 
Differences in culture also have an influence on fraud scandals. Coffee (2005) 
indicates that differences in ownership structure or system of governance do have an 
influence over fraudulent activities. A country like the US, with dispersed ownership 
systems of governance, is more vulnerable to earnings management than Europe, 
which has a more concentrated ownership system of governance. 
                                                 
6 Refer to Haniffa and Cooke (2002), cultural characteristics, Table 1, p. 325. 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 56 
Culture has also been found to have an influence over a company‘s level of 
disclosure. Haniffa and Cooke‘s (2002) analysis of culture and corporate governance 
disclosure in Malaysia indicates that there is a significant association between the 
proportion of Malay directors on boards with the extent of voluntary disclosure. The 
study used race and education as proxies for culture. A study on the influence of 
culture on governance and audit fees in Malaysia by Yatim et al. (2006) analysed the 
association of culture (using race as a proxy), finding that there is a strong negative 
relationship between the Bumiputera-owned companies and external audit fees. Lai 
(2007) conducted a study on leadership and ethnicity in Malaysian public companies 
and found that dual roles in Chinese-controlled companies did not have any 
significant impact on the companies‘ financial performance. The study indicates that 
Chinese practice a distinctive culture and way of conducting business, and the 
adoption of a leadership structure recommended by the MCCG (separating the 
chairman and CEO) did not improve the performance of Chinese-owned companies. 
These studies show that differences in culture do have an influence on accounting 
practices across all countries. Therefore, differences in chairman‘s cultural values and 
beliefs (using ethnicity as a proxy for culture) and their relationship with corporate 
fraud occurrences were chosen for analysis in this study. Could a chairman‘s cultural 
beliefs and way of doing business reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud?  
The above discussion shows that there is a relationship between chairman duality, 
tenure, ethnicity and corporate fraud incidences. Now the point of focus will shift to 
audit committee characteristics. 
3.3.1.2 Audit committee characteristics and activity 
Audit committees are set up as part of the corporate governance to control and 
monitor companies‘ financial reporting. They are one of the three board committees 
that are important in corporate governance (Conference Board, 1993). The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (section 301) indicates that independent audit committees are required to 
help avert management fraud and improve the integrity of financial reporting. The 
audit committee characteristics examined in this study are: the independence of the 
audit committee, the outside directorship of the audit committee and the number of 
audit committee meetings held each year. Beasley (1996), in his analysis of SEC 
sanctions for fraud, found that the existence of an audit committee was not 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 57 
significantly related to fraud occurrences. McMullen (1996) carried out the same 
study and made a similar conclusion to Beasley (1996). But these two studies only 
analysed the existence of an audit committee, not the characteristics or activity of the 
committee. Other studies that looked into audit committee characteristics and activity 
found significant relationships between audit committee characteristics and corporate 
fraud incidences (Abbott et al., 2004; He et al., 2009; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 
1992; Saksena, 2003; Uzun et al., 2004). 
Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) investigated the effects of audit committee 
characteristics, namely independence and number of audit committee meetings, on 
corporate fraud. The study found that there is a negative association between 
independent audit committee members, the number of meetings held and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. The authors found that companies that held audit 
committee meetings twice or more a year are less likely to be sanctioned. The more 
frequent the board meets, the more effective they are at monitoring, which will 
improve the company‘s governance (Abbott et al., 2004; He et al., 2009; Jensen, 
1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Uzun et al., 2004). Klein (2002) found a negative 
relationship between earnings management and the percentage of independent audit 
committee members, which is similar to the findings of Uzun et al. (2004). Owens-
Jackson et al. (2009) analysed the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and fraudulent financial reporting and found that independence and the 
number of audit committee meetings are negatively related to the likelihood of 
fraudulent financial reporting. The study also found that the likelihood of fraudulent 
reporting is positively related to companies‘ size and growth, in which the likelihood 
of fraud increases when companies grow bigger in size and growth increases. A study 
by Hence, this study analyses the relationship between the independence of audit 
committees, the frequency of audit committee meetings and the likelihood of 
corporate fraud occurring in Malaysia. 
Fama (1980) states that incentives for outside directors to carry out effective 
monitoring of managers‘ activities come from the market for outside directors. Being 
a director of good reputation company signals value to the external market, which 
then rewards directors with additional directorships. Ferris et al. (2003) analysed the 
monitoring performance of directors with multiple board appointments found that 
multiple directorship did not reduces the effectiveness of audit committee in 
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performing the monitoring responsibilities (consistent with Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Another study on multiple directorship and firm performance in India indicate that 
members with multiple directorships have positive effect on firm‘s value and they 
attend more meetings (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2009). Schnake and Williams (2010) 
indicate that holding a multiple directorship and serving on a larger board diminished 
the focus of the directors in their monitoring responsibilities as larger board is more 
difficult to coordinate. 
However, the monitoring of top management is time consuming and takes much effort 
(Bédard et al., 2004; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny, 1988); therefore, holding more 
directorships will not help an audit committee member carry out their duties 
effectively (Bédard et al., 2004). Persons (2005) studied fraudulent companies‘ 
relations with corporate governance and found that fraud is less likely when 
companies‘ audit committee members hold fewer outside directorships and all the 
members are independent. This is consistent with Beasley (1996), who found that the 
longer the tenure of the audit committee member, the lower the likelihood of fraud. 
Sharma and Iselin (2012) study on the association of audit committee directorship and 
tenure with the financial statement occurrences found that having multiple 
directorship increases the occurrences of financial misstatements. As their findings 
suggest that multiple directorship reduces the effectiveness in monitoring companies. 
This finding is consistent with the study by Tanyi and Smith (2015) that the busyness 
of audit committee member weakens the monitoring performance. Since holding 
many directorship demand more of the director‘s time and effort in monitoring and 
evaluating company‘s financial statement. As a result the directors might be too busy 
to allocate enough time and effort in carrying out their responsibilities.  
Thus, the literature indicates that there is a significant relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurring. However, 
these studies were carried out in different environments than Malaysia. In a different 
setting, the same consistent results may not be found. Hence, it is important to study 
this characteristic in Malaysia. The last corporate governance characteristic, 
institutional shareholdings (blockholders), is discussed next. 
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3.3.1.3 Institutional shareholdings (Blockholders) 
Independent blockholder stock ownership is defined as outside stockholders holding 
at least five per cent of a company‘s common shares (Beasley, 1996). Gilson (1990) 
and Burns (2003) found that large blockholders are able to monitor effectively and 
can have an influence over the company‘s corporate governance practices that will 
reduce the likelihood of fraud. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) found similar results, 
discovering that block ownership by institutional shareholders is more effective at 
keeping managers from pursuing their own interests than ownership by individual 
shareholders. Bange and De Bondt (1998) found that having a high institutional 
stockholding in a company reduces earnings management related to research and 
development costs. Crutchley et al. (1999) investigated agency problems in financial 
decision making by analysing the role of institutional ownership in leverage, 
dividends and insider ownership. They found that increases in institutional ownership 
reduce agency problems, which means better monitoring and control over 
management decisions. Bushee (2000, 2001) also found that when companies have 
high institutional stockholdings it increase firms‘ value in the long-term earnings. 
Kim et al. (2009) found that a higher concentration of institutional shareholdings in a 
company leads to better monitoring and control of the company‘s activities (unrelated 
corporate diversification), in particular regarding a dual CEO.  
A study carried out by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) on the relationship between 
corporate governance structure and performance of Malaysian listed companies found 
that the top five substantial shareholdings and board size are significantly related to 
company performance, both in market and accounting measures. The discussion 
above shows that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings and performance and control. Consistent with other 
studies, a study in Malaysia by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) gives the same results. The 
findings indicate that this characteristic could become the most important 
characteristic in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud in Malaysia. Thus, it is 
important to analyse this characteristic in relation to corporate fraud in Malaysia.  
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Discussion 
Past studies on most of the corporate governance characteristics discussed yielded 
mixed results. This shows that the different settings or nature of the samples are 
influencing the characteristics, and the purposes of the governance, leading to 
inconsistent results. The nature of a sample refers to its characteristics, e.g. the 
country or industry, while the purpose of the governance refers to the role of corporate 
governance with respect to performance, audit fees, managing earnings or corporate 
fraud. Much of the research on this topic was carried out in Western countries and 
other Asian countries. Studies in the field of corporate fraud in particular are still 
lacking in Malaysia. Given Malaysia‘s unique environment and background, studying 
these characteristics in this country is important as the results could highlight 
differences in corporate governance characteristics between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies. Such a study could reveal which corporate governance 
characteristics have a significant relationship with the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences in Malaysia. 
The chapter will continue with a discussion on earnings management. 
3.4 Earnings Management 
This section will introduce the motivating factors for earnings management. This will 
be followed by an overview of earnings management in Malaysia and a discussion of 
past studies in this area. 
3.4.1 Motivation for managing earnings 
The act of managing earnings is not without motivations, and these motivations can 
be broken down into three categories: capital market, regulatory and contractual 
motivation (Healy & Wahlen, 1999), together with Lev‘s (2003) categories. 
i. Capital market motivation 
Motivated by the need to attract investors and maintain supplier support, managers 
manage earnings to give the appearance of good company performance, which can 
influence the share price prior to an equity offering period or management buyout, 
and help meet financial analyst or management earnings expectations (Healy & 
Wahlen, 1999). A study by Wu (1997) on earnings manipulation in 87 management 
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buyout cases from 1980 to 1987 found that managers manipulated earnings 
(downwards) prior to the management buyout proposal. This is consistent with the 
findings of DeAngelo (1988). Another study on management buyout and earnings 
management by Perry and Williams (1994) analysed the unexpected accruals (setting 
changes in revenues and depreciable capital as control variables) and found that 
managers engaged in (income-decreasing) earnings management prior to management 
buyout.  
Past studies on managing earnings prior to equity offerings show that managers do 
manage earnings in order to attract investors. Teo, Welch and Wong (1998) examined 
the seasoned equity issuers for the period 1976 to 1989 and found that managers 
managed earnings upwards prior to the equity offerings. Deachow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996) investigated firms that were subjected to SEC enforcement actions 
for financial reporting violations and found that these companies did make seasoned 
equity offerings before being detected by the SEC. A more recent study by Lin, Liao 
and Liu (2008) on the effect of compensation structure and CEO compensation 
incentives found that equity-offering companies did manage earnings. Ahmad-Zaluki, 
Campbell and Goodacre (2009) examined earnings management for IPOs in 
Malaysian companies and found that earnings were managed during the economic 
crisis.  
Studies have also found that managers manage earnings to meet analyst expectations 
or management earnings forecasts. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) found that 
managers manage earnings to avoid reporting losses, while Burgstahler and Eames 
(1998, 2006) report that managers manage earnings upwards to beat analysts‘ 
earnings forecasts. Kasznik (1999) indicates that management use unexpected 
accruals when managing earnings upwards to meet management earnings forecasts.  
ii. Regulatory motivation 
Past studies have examined the relationship between earnings management and 
regulations (such as antitrust regulations), investigations, litigations issues, import 
relief investigations, political scrutiny, price regulation and taxation structure. Watts 
and Zimmerman (1978) indicate that firms have a tendency to manage earnings 
downwards when they are subject to antitrust regulations or political scrutiny. The 
same results were found by Cahan (1992), indicating that companies under antitrust 
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investigations report income-decreasing abnormal accruals. Jones (1991) examined 
companies‘ earnings during import relief investigations and found that companies that 
applied for import relief deferred their income in the year of application. The same 
result was found in Key‘s (1997) examination of companies in the cable television 
industry; companies did defer their earnings during periods of congressional scrutiny. 
Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo‘s (1995) analysis of earnings management in the 
banking industry, with a focus on taxes and regulatory capital, found evidence of 
managed earnings. Roubi and Richardson (1998), and Adhikari, Derashid and Zhang 
(2005), studied the relationship between earnings management and tax regulations. 
They found that companies did manage earnings in response to tax regulations or to 
influence tax policy. 
iii. Contractual motivation 
Guan, Koo and Teruya (2005) state that: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying 
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. For banks, 
earnings management may be of particular concern when it is engaged 
in to avoid technical default of debt covenants. (p. 2) 
Healey and Wahlen (1999) support the notion that accounting information is used to 
monitor and regulate contracts between companies and stakeholders, management 
compensation contracts, and lending contracts. Management compensation contracts 
become incentives for managers to carry out their stewardship duties. This is to avoid 
agency cost. Meanwhile, lending contracts control managers‘ actions, stopping them 
from overusing credit to benefit companies‘ stakeholders (to protect creditors‘ 
interests). These contracts motivate managers to manage earnings (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978).  
The early studies on earnings management and management compensation contracts 
date back to the 1980s, where it was found that in the US a change of CEO is due to 
poor company performance. Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watters and 
Wruck (1988), and Weisbach (1988) found that CEOs managed earnings when they 
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wanted to avoid losing their post. Healy‘s (1985) and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan‘s 
(1995) analyses on bonus caps in relation to managing earnings indicate that 
companies with caps on bonus awards are more likely to defer income when the cap is 
reached. Dechow and Sloan (1991) indicate that CEOs manage earnings by reducing 
research and development expenses in order to increase reported earnings during their 
final year in office. Even though Australia does not use formal compensation 
payments, Wells (2002) looked into Australian companies and found that companies 
did manage earnings due to compensations; this was to reflect on the companies‘ past 
performance. 
Another study conducted in Australia by Smith, Kestel and Robinson (2001) found 
that distressed companies show a significant tendency to increase reported income 
using changes in accounting policy. Christie and Zimmerman (1994) report that 
poorly performing companies use opportunistic income-increasing accounting 
techniques. While many researchers have concluded that financially distressed 
companies show a tendency to increase their reported income, De Angelo, De Angelo 
and Skinner (1994) note that financially distressed companies tend to decrease their 
reported income. As a result, most of these companies would not survive in the long 
run if the economy continued to fall. Studies conducted in the past have indicated a 
trend of selecting accounting techniques that could give the illusion of a higher 
income. Christie and Leftwich (1990) indicate that there is a consistent positive 
relationship between leverage and accounting method choice. This result is supported 
by Christie and Zimmerman (1994), whose study found that poor troubled companies 
frequently use income-increasing accounting methods to present better financial 
results.  
Debt contracts are important for creditors/lenders as they help them secure their 
interests by limiting companies‘ decision-making powers (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Sweeney (1994) examined companies that violated 
lending covenants and found that these companies managed earnings upwards, but the 
difference was that the first study found that companies managed earnings one year 
prior to the covenant violation, while the second study found that companies managed 
earnings after the violation. Studies on earnings management and debt renegotiation 
by Mohd Saleh and Ahmed (2005), focusing on distressed companies, found that 
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these companies did engage in earnings management (income-decreasing) during debt 
renegotiations with lenders. 
These motives for managing earnings have at times pushed companies‘ actions to the 
edge of legality. Once they go beyond the legal limit earnings are considered 
manipulated, and this is fraud. The next section discusses the issue of earnings 
management and fraud. 
3.4.2 Earnings management in Malaysia 
The practice of earnings management in Malaysian companies is somehow different 
to other countries due to the country‘s unique capital market, cultural accounting 
practices, economic environment and legal system (Claessens et al., 2000; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Leuz et al., 2003; Yatim et al., 2006). The culture and capital market 
structure have the most influence on the practice of earnings management among 
companies in Malaysia. Guan et al. (2005), Hashim and Susela (2006), Doupnik 
(2008), Geiger and Laan Smith (2010), and Han et al. (2010) conducted a cross-
country analysis of earnings management practices in Malaysia and other countries. 
The findings indicate that there are significant differences in the practice of earnings 
management between Malaysia and other countries as a result of cultural differences.  
Culture determines a country‘s legal system, accounting practices, economic 
environment, taxation system, and people‘s adherence to their duties and 
responsibilities. In studying cross-country differences in institutional influences on 
earnings management, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) focused on the relationship 
between a country‘s institutional framework for protecting outside investors and the 
level of firm engagement in earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) analysed this 
relationship based on investor protection measures and legal enforcement measures, 
which are both indexes developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998). The study reports a significant negative relationship between the two 
measures and earnings management, which means that countries with stronger 
enforcement and better investor protection frameworks reduce the incentive to 
manage earnings. Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) examined the influence of capital 
market incentives and institutional factors on earnings management in European 
countries and found that earnings management is common in countries that have a 
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weak legal system. Also, it is more common in privately held companies than in 
publicly held ones.  
Most of this research studied the relationship between earnings management and 
corporate governance, culture, and audit quality in Malaysia. One study in particular, 
that by Hasnan et al. (2008), explored the relationship between earnings management 
and fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. However, the study only checked 
whether companies managed earnings or not using the modified Jones model. The 
results indicate that companies did manage earnings. Another study in Malaysia, this 
time by Kamarudin, Wan Ismail and Wan Mustapha (2012), looked at the relationship 
between aggressive financial reporting and corporate fraud (using a sample of 92 
companies that violated the Malaysia Securities Commission and Bursa Malaysia 
rules and regulations on fraud). It found that firms that were involved in fraud 
employed aggressive financial reporting during the two years prior to the criminal act. 
The fraudulent companies sample included companies that violated a number of rules, 
including: submission of accounts rules, insider trading/market manipulation, reported 
profit/loss inconsistent with audit and other breaches. The high concentration of 
family ownership of companies, as well as ethnicity, had an influence over the 
earnings management practices in Malaysia; this means that findings from other 
countries might not be generalizable to Malaysia (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Zhuang, 
1999).  
Using Hofstede‘s (1980) and Gray‘s (1998) cultural dimension as a proxy for culture, 
and discretionary accruals as proxy for earnings management, a study by Guan et al. 
(2005) on five Asian-Pacific countries found that there were significant differences 
among the countries and their level of earnings management. One of the countries 
studied was Malaysia. This is perhaps the first study that empirically linked culture 
with earnings management. 
Doupnik (2008) indicates that there are two reasons for the differences in level of 
earnings management across countries: first is that the institutional factors influencing 
the level of earnings management differ between countries in terms of their strength; 
and second, there are differences in other factors that could influence the level of 
earnings management, such as economic incentives. Doupnik (2008) conducted a 
study on 31 countries to assess the relationship between culture and earnings 
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management. He used Hofstede‘s four cultural dimensions as the proxy for culture. 
The study found that there was a significant difference between culture and earnings 
management, especially earnings smoothing, among countries. The study also found 
that from Hofstede‘s four cultural dimensions, individualism and uncertainty 
avoidance were the most related to earnings management. 
Geiger and Laan Smith (2010) examined the effect of institutional and cultural factors 
on perceptions of earnings management across 13 countries (Malaysia included). The 
study analysed the perceptions of people with stakeholder-oriented institutional 
backgrounds and those with shareholder-oriented institutional backgrounds on the 
practice of earnings management (accounting earnings management and operating 
earnings management). The study found that stakeholder-oriented individuals are not 
as accepting of earnings management activities as shareholder-oriented individuals. 
The study also examined one of the Hofstede‘s cultural dimensions, secrecy, and 
found that people from secretive cultures are more accepting of both types of earnings 
management. Han et al. (2010) studied the relationship between culture, legal 
enforcement and managers‘ exercise of earnings discretion in 32 countries, including 
Malaysia. This study used Hofstede‘s four cultural dimensions as the proxy for culture 
and investor protection framework as the legal enforcement proxy. Consistent with 
previous studies, Han et al. (2010) found that individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
are related to earnings discretion. In countries with strong investor protection, 
individualism has a positive association with earnings discretion. Also, there is a 
negative association between uncertainty avoidance and discretionary accruals in 
countries with weak investor protection. 
Clearly, Malaysian businesses are not excluded from the problem of earnings 
management and manipulation. The relationship between earnings management and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud has triggered the need for a study on this topic in the 
Malaysian context. Differences in the cultural, legal and business environments do 
have an influence on earnings management; so Malaysia‘s unique cultural dimension 
has made it important to study earnings management in this country. The following 
section discusses the past research on earnings management. 
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3.4.3 Past research on earnings management 
This section explores the research that has been carried out on earnings management. 
The discussion first touches on the research on earnings management and fraud, then 
moves on to the link between earnings management and corporate governance. 
 
3.4.3.1 Earnings management and fraud 
Earnings are managed for opportunistic or informational reasons; therefore, Godfrey 
et al. (2010) state that research on detecting earnings management is undertaken from 
two perspectives: the opportunistic perspective and the informational perspective. 
Under the opportunistic perspective, earnings are managed as a result of fraud, 
meeting industrial regulations, during equity offerings, for debt covenants or for the 
purpose of meeting management compensation goals. While from the informational 
perspective, earnings are managed for signalling purposes or to present fair values of 
accounting numbers. Godfrey (2010) further states that despite the differences, 
management is said to have insider knowledge of companies‘ performance and 
therefore is able to choose whether to report accounting numbers towards the 
fundamental value (informational perspective) or away from the fundamental value 
(opportunistic perspective). The opportunistic perspective has the management choose 
to divert away from providing true earnings information, while the informational 
perspective has managers provide true information to the users. Godfrey et al. (2010, 
p. 430) state that fraud (under the opportunistic perspective) ‗is the most extreme 
variant of earnings management used by managers to deceive financial statements 
users‘. 
Godfrey et al. (2010) demonstrated six ways to detect earnings quality and the 
probability of accounting management. They are: 
i. Share price reaction: this can be used as an indicator of quality. However, 
Sloan (1996) notes that the market does not fully understand accruals and 
tends to overreact to positive income, increasing accruals.  
ii. Financial analysts’ reactions: these can be used, but it is suggested that there 
may be bias. 
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iii. Auditors: reports and opinions from auditors can be used; however, there is an 
issue regarding auditor independence.  
iv. Board of directors: the strength of corporate governance can be used as an 
indicator and is considered as quality information. 
v. Discretionary accruals: information on the types of accrual being managed is 
important as it depends on the management‘s purposes in managing earnings 
(i.e. for new equity offerings, taxation and management buyout). 
vi. Insider trading reaction: future earnings and returns can be predicted more 
accurately by analysing whether insider trading increases or decreases 
accruals, as insiders have specialised knowledge of the firm. 
A discussion of earnings management cannot proceed without first understanding 
what earnings are, their importance and how they are managed. The importance of 
earnings explains the motivation for companies to manage earnings to a point that 
reaches the level of fraud. 
There have been quite a number of definitions for earnings management. Ronen and 
Yaari (2008) classify the various definitions into three categories: white, gray and 
black. A summary of these categories is as follows (Ronen & Yaari, 2008, p. 25): 
White – Earnings management takes advantage of flexibility in the choice of 
accounting treatment to signal the manager‘s private information on future 
cash flow. 
Gray – Earnings management is choosing an accounting treatment that is either 
opportunistic (maximizing the utility of management only) or economically 
efficient. 
Black – Earnings management is the practice of using tricks to misrepresent or reduce 
the transparency of financial reports. 
The white category is for definitions of beneficial earnings management that could 
improve transparency in financial reporting. Stolowy and Breton (2003) indicate that 
earnings management in not an act of fraud; it is within the limits of GAAP (while 
fraud is beyond the limits of GAAP) and is another form of accounts manipulation. 
They define accounts manipulation as ‗the use of management‘s discretion to make 
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accounting choices or to design transactions so as to affect the possibilities of wealth 
transfer between the company and society fund providers or managers‘ (p. 20). 
Another definition of earnings management that falls in this category is earnings 
management as a deliberate action taken in order to achieve a level of reported 
earnings that is within the GAAP limits or boundaries (Koumanakos, Siriopoulos & 
Georgopoulos, 2005). According to Jones (2011), earnings management uses the 
flexibility within accounting to meet desired objectives (profit forecasts).  
Earnings management is a subjective matter when it comes to the interpretation of 
earnings figures; therefore, this is not an act of fraud (Diana & Madalina, 2007) as it 
does not benefit the management nor decrease the firm‘s value (Jiraporn, Miller, 
Yoon & Kim, 2008). Earnings management is also seen as an ethical/legal practice 
that can increase the informative value of financial statements (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1986; Holthausen, 1990; Peasnell et al., 2001; Glover & Sunder, 2003). This is 
consistent with Ronen and Yaari‘s (2008) gray category, which considers earnings 
management to be manipulation of financial reports within the allowable limits of the 
applicable standards. This can either be opportunistic or enhance efficiency. A study 
by Hunton, Libby and Mazza (2004) on transparency in reporting and its relationship 
with earnings management detection found that a more transparent reporting format 
reduces earnings management practices. This is because the more transparent format 
will subject the report to more user scrutiny. As a result this could damage the 
company‘s share price and the credibility of the financial reports, therefore reducing 
earnings management practices. 
Nevertheless, without violating accounting standards, earnings management can still 
give inaccurate financial information that could mislead users (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 
2006; Jones, 2011). The black category refers to the definition of illegal 
misrepresentation and fraud; for example, Schipper (1989, p. 92) defines earnings 
management as ‗a purposeful intervention in the financial reporting process with the 
interest of obtaining some private gain‘. Also in the black category, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) give the following definition: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial 
reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either 
mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
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company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers. (p. 368) 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) offer another definition of earnings management that consists 
of three parts: measures earnings against short-term truth, attaches subjective value to 
earnings management and describes how earnings management is achieved.  
Consistent with this study‘s main theme of corporate fraud, the definition by Healy 
and Wahlen (1999) is the most appropriate for use in analysing earnings management, 
where earnings are managed beyond GAAP limits and the activity is fraudulent. 
Corporate earnings have always been one of the important indicators of company 
performance. Lev (2003) states that corporate earnings are important for the following 
reasons: 
i. They are part of investors‘ valuation models, which have an impact on share 
prices and managers‘ compensation. 
ii. They are a measurement of managers‘ performance and quality by companies‘ 
boards and institutional investors. 
Ronen and Yaari (2008) state that earnings are important due to the importance of 
accounting information. The importance of earnings opened a pathway to earnings 
management, which became a strong incentive to manipulate earnings (Lev, 2003). 
Lev states that such earnings manipulation can be classified into three overlapping 
categories: personal gain, continuation of investors‘/suppliers‘ support and satisfying 
contractual arrangements, which are consistent with Healey and Wahlen‘s (1999) 
classification in their review of earnings management motivation. However, the 
difficulties in differentiating legitimate earnings management from illegitimate 
earnings management remain a problem to be solved. 
Earnings management that is done within the GAAP is legal. Earnings 
manipulation/fraud happens when the management‘s interventions to achieve the 
desired earnings violate GAAP (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). Since the difference between 
earnings management and earnings manipulation/fraud lies in the level of materiality 
(material misstatement), it is important to establish the material level that could 
differentiate between legitimacy and outright fraud (Schipper, 1989). Unfortunately, it 
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is hard to differentiate between legitimate earnings management and illegitimate 
earnings manipulation, as indicated by Wells (2001): 
Fraud by its nature is easy to conceal and difficult to detect; an entity that 
manipulates its earnings only once might avoid discovery altogether. But 
manipulating financial statements is usually a continuous process that 
grows and deepens. (p. 83) 
Rosner (2003) studied earnings management in failing firms and argues that earnings 
management can be distinguished from earnings manipulation/fraud by the earnings 
manipulation proxy variables‘ magnitude. She states that lower or immaterial 
magnitudes can be considered as earnings management, while higher magnitudes are 
more likely material earnings manipulation. The benchmarks of materiality used in 
her study to differentiate earnings management from earnings manipulation are: 
i. FASB SFAC No. 2 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1980), Appendix 
C: Quantitative Materiality Considerations suggest benchmarks such as 5% of 
assets, 10% of individual accounts and 5-10% of net income. SEC SAB No. 
99 suggests that a 5% threshold is commonly used as a rule of thumb. If 
earnings are managed more than the suggested benchmark, it could indicate 
earnings manipulation. 
ii. Thomas and Zhang (2000) hypothesize that the benchmark for mean total 
accruals of firms with no incentives to manage earnings is -5% of beginning-
of-year assets and current accruals of 0. If firms have a mean of total accruals 
and current accruals more than the suggested benchmark, it could indicate 
earnings manipulation.  
The literature on earnings management indicates that earnings are managed in many 
ways. Ronen and Yaari (2008) give the following methods:7 
i. Choice of methods accepted under GAAP. 
ii. Timing of new standard adoption. 
iii. Choices of accounting estimates allowed under GAAP. 
iv. Classification of items either above or below the line of operating earnings in 
the financial statement. 
                                                 
7 Which have been noted by many researchers; refer to Ronen and Yaari (2008, p. 31). 
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v. Related operating, investment and financing decisions. 
vi. Structuring transactions in order to meet the target results (income). 
vii. Timing of income and expenses recognition. 
viii. Managing financial statement transparency and informativeness of earnings. 
The PwC economic crime surveys and KPMG fraud surveys from 2000 to 2009 
highlight revenue recognition and asset misappropriation as being among the frequent 
fraudulent acts committed (KPMG, 2002, 2004, 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2003, 
2007b, 2009). This emphasises the importance of studying earnings and their 
relationship with corporate fraud. 
For the purposes of this study, the approach used involved analysis of earnings 
management indices and ratios (whether they be income increasing or decreasing, as 
well as total accrual).  
Earnings management is one of the methods used in fraudulent financial reporting by 
managers in order to meet Wall Street‘s earnings forecasts (Grant, De Pree & Grant, 
2000). Earnings management has been related to fraudulent financial reporting in 
which fraudulent acts may be committed through various accounting choices. 
Dhaliwal, Salamon and Smith (1982) state that management can either increase or 
decrease the various accounting numbers by selecting different accounting valuation 
methods. Persons (1995) examined the financial data of companies listed under the 
SEC enforcement release and its ability to identify factors associated with fraudulent 
financial reporting. It was found that financial leverage, capital turnover, asset 
composition and firm size are significantly associated with fraudulent financial 
reporting. Chow and Rice (1982) found that as companies‘ leverage increases so does 
the transfer of wealth from debt holders to managers, which may increase the 
tendency of managers to manipulate financial statements in order to meet the debt 
covenant.  
Apart from leverage/debt covenant, sales, accounts receivable, allowance for doubtful 
debt and inventory were also found to be manipulated by management due to their 
subjective nature of judgement and difficulty to audit (Feroz, Park & Pastena, 1991; 
Green, 1991; Loebbecke et al., 1989; Persons, 1995; Schilit, 1993; Wright & Ashton, 
1989). Summers and Sweeney (1998) studied fraudulent financial reporting and found 
that companies manipulated the figures of uncollected accounts and obsolete 
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inventory due to the subjective nature of the judgement in the method used. The study 
also found that insiders reduced their shareholdings when fraud was present.  
Beneish (1999b) carried out an investigation on the incentives and penalties related to 
earnings overstatement in companies under SEC accounting enforcement action. He 
determined that managers overstated earnings to exercise their stock options. Beneish 
(1999a) examined companies that were charged with earnings manipulation under 
SEC accounting enforcement release over the period 1982 to 1992. He analysed 
financial data in the form of financial indexes or ratios. The results show that out of 
eight indexes studied, five were found to be significantly related to manipulators‘ 
companies; that is, the study found that 50% of the manipulators‘ companies did 
manage earnings. Lee, Ingram and Howard (1999) analysed the differences between 
earnings and operating cash flow in fraudulent companies. They found that there is a 
high level of earnings over operating cash flow in fraud cases. Dechow, Sloan and 
Sweeney (1996) studied companies subjected to SEC enforcement action for 
violations of GAAP and found that the companies managed earnings to attract 
external financing.  
Rosner (2003) examined earnings management variables in distressed companies and 
non-distressed companies found that companies that are on the verge of bankruptcy 
appeared to show signs of material income-increasing earnings manipulation as 
compared to the control group (non-distressed companies). The study found that there 
is a significant increase in receivables, inventory, property, plant and equipment, 
sales, networking, and current and discretionary accruals for companies approaching 
bankruptcy. 
A study carried out by Hasnan et al. (2008) on the relationship of earnings 
management and fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia indicates that there is a 
significant positive relationship between earnings management and fraudulent 
financial reporting. Kamarudin, Wan Ismail and Wan Mustapha‘s (2012) study on the 
relationship between aggressive financial reporting and corporate fraud (using a 
sample of 92 companies that violated the Malaysia Securities Commission and Bursa 
Malaysia rules and regulations) indicates that firms involved in fraud employed 
aggressive financial reporting during the two years prior to the occurrence of fraud.  
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A study conducted in the US by Perols and Lougee (2010) indicates that companies 
that previously engaged in earnings management are highly likely to commit fraud. 
By analysing 54 fraudulent and 54 non-fraudulent companies, the authors found that 
fraudulent companies did manage earnings prior to the year of fraud by meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts and inflating their revenue. The above review shows that 
there is some relationship between earnings management and corporate fraud 
incidences. The chapter will now continue with a discussion of earnings management 
and corporate governance. 
3.4.3.2 Earnings management and corporate governance 
The role of corporate governance is to monitor and control companies‘ activities and 
management‘s decision making. Incidences of earnings management are strongly 
related to companies‘ corporate governance structures. Weaknesses in companies‘ 
corporate governance result in weaknesses in companies‘ internal controls (Beasley et 
al., 1999). Weak internal control and a poor corporate governance structure mean that 
the control and monitoring systems are weak as well, which may result in a failure to 
control managers‘ decisions, including the level of earnings management.  
Dechow et al. (1996) examined companies that manipulated earnings and found that 
such companies are more likely to have: a management-dominated board of directors, 
CEO as chairman of the board and CEO as company founder. They are less likely to 
have: an audit committee and an outside blockholder. Xie et al. (2003) looked at the 
role of the board of directors and audit committee in obviating earnings management. 
They report that the more frequent the board and audit committee meet, and the more 
knowledgeable the members are, the lower the level of discretionary accruals. A study 
carried out in Canada by Park and Shin (2004) on the effect of board composition on 
earnings management shows that outside directors and the tenure of outside directors 
do not reduce abnormal accruals, but having a director with a financial or accounting 
background, as well as institutional blockholders, does reduce abnormal accruals. The 
study also found that companies have the tendency to manage earnings upward in 
order to avoid reporting earnings losses or declines.  
A study conducted in the UK by Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) on the relationship 
between board monitoring (the roles of outside directors and audit committees) and 
earnings management found that the proportion of independent directors on the board 
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is negatively related to the likelihood of managers managing earnings upwards in an 
attempt to avoid reporting losses. It was also found that having an audit committee did 
not affect the degree of income increasing or decreasing manipulation by the 
managers. A study in Australia by Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) 
examined Australian firms‘ corporate governance mechanisms for curbing earnings 
management (measured by the level of discretionary accruals), in particular the roles 
of the board and audit committee, internal audit functions, and the choice of external 
auditor. The study determined that a higher proportion of non-executive directors in 
both board and audit committee is significantly associated with reducing the 
likelihood of earnings management. The existence of internal audit functions and the 
choice of external auditor were found to be insignificant in reducing the level of 
companies‘ discretionary accruals. Jin Kim and Suk Yoon (2016) study on the impact 
of corporate governance on earnings management in Korea found that independent 
directors, ownership structure, foreign ownership, leverage ratios and firm size 
significantly affect the discretionary accruals and total accruals (decrease the level or 
earnings management) of companies studied. The study indicates that corporate 
governance and earnings management are significantly related.  
Weber (2006) examined the sensitivity of executive wealth to the fluctuations of stock 
price and this factor‘s possibility as an incentive for earnings management, as well as 
its association with corporate governance. The study found that there is a positive 
association between CEO wealth sensitivity and measures of abnormal accruals. The 
study also discovered that there is no significant association between corporate 
governance and CEO stock-based wealth sensitivity and income smoothing. Bradbury 
et al. (2006) analysed the relationship between board characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics and abnormal accruals. The study determined that the size of the board 
and audit committee independence is associated with lower abnormal working capital 
accruals. Audit committees are also effective at reducing the income-increasing 
abnormal accruals‘ level. The study indicates that audit committees are effective when 
all the members are independent. This result is consistent with Klein‘s (2002). 
Ebrahim (2007) examined the relationship between earnings management behaviour 
and board and audit committee activity and found earnings management to be 
negatively related to both.  
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A study in Malaysia on the relationship between audit committee characteristics and 
earnings management reported that companies that have a fully independent and 
knowledgeable audit committee and more frequent audit committee meetings show 
less earnings management (Mohd Saleh, Mohd Iskandar & Rahmat, 2007). A study by 
Hasnan et al. (2008) investigated management predisposition, motives, opportunity 
and earnings management for fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia, where one of 
the proxies used for opportunity was a poor corporate governance structure. The study 
found that poor corporate governance structures are significantly related to fraudulent 
financial reporting. Also, the insignificant role of an independent board of directors in 
reducing earnings management is consistent with the findings of Hashim and Susela 
(2006), and Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2008). 
Grove and Basilico (2008) examined the detection of fraudulent financial reporting 
using financial ratios and corporate governance characteristics. They studied earnings 
manipulators and non-earnings manipulators for a year prior to the public being 
informed of the fraud. The study found that three indices, namely gross margin index, 
sales growth index and account receivables index, were higher in the earnings 
manipulating companies, which could be used to indicate fraudulent financial 
reporting. The study also found that fraudulent companies have powerful CEOs, weak 
systems of management control, higher turnover of senior managers, insider stock 
trading and questionable business strategies. Wang, Chuang and Lee (2010) examined 
the effect of board of director characteristics and composition, and earnings 
management on fraud in Taiwanese listed companies and found that earnings 
management did not have an influence on fraud. This may be due to the ownership 
structure of Taiwanese companies, many of which are family owned and very seldom 
have separate ownership and management.  
Study carried out by Kasipillai and Mahenthiran (2013) on the practice of deferred in 
managing income and the role of governance in Malaysia found that Malaysian 
companies used the component in deferred tax to manage income in order to avoid 
declining in income. The study also found that the practice is more common in highly 
concentrated ownership‘s companies with less independent director and small board 
size. 
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3.5 Summary 
The results of all the studies discussed in this chapter indicate some relationship 
between earnings management, corporate governance and fraud. Few researchers have 
studied the relationship between earnings management and corporate fraud in the 
Malaysian context, which is what motivated this study. Due to its differences in 
culture, law and business environment, it is important to research this topic in 
Malaysia. The results of past research did show inconsistencies in the relationship, 
which could suggest that setting has some effect on earnings management. The review 
of past research helped in formulating research questions three and four of this study. 
Now that the related studies have been explored, the next chapter will move on to the 
framework and hypotheses development for this study. 
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    Chapter 4 
Research Framework and Development of 
Hypotheses 
This chapter describes the research framework for the study and how the hypotheses 
were developed. The research framework becomes the foundation for the study, 
whereby it logically develops, describes and elaborates the associations among the 
variables that are relevant to the study topic. The chapter will start with the problem 
statement and the selection of variables: corporate governance characteristics and 
earnings management variables. This is followed by an explanation of the 
development of the hypotheses. 
4.1 Research Framework 
Corporate fraud can be committed in many ways, including asset misappropriation, 
and accounting and auditing fraud. The results of the PwC (2007b, 2009) crime 
survey show that for the types of fraud committed, asset misappropriation is more 
common than accounting and auditing fraud. However, the losses are higher for 
accounting and auditing fraud as compared to asset misappropriation. This shows that 
accounting and auditing fraud have more serious consequences especially, to capital 
market participants. Accounting and auditing fraud relate to companies‘ financial 
reports, so they are also known as fraudulent financial reporting. This type of fraud is 
a major concern to capital market participants as they use financial reports as 
important sources of information.  
Arens (2007, pp. 342-343) defines fraudulent financial reporting as ‗an intentional 
misstatement or omission of amounts or disclosures with the intent to deceive users‘, 
while misappropriation of assets is ‗fraud that involves theft of an entity asset‘. The 
severity of damages and losses due to accounting and auditing fraud became the 
motivation for this study. The goal is to analyse the ability of financial reports to 
indicate if a company is at risk of fraud. 
Rezaee (2005) stated that investors are able to make good decisions because of the 
reliability, transparency and uniformity of financial reporting. Financial statements are 
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one of the important sources of information used in decision making, planning and 
control of economic resources (Harvey, Atrill, McLaney & Jenner, 2003). For 
external users, financial reports, which are presented in annual reports, are the only 
publicized source of information they can depend on in making decisions, planning 
and controlling their economic resources for investment purposes. Rezaee (2005, p. 
278) further states that ‗published audited financial statements that reflect a true and 
honest financial performance instead of a rosy picture and inflated and fraudulent 
earnings are useful to market participants, including investors and creditors‘. 
Consequently, it is crucial for the financial information provided in annual reports to 
be reliable and relevant. 
However, recent times have seen companies that appeared to be financially sound 
going bankrupt because of fraudulent activities. This has increased market 
participants‘ expectations for corporate governance to be more vigilant and active in 
ensuring the integrity, transparency and quality of financial information (Rezaee, 
2005). The calculation of income under the generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) is said to be an ‗imperfect measure of economic income or fundamental 
value‘ (Godfrey, Hodgson, Tarca, Hamilton & Holmes, 2010 p. 45). Godfrey et al. 
(2010) states that imperfect measures are due to the inconsistency and imprecise 
definition of accounting standards among countries, where there are differences in the 
interpretations of estimates by accountants. This in turn is due to the nature of 
subjectivity and cultural differences. The differences in the institutional setting (e.g. 
socio-economic, legislation and culture) may have influence over the governance 
system (Ahrens, Filatotchev and Thomsen, 2011; Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel and 
Jackson, 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Institutional theory… 
In determining the data and variables to be used in this study, the past literature and 
recent issues relating to corporate fraud or fraudulent financial statements were 
analysed. Weak internal control has been found to be the reason for corporate fraud 
and failure (Beasley, 1999), and therefore this was the starting point in determining 
the variables. Since it is not easy for external users to obtain information on 
companies‘ internal control systems or structures, this study looks into what 
contributes to the weaknesses in companies‘ internal control: the corporate 
governance structure. Weaknesses in corporate governance structures have been 
linked to weaknesses in companies‘ internal control systems, which make room for 
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fraudulent reporting and earnings manipulation. Theoretically, weak governance 
structures result in weak control and monitoring of company activities, which could 
contribute to more earnings manipulation or management and as a result raise the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. Weak governance will increase agency problem as well 
as agency cost where more costly effort have to be constructed to control and monitor 
managers and companies activities. Agency theory assumed that the goal of agent 
(managers) and principal (owners) is not the same (Hill and Jones, 1992). This means 
that agent will not always act in the best interest of the principle (Ross, 1973; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). As a result, the manager might not work towards the goal of 
profit maximization (shareholders‘ wealth) but towards their own self-interest 
therefore destroy the relationship between the managers and shareholders.  The 
development of corporate governance is based on this basic problem. The corporate 
governance imposed control on the company‘s activities which control the managers 
as well as the role of monitoring. This control and monitoring effort is there to reduce 
the effect of agency problem or conflict. 
Claessens (2006) state that there is other factors that have influence on corporate 
governance framework such as historical and cultural background and institutional 
arrangement. These other factors is referred as institutional setting, is the base of 
institutional theory. Agency theory did not cover these other factors. Discussion on 
institutional theory is very wide and dated back to the late 19th century. Scott (2008, p. 
48) states that institution; 
 Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience.  
 Institutions are composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative 
elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide 
stability and meaning to social life.  
 Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic 
systems, relational systems, routines, and artefacts. 
 Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localised interpersonal relationships.  
 Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, 
both incremental and discontinuous. 
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Hence, institutional theory is an in depth theory of social structure by which the 
structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, is established as 
authoritative guidelines for social behaviour. Both rules (base on agency theory) and 
institutional setting (institutional theory) is important in the development of corporate 
governance framework. Thus, the agency theory and institutional theory become the 
underpinning theory for this study where the effectiveness of corporate governance is 
affected by the setting studied (institutional setting). Hence, corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings management indices/ratios were selected as the variables 
for this study. 
The research framework for the data analysis in this study was developed based on the 
research questions (see chapter one, section 1.3). First, this study analyses the 
corporate governance characteristics and earnings management indices/ratios for both 
groups of companies (non-fraudulent and fraudulent). In analysing and establishing 
the variables, 11 corporate governance characteristics and 9 earnings management 
indices/ratios were studied. The variables of corporate governance were established 
by reviewing the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2001) and past literature. 
Figure 4-1 shows the overall research framework for this study. 
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Figure 4-1: Overall Research Framework 
 
This study aims to examine the usefulness of corporate-published information in 
indicating if a company is at risk of fraud. This will be done by first analysing the 
differences in corporate governance characteristics and earning management indices 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies, thus answering questions one and 
three. The hypotheses relating to corporate governance characteristics and earnings 
management variables will be tested to determine the differences between fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies (testing hypothesis (a)). This is depicted in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2: Framework for Testing Differences Hypothesis (Ha) 
 
To answer questions two and four, a logistic regression model will be used to 
determine the relationship between the variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences (testing of hypothesis (b)). This is depicted in Figure 4-3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: Framework for Testing Relationship Hypothesis (Hb) 
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The following section continues with the explanation of how the hypotheses were 
developed for this study. 
4.2 Hypotheses Development 
After the relevant and important variables have been identified and the logical 
relationships among the variables established, the next step is to test the relationships 
that have been developed. The results of the tests will provide reliable information on 
the kinds of relationships that exist among the variables, which could suggest what 
could be done to solve or reduce the problem under investigation. This process is 
known as hypotheses development. Sekaran (2005, p.85) defines a hypothesis as ‗a 
logical conjectured relationship between two or more variables expressed in the form 
of a testable statement‘. Basically, there are two formats for hypotheses: directional 
and non-directional hypotheses, and null and alternate hypotheses.  
Directional hypotheses state the direction of the relationship between the variables, 
while non-directional hypotheses do indicate a relationship or difference, but do not 
offer any indication of the direction of the relationships or differences. A null 
hypothesis proposes a definitive, exact relationship between two variables, which is 
general and expressed as no (significant) relationship/difference between two groups. 
On the other hand, an alternate hypothesis indicates relationships/differences between 
two variables (Sekaran, 2005). Since the true situation in the population is not known, 
inferences are drawn based on the findings in the sample studied; therefore, the null 
hypothesis is formulated so it can be tested for rejection to allow for the alternate 
hypothesis to be supported, indicating a relationship/difference between the variables 
(Sekaran, 2005). Therefore, this study uses null hypotheses for testing the differences 
in the variables between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies, as well as for 
testing the relationship between the variables studied and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. 
4.2.1 Corporate governance characteristics and hypotheses 
According to agency theory, conflict between the agent and principle is unavoidable. 
Managers are expected to carry out their duty to protect the interest of shareholders as 
well as other minority stakeholders in the company. The difference interest of 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders increases the need for effective 
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corporate governance to control and monitor company‘s activities. Board composition 
and size are the most important internal control mechanism against agency problem 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Singh and Davidson, 2003). In the scope of institutional 
theory, Malaysian unique background does have significant impact on company‘s 
corporate governance structure (Claessens, 2006). This relates to among others the 
size of board, ethnicity of directors, institutional and managerial shareholdings. The 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance best practices highlight three main areas of 
governance: the board of directors, accountability and auditing, and shareholders. 
These three areas were set as guidelines to assist companies in developing their 
corporate governance practices. The first is the board. The guidelines highlight the 
principal responsibility of the board, constitution of an effective board, size of non-
executive participation, appointments to the board, structure and procedures of the 
board, and relationship between the board and management. Second is accountability 
and auditing; the focus here is on audit committees‘ characteristics, roles and 
functions. The third area is shareholders, which involves the relationship between the 
board and the shareholders. 
Based on the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance best practices and previous 
studies (Albrecht et al., 2004; Audra, Casares, Jonathan & Charu, 2007; Beasley et al., 
1999; Beasley, Carcello & Hermanson, 2000; Bédard et al., 2004), 11 corporate 
governance variables were selected for this study. They are: 
i. Independence of board directors  
ii. Size of board of directors 
iii. Frequency/number of board meetings held in a year  
iv. Managerial/directors shareholding  
v. Chairman‘s duality 
vi. Tenure of board‘s chairman 
vii. Ethnicity of board‘s chairman 
viii. Independence of audit committee members  
ix. Outside directorships held by audit committee members  
x. Frequency/number of audit committee meeting held in a year 
xi. Institutional shareholding/blockholder stock ownership  
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Hypotheses development for corporate governance characteristics 
To answer the research questions, the following hypotheses were developed. In 
examining the non-financial factors associated with corporate fraud the selected 
variables for corporate governance will be used. The hypotheses were developed to 
test the corporate governance variables on two groups of companies (fraudulent 
companies) and control companies (non-fraudulent companies) to examine the 
differences in the variables. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (Part 2: 
Best Practice in Corporate Governance) lists three important areas in company 
governance: board of directors, accountability and auditing, and shareholders. This 
study examines the characteristics of board of directors and audit committee 
members, which are part of the requirements of the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance. Analysis will be performed on 11 variables under board of directors and 
audit committee characteristics as follows: 
i. Independence of board directors (INBOD) 
Independent board directors are those who are not employees or part of the 
company‘s subsidiaries‘ management team. Shamser and Annuar (1993, p. 44) 
define independence of board members as ‗the proportion of outside directors 
to the total number of directors‘. This variable has been found to be a 
significant factor for good governance by many researchers (Beasley, 1996; 
Beasley et al., 2000; Jensen, 1993; Xie et al., 2003). However, a study 
conducted in the Malaysian setting found this variable not significant in board 
monitoring (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2008; Che Haat et al., 2008; 
Hashim & Devi, 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008). For this study, independence of 
board directors is measured by the proportion of outside directors to the total 
number of directors on the board. The terms independent board directors or 
outside directors will be used interchangeably throughout this study.  
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that a board with a higher 
percentage of independent directors provides better decision control and 
monitoring of management activities. Xie et al. (2003) found a significant 
negative relationship between the percentage of outside directors and earnings 
management activities. Beasley (1996) states that more independent directors 
on the board significantly reduces the likelihood of financial statement fraud. 
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A higher percentage of independent directors provides better control and 
monitoring of management activities and reduces the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. On the other hand, Li and Ang (2000) conclude otherwise as their study 
found that a greater number of outside directors does not change the 
effectiveness of directors‘ performance in monitoring and controlling 
management activities. Hasnan, Abdul Rahman and Mahenthiran (2008) find 
that outside directorships or independent directors do not have a significant 
relationship with fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. Therefore, this 
study empirically tests the following null hypothesis: 
H1a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the independence of the board of directors. 
H1b: There is no significant relationship between the independence of the 
board of directors and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
ii. Size of board (TBOD) 
Size of board refers to the number of directors on the board. Previous research 
has found that having too many or too few directors does affect the ability of 
the board to monitor and control the activities of the management and the 
company (Beasley, 1996; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 
1996). For a board to be effective at controlling and monitoring managers, the 
number of board directors should be seven or eight (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992). Yermack (1996) indicates that the smaller the number of 
directors on the board, the more effective the board is in carrying out their 
function. This is consistent with the finding of Beasley (1996) that more 
members on the board increase the likelihood of financial statement fraud as it 
reduces the effectiveness of the controls. Xie et al. (2003), on the other hand, 
state that having a larger board is associated with less earnings management 
activities. The Malaysian corporate governance did not specify the exact 
number for the board, it only required for the number of director to be 
appropriate. Though in most practices, the number of members on the board 
depends on the size of the company, there are still differences in the number 
among company in the same size, as size does not mean an exact value. In the 
scope of institutional theory, the differences in cultural values and 
concentration of ownership do have influence in determining what size is 
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appropriate. Past studies provide mixed results about the size of the board; 
therefore, this study will examine the differences (if any) in the number of 
directors on the board between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies. 
Thus, this study tests the following null hypothesis: 
H2a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the size of the board. 
H2b: There is no significant relationship between the size of the board and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. 
iii. Frequency/number of board of directors meetings in a year (BODMEET) 
This variable refers to the number of meetings the board has per year. The 
board is more effective at monitoring when they have more meetings, which 
improves the company‘s governance (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992) 
resulting in better control and monitoring of managers‘ activities (Abbott et 
al., 2004; He et al., 2009; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). On the other hand, Uzun et 
al. (2004) and Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) found that the frequency 
of board meetings does not necessarily lead to effective monitoring of the 
management. Generally, when a company is charged with fraud, the credibility 
of the directors will be scared is not much, a little. This will tarnish their 
credibility as a result their marketability. Having to secure their own interest 
(protecting their credibility in the market – agency theory), when there is 
problem with the company financial report, they will sit together for a meeting 
more often than they usually do. As there are arguments for both a positive 
and a negative impact of board meeting frequency, this study tests the 
following null hypothesis: 
H3a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the frequency of board meetings.  
H3b: There is no significant relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
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iv. Directors’ shareholding (DIROWN) 
This variable refers to the percentage of company shares owned by the 
directors. Directors having a large interest in a company would decrease the 
problem of agency cost (Jensen, 1993) and the managers will not put the 
company at risk of fraud; therefore, there will be a reduction in the likelihood 
of corporate fraud. On the other hand, Loebbecke, Eining and Willingham 
(1989) note that having a significant ownership in a company is a motivational 
factor of fraud. Summers and Sweeney (1998) investigated the relationship 
between insider trading and fraud, and found that managers, i.e. insiders, will 
reduce their shareholdings in the event of fraud.  
It is important to examine this factor in the Malaysian context due to the 
composition of ownership seen in the country. Zhuang et al. (2001) indicate 
that family shareholders are the largest shareholders in Malaysian companies 
as many of the companies started as family-owned companies then went 
public. Most East Asian companies are controlled by family owners (La Porta 
et al., 1999), which means the managers come from families that hold many 
shares in the companies. The institutional theory and agency theory are both 
have role in this variable. In the view of agency theory, acting on their self-
interest, holding a larger shareholding the directors will carry out their duty to 
the very best they can to ensure the company will not fall into any problem as 
they have to protect their interest. Within the boundaries of institutional 
theory, high family concentrated ownership in Malaysia companies influences 
the business structure and the appointment of directors. Having owners as the 
director could have impacted on the effectiveness of company governance. 
This study will examine the relationship between managerial ownership and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud. As the arguments from past research on this 
relationship indicate both negative and positive relationships, this study tests 
the null hypothesis as follows: 
H4a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to managerial ownership. 
H4b: There is no significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 90 
v. Chairman’s duality (DUALITY) 
CEO duality is when the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Che Haat et 
al., 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Past research has established that the 
effectiveness of monitoring of management activities is reduced when a 
company has a duel CEO (Fizel & Louie, 1990; Lorsch & Maclver, 1989). 
Blackburn (1994) argues that the board of directors should be able to discuss 
company matters independently, without the CEO/chairman present, so they 
can effectively monitor the CEO‘s plans. Therefore, it is important to separate 
company CEO and chairman of the board. However, Rechner and Dalton 
(1991) found that CEO duality can benefit companies as management‘s 
compensation is based on company performance and therefore the CEO could 
carry out the company‘s strategic planning to increase performance without 
much interference from the board. This is because the CEO, as chairman, will 
have the power to defend the company‘s strategies and actions). As there are 
arguments that CEO duality has both positive and negative relationships with 
the effectiveness of company governance, this study tests the null hypothesis 
as follows: 
H5a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to duality.  
H5b: There is no significant relationship between duality and the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. 
vi. Tenure of board’s chairman (TENURE) 
Tenure of board chairman refers to the period of time the board‘s chairman has 
been on the board. Past research has found that the tenure of the CEO, who, in 
many cases, is also the company‘s chairman, does have an influence on the 
board‘s decision making (Hill & Phan, 1991; Mace, 1986; Patton & Baker, 
1987; Vancil, 1987). This variable will be tested to determine whether the 
board chairman‘s tenure has any effect on the effectiveness of the board‘s 
monitoring and control. There have not been many studies on chairman‘s 
tenure in relation to corporate fraud, and, as in most cases the chairman is also 
the CEO, studies on CEO tenure will be used as the basis of discussion in this 
study. Hill and Phan (1991) found that the longer the CEO is on the board the 
more influence they have over the decision-making process of the board. Mace 
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(1986), Patton and Baker (1987), and Vancil (1987) state that even though 
there is a nominating committee on the board, the CEO has the strongest 
influence over board selection and therefore has the power to control the 
board. An established CEO who has been on the board for a long time will be 
more able to dominate the board as compared to a new CEO (Hermalin, 2005; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Daboub, Rasheed, Priem and Gray (1995) 
found that the longer the tenure, the less likely fraud is to be committed. Thus, 
this study tests the null hypothesis as below: 
H6a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the tenure of the board‘s chairman. 
H6b: There is no significant relationship between the tenure of the board‘s 
chairman and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
vii. Ethnicity of the board’s chairman (ETHNIC) 
Every ethnicity has its own unique culture, and as Malaysia‘s main ethnicity is 
Malay, this study will look at the differences between Malay chairmen and 
those from other ethnicities with respect to corporate fraud. Studies on culture 
have found that differences in cultural practices have various influences over 
business practices, organizational structures, managerial styles, accounting 
disclosure practices, auditing services and governance structures (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hofstede, 1980; Yatim et al., 2006). 
Malaysia‘s capital market shows clear segmentation based on ethnicity. There 
is a clear distinction between the Malays and the Chinese (Jesudason, 1989). 
Malaysian listed companies‘ boards and shares are predominantly controlled 
by Malays and Chinese (Yatim et al., 2004). In this country the cultural 
differences between Chinese and Malays have significant influence over 
managerial styles. Chinese have been found to be more secretive in their 
disclosures, while Malays are more transparent, which could be because of 
their religious beliefs (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). The results found by Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) are in contrast with Hofstede and Gray‘s hypothesis,8 which 
posits that Malays are less transparent and more secretive. Therefore, this 
study will examine whether there is any difference between fraudulent and 
                                                 
8 Refer to Haniffa and Cooke‘s (2002) cultural characteristics, Table 1, p. 325. 
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non-fraudulent companies‘ board chairmen‘s ethnicities and their relationship 
to the likelihood of corporate fraud. Thus, the following null hypothesis is 
tested: 
H7a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the ethnicity of the board‘s chairman. 
H7b: There is no significant relationship between the ethnicity of the board‘s 
chairman and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
viii. Independence of the audit committee (INDAC) 
This variable refers to audit committee directors who are not employees of the 
companies or their subsidiaries; they are also known as outside directors. 
Studies have found that there is a negative association between independent 
audit committees and earnings management activities and the likelihood of 
fraud in companies (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2002; Klein, 2002). The 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2001) best practices require audit 
committees to have a majority of independent members for the committee to 
be effective in monitoring the company‘s financial affairs. This is consistent 
with Klein (2002), who found a negative relationship between earnings 
management and the percentage of independent audit committee members. A 
similar result is presented by Abbot, Park and Parker (2002), whose study 
indicates that there is a negative association between independent audit 
committee members and the likelihood of corporate fraud. This study 
examines the differences in the percentage of independent audit committee 
members between non-fraudulent companies and fraudulent companies and its 
relationship with the likelihood of corporate fraud; thus, the following null 
hypothesis is tested: 
H8a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the percentage of independent audit committee 
members. 
H8b: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of 
independent audit committee members and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. 
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ix. Outside directorships held by the audit committee (OUTDIR) 
This refers to the proportion of directors on the board holding at least one 
additional directorship in another company to the total number of directors on 
the audit committee (consistent with the definition by Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006). Audit committee is responsible for overseeing the company‘s financial 
affairs. This takes a lot of time as there is copious financial information to 
digest and financial matters can be complicated. The number of outside 
directorships has been found to have a significant relationship with the 
effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring companies‘ financial affairs 
(Tanyi and Smith, 2015; Sharma and Iselin, 2012; Ahn et al., 2010; Ferris et 
al., 2003; Bédard et al., 2004; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Morck et al., 1988; 
Fama, 1980; Beasley, 1996). Fama (1980) states that the incentive for outside 
director to carry out effective monitoring of managers‘ activities comes from 
the market for outside director. Being a director of a reputable, well-
performing company reflects on the director‘s ability to be effective and 
therefore signals value to the external market, which rewards them with 
additional directorships. In the view of agency theory, directors will try to 
maximize their own value for their own interest which in respect to this 
variable, holding more directorship increase their value in the market therefore 
directors will carry out their duties effectively. 
However, monitoring top management is time consuming and requires much 
effort (Bédard et al., 2004; Morck et al., 1988); therefore, when one is trying 
to carry out the duties of an audit committee member effectively, holding more 
directorships will not help (Bédard et al., 2004). Beasley (1996) states that 
director that holds two or more outside directorships reduce the effectiveness 
of their roles, thus increasing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting. The 
same conclusion was found by Tanyi and Smith (2015) and Sharman & Iselin 
(2012) that having multiple directorships reduces the effectiveness in 
monitoring. The study on the role and effectiveness of governance by audit 
committee with multiple directorships is divided to two schools of thought. On 
one hand, being busy by holding more directorships increases the effectiveness 
of monitoring as the directors have more knowledge and experience that they 
bring with them from directorships. On the other hand, being busy decrease 
the ability of monitoring by these directors. It is important to study this 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 94 
characteristic to understand the effectiveness of having multiple directorships 
in Malaysia setting. 
 
Thus, this study will examine the differences in the percentage of audit 
committee members holding more than one outside directorships between non-
fraudulent companies and fraudulent companies and this factor‘s relationship 
with the likelihood of corporate fraud. Therefore, the following null 
hypothesis is tested: 
 
H9a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the percentage of audit committee members 
holding one or more additional outside directorship.  
H9b: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of audit 
committee members holding one or more additional outside directorship 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
x. Frequency/number of audit committee meeting in a year (ACMEET) 
This variable refers to the number of meetings held by the audit committee in 
a year. Consistent with the need to analyse the frequency of board meetings, 
the frequency of audit committee meetings will also be studied as audit 
committees are responsible for monitoring financial reporting, which is an 
important source of information for users. Consistent with the argument for 
frequent board meetings, the audit committee is more effective at monitoring 
when they have more meetings, and this will improve the company‘s 
governance (Abbott et al., 2004; He et al., 2009; Jensen, 1993; Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Uzun et al., 2004). As audit committees are responsible for 
monitoring financial affairs and they have the expertise to analyse and 
understand the process of preparing financial reports, they should be able to 
highlight any irregularities in the company‘s financial reports. Thus, the below 
null hypothesis is tested: 
H10a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies with respect to the frequency of audit committee 
meetings. 
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H10b: There is no significant relationship between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
xi. Institutional shareholding/blockholder shares ownership (BLOCK) 
In the view of institutional theory, the differences in institutional setting have 
influence over the company‘s governance framework. With a high 
concentration of family ownership in many companies, the existences of 
institutional shareholders could increase the governance of company. A large 
blockholder ownership has been found to be effective in monitoring and 
influencing companies‘ corporate governance practices (Burns, 2003; Gilson, 
1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Therefore, this study will analyse the 
percentage of blockholder ownership in both groups of companies. 
Institutional shareholding or independent blockholder stock ownership is 
defined as outside stockholders holding at least five per cent of companies‘ 
common shares (Beasley, 1996). Gilson (1990) and Burns (2003) report that 
large blockholders are able to monitor effectively and can influence 
companies‘ corporate governance practices to reduce the likelihood of fraud. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) found a similar result that confirms block 
ownership by institutional shareholders is more effective in controlling 
managers from pursuing their own interests than individual shareholders. This 
study will examine the differences in the percentage or proportion of 
blockholder stock ownership between non-fraudulent companies and 
fraudulent ones, as well as its relations with the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H11a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies with respect to the percentage of institutional 
shareholding (blockholder share ownership). 
H11b: There is no significant relationship between the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings (blockholder share ownership) and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. 
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4.2.2 Earnings management variables and hypotheses 
Within the framework of agency theory and institutional theory, earnings management 
is committed by managers in order to present a positive look on company‘s financial 
performance which reflects back to managers‘ performance (Jin Kim and Suk Yoon, 
2016). A good governance reduces the earnings management committed by managers 
( Earnings management is a ‗deliberate action taken by the management to meet 
earnings objectives‘ (Arens et al., 2007, p. 342). Beneish (1999a, p. 24) defines 
earnings manipulation as ‗an instance in which the company‘s managers violate 
generally accepted accounting principles to favourably represent the company‘s 
financial performance‘. This definition shows that managing earnings within GAAP 
principles is not fraud. However, managing earnings beyond the scope of GAAP is an 
act of fraud. Given the opportunity to manage earnings and a lack of governance and 
control, fraudulent financial reporting can easily occur (Beasley et al., 1999).  
Dechow et al. (1995) state that the analysis of earnings management often focuses on 
the management‘s use of discretionary accruals. However, there is no systematic 
evidence on the relative performance of alternative models based on discretionary 
accruals at detecting earnings management. The most common model for detecting 
earnings management by measuring discretionary accruals are the Healy Model, 
DeAngelo Model, Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and the Industry Model 
(Dechow et al., 1995).  
The Healy Model tests earnings management by comparing mean total accruals scaled 
by lagged total assets across the earnings management partitioning variable. The De 
Angelo Model tests earnings management by computing the first differences in total 
accruals and by assuming that the first differences have an expected value of zero 
under the null hypothesis of no earnings management. The Jones Model relaxes the 
assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are constant and attempts to control the 
effect of changes in a firm‘s economic circumstances on nondiscretionary accruals. 
The Modified Jones Model is designed to eliminate the conjecture tendency of the 
Jones Model to measure discretionary accruals with error when discretions are 
exercised over revenues. The Industry Model is similar to the Jones Model except that 
instead of attempting to directly model the determinant of nondiscretionary accruals, 
it assumes that variations in the determinants of nondiscretionary accruals are 
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common across firms in the same industry. The most common starting point for the 
measurement of discretionary accruals is total accruals. A particular model is then 
assumed for the process, generating the nondiscretionary component of total accruals 
and enabling total accruals to be decomposed into discretionary and nondiscretionary 
components. Most of the models require at least one parameter to be estimated, and 
this is typically implemented through the use of an ‗estimation period‘ during which 
no systematic earnings management is predicted (Dechow et al., 1995).  
Dechow et al. (1995)9 studied the five aforementioned earnings management models 
and suggest that all of the models are reasonably well-specified tests for a random 
sample of firms‘ years, but the power of the tests is low when there is an economically 
plausible magnitude. However they indicate that out of the five models tested, the 
Modified Jones Model is the most powerful in detecting earnings management. 
However, the study recommends further research on developing models that could be 
powerful tests for detecting earnings management, as all of the five models‘ ability to 
detect earnings management of an economically plausible magnitude is relatively low.  
Studies on earnings management and its relation to fraud have mostly focused on 
analysing companies‘ accruals (Dechow et al., 1995, 1996; Den Adel, 2005; Ebrahim, 
2007; Hasnan et al., 2008; Jordan, Clark & Pate, 2008). As the most common 
techniques used in fraudulent financial reporting are improper recognition of revenue 
and overstatement of assets (Treadway Commission, 1999), it can be seen that 
financial variables other than accruals should also be considered. Beneish (1999a), 
Grove and Basilico (2008), and Rosner (2003) all conducted analyses on earnings 
management that included other financial indexes/ratios as well as accruals. Beneish 
(1999a) conducted a study on detecting earnings manipulation and then used the 
sample of earnings manipulators to develop a model for detecting earnings 
manipulation using published financial information. Grove and Basilico (2008) 
examined fraud using the earnings management variables and model developed by 
Beneish (1999a). Rosner (2003) analysed earnings management/manipulation in 
failing firms using accruals and other financial indexes/ratios (profitability ratios, 
leverage) as proxies for earnings management. 
                                                 
9 Refer to Appendix 1 for the discussion of the five models by Dechow et al. (1995). 
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In developing the earnings management hypotheses, this study did not only examine 
companies‘ accruals, but also other financial indexes/ratios over a five-year period 
(the first year of fraud and four years prior to it). The reason for not studying the 
discretionary accruals is that the main objective of this study is to analyse the ability 
of published information to indicate if a company is at risk of fraud; therefore, the 
indexes used contained companies‘ published financial data that could easily be 
extracted and understood by general users. A total of 10 earnings management 
variables were selected for this study, as explained later in this chapter. Eight out of 
the 10 earnings management variables were also analysed by Beneish (1999a), and 
two were used by Rosner (2003). However, the sales, general and administrative 
expenses indexes (which were studied by Beneish, 1999) had to be dropped from this 
study as many Malaysian listed companies did not report this figure in their profit and 
loss statement. As a result of the requirement for reporting under FRS 101, the figure 
is very low, which means that the sales, general and administrative expenses figures 
are not mandatorily reported or disclosed. Therefore, this study only analyses nine 
variables in total, of which seven are consistent with Beniesh and two (inventories 
ratio and inventories growth over sales growth ratio) with Rosner (2003). 
These variables are appropriate for this study given its main objective, which is to 
analyse the ability of companies‘ published information to indicate if a company is at-
risk of fraud, where the financial information can be easily obtained. Definition and 
measurement of earnings management for this study referred to Beneish (1999) and 
Rosner (2003), as both studies assess earnings manipulation by fraudulent companies, 
which is more appropriate for this study. The nine earnings management variables are: 
i. Days‘ sales in receivables index 
ii. Gross margin index 
iii. Asset quality index 
iv. Sales growth index 
v. Total accruals to total assets index 
vi. Depreciation index 
vii. Leverage index 
viii. Inventories ratio 
ix. Inventories growth over sales growth ratio  
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Development of earnings management variables’ hypotheses 
For each of the variables, the index will be calculated for both groups of companies 
and the results will be compared. The developments of the 10 financial hypotheses are 
(for all the formulas in index calculation, t is the fraud year and t-1 is the year prior to 
the fraud year, the same formula is applied to all five years analysed): 
i. Days’ sales in receivables index (DSRI) 
DSRI = 
11 /Re
/Re
 tt
tt
Salesceivables
Salesceivables
 
 
Day‘s sales in receivable index (DSRI) is the ratio of days‘ sales in receivables in the 
first year in which earnings manipulation was uncovered (year t) over the ratio of 
days‘ sales in receivables in the year prior to which earnings manipulation was 
uncovered [year (t – 1)] (Beneish, 1999a). Beneish argues that a large increase in 
days‘ sales in receivables could be the result of a change in credit policy to increase 
sales in the face of increased competition, but disproportionate increases in 
receivables relative to sales could also suggest revenue inflation. Thus, he expects a 
large increase in the DSRI to be associated with a higher likelihood that revenues and 
earnings were overstated. Wells (2001) states that a material increases in the days‘ 
sales in receivables index could indicate that a company‘s receivables are not true. A 
sudden change in the amount of sales from one year to the next could be because of 
changes in credit policy (to increase sales to compete) or because of a decrease in 
revenue (Beneish, 1999a). Therefore, a large increase in receivables may be 
associated with a higher likelihood of earnings being overstated. This study tests the 
null hypothesis as follows: 
H12a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the days‘ sales receivable index. 
H12b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s days‘ receivable 
index and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
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ii. Gross margin index (GMI) 
GMI = 
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ttt
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Where: 
COGS = cost of goods sold 
Gross margin index (GMI) is calculated as the ratio of the gross margin in year (t - 1) 
to the ratio of the gross margin in year (t) (Beneish, 1999a). Beneish states that 
companies with poorer prospects are more likely to engage in earnings manipulation 
and expects a positive relationship between GMI and the probability of earnings 
manipulation. Wells (2001) argues that when there is a gross margin decrease from 
one year to the next, there is a higher risk that management will engage in fraud to 
offset the declining gross margin. A decrease in a company‘s gross margin indicates a 
decrease in the company‘s performance, which sends a negative signal regarding 
companies‘ prospects (Lev & Thiagarajan, 1993). A GMI of greater than one means 
that the gross margin decreased (Beneish, 1999a). Therefore, a large decrease in GMI 
means a company‘s performance is deteriorating, and a poorly performing company is 
more likely to manage earnings (Christie & Zimmerman, 1994; Smith et al., 2001). 
This study will examine the differences in GMI of non-fraudulent companies and 
fraudulent companies. Thus, the null hypothesis below is tested: 
H13a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the gross margin index. 
H13b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s gross margin 
index and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
iii. Asset quality index (AQI) 
AQI = 
]/)[(1
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Where: 
CA = current assets 
PPE    = plant, property and equipment. 
TA = total assets 
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Asset quality index (AQI) is the ratio of noncurrent assets other than property, plant 
and equipment (PP&E) to total assets and measures the proportion of total assets for 
which future benefits are potentially less certain (Beneish, 1999a). The AQI is the 
ratio of asset quality in year t to asset quality in year (t – 1). Beneish states that an 
increase in asset realization risk indicates an increased propensity to capitalize, and 
therefore defer, costs. Thus, he expects to find a positive relationship between the 
AQI and the probability of earnings manipulation. Wells (2001) states that an increase 
in the amount of intangible assets or AQI may indicate that in a declining 
performance period, companies would capitalize costs into intangible assets. An 
increase in the AQI indicates an increase in capitalization. Siegel (1991) suggests AQI 
is a measure of changes in asset realization risk, which means the company has the 
tendency to capitalize cost. Thus, this study tests the following null hypothesis: 
H14a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the assets quality index. 
H14b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s assets quality 
index and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
iv. Sales growth index (SGI) 
SGI = 
1t
t
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Sales
 
The sales growth index (SGI) is the ratio of sales in year t to sales in year (t – 1) 
(Beneish, 1999a). An increase in the SGI indicates an increase in sales, though this 
may not be true. The United States National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting 1987 and the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 1993 (as 
cited in Beneish, 1999) state that growth does not imply manipulation, but growing 
companies are viewed by professionals as more likely than other companies to 
commit financial statement fraud, because their financial positions and capital needs 
put pressure on managers to achieve earnings targets. Motives to manipulate earnings 
can be put into three categories: personal gain, continuation of investor/supplier 
support and satisfying contractual arrangements (Lev, 2003). The pressure to ensure 
company growth is therefore a big issue to management as the performance of 
managers is based on company performance. Managers manipulate earnings for their 
own benefit (Leuz et al., 2003). Skinner and Sloan (2000) found a positive earnings 
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management relationship with company growth. Therefore, the higher the SGI, the 
more likely the company is to manipulate earnings. This study tests the following 
hypothesis: 
H15a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the sales growth index. 
H15b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s sales growth index 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
v. Total accruals to total assets index (TATA) 
TATA = ( tCA  - tCash  - tCL  - Current Maturities of LTD t  - 
Income Tax Payable
t
 - Depreciation and amortization t ) / 
Total assets t  
Where: 
CA  = current assets 
CL  = current liabilities 
LTD = long-term debt 
Total accruals (TATA) are calculated as the change in working capital accounts other 
than cash less depreciation (Beneish, 1999a). Beneish expects higher positive accruals 
(less cash) to be associated with a higher likelihood of earnings manipulation. Wells 
(2001) states that an increase in the TATA indicates larger accruals and less cash, 
which are associated with a higher risk of earnings manipulation. Many studies have 
used discretionary accruals for the assessment of earnings management; for instance, 
Healy (1985), Jones (1991) and Ebrahim (2007). Higher positive accruals (less cash) 
are associated with a higher likelihood of earnings manipulation (Beneish, 1999a). 
This study will examine the differences in TATA between non-fraudulent companies 
and fraudulent companies. The below null hypothesis is tested: 
H16a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the total accruals to total assets index. 
H16b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s total accruals to 
total assets index and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
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vi. Depreciation index (DEPI) 
DEPI = 
)/(
)/( 111
ttt
ttt
PPEonDepreciationDepreciati
PPEonDepreciationDepreciati

   
Depreciation index (DEPI) is calculated as the ratio of the rate of depreciation in year 
t-1 over the ratio of the rate of depreciation in year t. Beneish (1999) states that a 
DEPI greater than 1 indicates that the depreciation rate of assets has been slowed and 
raises the possibility that companies have adopted income-increasing methods by 
revising the assets‘ estimated useful life upward. Therefore, we can expect fraudulent 
companies to show a DEPI of greater than 1 if income increasing related to 
depreciation is not a common practice among Malaysian companies. Thus, this null 
hypothesis is tested: 
H17a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the depreciation index.  
H17b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s depreciation index 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
vii. Leverage index (LVI) 
LVI = 
111
1
/)(
/)(
 

ttt
tt
sTotalAssetbilitiesCurrentLiaLTD
sTotalAssetbilitiesCurrentLiaLTD
 
Where LTD = long-term debt 
Leverage index (LVI) is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets in year t 
over year t-1. A LVI greater than 1 indicates an increase in leverage. Beneish (1999) 
indicates that LVI is used to capture incentives in debt covenants for earnings 
manipulation. The author states that the inclusion of LVI is done ‗to capture 
incentives in debt covenants for earnings manipulation‘ (p. 28). An LVI more than 1 
means that there is an increase in leverage. It will be interesting to see the differences 
between the two groups of companies with respect to LVI, to examine whether 
fraudulent companies manipulate income through leverage and also to analyse the 
relationship of this index with the likelihood of corporate fraud. Thus, the following 
null hypothesis is tested: 
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H18a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to leverage index. 
H18b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s leverage index and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
viii. Inventories ratio (INVR) 
INVR = (Inventory t - Inventory 1t )/Total Assets 1t  
The inventories ratio (INVR) is calculated as the change in inventory as a percentage 
of beginning-of-year assets (Rosner, 2003). One of the common techniques used in 
fraudulent financial reporting is overstatement of assets and improper revenue 
recognition. Testing this variable is appropriate as there is a tendency for companies 
to inflate or deflate the value of their inventories by changing the recording method 
(LIFO, FIFO or weighted average). Inventory (apart from receivables) is the most 
frequently manipulated financial information (Asare & Davidson, 1995; Beasley et 
al., 1999; Schilit, 1993). The COSO study conducted by Beasley (1999) indicates that 
the most common misstatement of assets relates to receivables and inventories. 
Therefore, this study analyses the INVR to look at whether there is any difference 
between fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent companies‘ practices, as well as the 
index‘s relationship with the likelihood of corporate fraud. Thus, the below null 
hypothesis is tested: 
H19a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the inventories ratio. 
H19b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s inventories ratio 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
ix. Inventories growth over sales growth ratio (INVSR) 
INVSR = 
)/(
)/(
11
11




ttt
ttt
SalesSalesSales
InventoryInventoryInventory
 
The inventories growth over sales growth ratio (INVSR) is calculated as the 
difference in growth between inventory and sales (Rosner, 2003). If the ratio is 
positive, it means that inventory is growing at a faster rate than sales, which is 
considered to be a potential signal of fraud (Schilit, 1993). In assessing the differences 
in the INVSR, the above formula is used. It is calculated as the difference in growth 
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between inventory and sales (Rosner, 2003). This study tests the following 
hypothesis: 
H20a: There is no significant difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the inventories growth over sales growth ratio. 
H20b: There is no significant relationship between a company‘s inventories growth 
over sales growth ratio and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
For the purposes of calculating the indices and ratios, year (t) is the year studied and 
year (t – 1) is the year prior to the year studied. For example, if this study set the first 
year of fraud as 2003, then the financial information needed to calculate the indices 
and ratios would come from 2003 a year (t) and 2002 as year (t-1). The same formula 
of calculation for the earnings management indices and ratios is applied for all five 
years analysed. The calculation of the indices was carried out for each of the 
companies in both groups (fraudulent and non-fraudulent). This gives a general view 
of earnings manipulation according to each index for each company. The result 
answer question one of this study and provides a descriptive analysis for both sample 
groups. 
Further analyses were carried out using the information obtained from the descriptive 
analysis. For each group, the mean, median and t-test results for earnings management 
variables were examined to look for differences between fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies‘ practices. This answers research question number two. To 
determine the significant variables that could indicate that a company is manipulating 
earnings, which will answer question three, logistic regression analysis was performed 
on all nine earnings management variables, consistent with Beneish (1999) and Grove 
and Basilico (2008). The regression models are explained in section 5.5.2 under 
research methodology. 
Both the non-financial (corporate governance) and financial (earnings management) 
variables were analysed for each of the companies in the fraudulent and non-
fraudulent groups. This established the corporate governance and earnings 
management practices for both groups of companies. There are two sets of time frame 
for data in this study. For corporate governance characteristics this study investigated 
two years‘ worth of data; that is, the first year of fraud (year t) and the year prior to 
the first year of fraud year t-1). Meanwhile, for the earnings management variables, 
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this study extended the period of study to five years: the first year of fraud (year t) to 
four years prior to the first year of fraud (year t-1, year t-2, year t-3 and year t-4). The 
first year of fraud (year t) for both sets of data is same year (the year when the 
company was charged with fraud by the Malaysia Securities Commission). 
The corporate governance and earnings management practices of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies were compared to determine any significant differences 
between them. The results of this analysis will highlight the significant differences 
between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies‘ earnings management and 
corporate governance practices, thereby answering research questions one and three. 
To determine the significant relationships between the variables and corporate fraud, 
further analyses will be carried out on the variables using logistic regression analysis; 
this will answer questions two and four.  
4.3 Summary 
This chapter explained the research framework and the selection of variables. The 
variables were chosen based on the significant relationship between them and the 
incidences of fraud, which was found in the literature. The chapter further described 
the development of the 20 hypotheses for this study, of which 11 are hypotheses on 
corporate governance characteristics and 9 focus on earnings management variables. 
Explanations of the formulae used in calculating all the earnings management 
variables were also described. The methodology for data collection, sampling 
procedures and data analysis will be covered in the following chapter. 
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    Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
This chapter describes the research setting and design procedures in detail. This 
research adopts the positivism approach. Positivism is ―an approach to social research 
that seeks to apply the natural science model of research to investigations of social 
phenomena and explanations of the social world‖ (Denscombe, 2002, p.27). The 
approach study of positivism involves deductive study which hypothesis testing is one 
of its main principles. By testing the hypothesis, explanation and generalisation of 
result can be developed and examined. This offers objectivity and can be control 
scientifically (Bryman, 2008).  
After a brief discussion on the research approach, the chapter continues with the 
explanation on the sampling method used, including the criteria for the companies 
selected as well as the size of the sample. Next, the time period for data collection and 
how the data were collected are described. The final part discusses the statistical 
analysis used for this study, including the models used in testing the hypotheses. As 
stated in chapter one, the objective of this study is to analyse the usefulness of 
corporate-published information in indicating if a company is at risk of corporate 
fraud in Malaysia. Therefore, this study analyses corporate governance characteristics 
and earnings management variables for two groups of companies (fraudulent and non-
fraudulent). The research setting is discussed in the following sections. 
5.1 Sample 
As the objective of this study is to determine the usefulness of corporate-published 
information in indicating if a company is at risk of fraud, the determination or 
selection of fraudulent companies and non-fraudulent companies was very important. 
The selection of both groups of companies was made based on the specific criteria 
explained for each group. The general criteria for both groups of companies are as 
follows: 
i. Companies were selected from public listed companies in Bursa Malaysia as 
these companies are required to publish annual reports and therefore 
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information can be accessed by external users of business information and 
market participants. 
ii. Banking, finance, insurance and unit trust companies were excluded from the 
selection as these companies, apart from being subjected to certain regulations 
and requirements as other companies in other industries, are also subjected to 
additional statutory requirements, namely the Banking and Finance Act 1989, 
as well as banking and finance regulations.  
iii. All companies for both groups needed a complete set of data for each year 
analysed; therefore, companies with incomplete data were excluded.  
Once the general criteria for both groups of companies were established, the selection 
of each sample was carried out according to the specific criteria explained in the 
following section. 
5.1.1 Sample of fraudulent companies 
It is difficult to determine a fraudulent company due to the secretive nature of fraud. 
Companies are reluctant to publicize any fraudulent activities that took place within 
their organization. Past research carried out in the US (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Beasley et 
al. 1999; Cook & Grove, 2004; Cullinan & Suttom, 2002; Deachow et al., 1996; 
Pearson, 2005; Rosner, 2003) used a sample of fraudulent companies obtained from 
the Securities Commission Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release. Therefore, 
consistent with past studies, this study uses fraudulent companies listed in the 
Malaysian Securities Commission Enforcement Release for the period 2003 to 2007. 
As one of the important groups of variables analysed in this study is corporate 
governance characteristics, the starting time period for selecting the fraudulent 
companies was one year after the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance was 
made mandatory to all listed companies. The Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance was established and made mandatory in March 2000. The reason for 
starting the selection in 2003 was that since the Malaysian Code of Corporate 
Governance was introduced in 2000, the year 2001 was considered an adjustment 
period for companies to adapt to the new requirements. Thus, the year 2002 was seen 
as appropriate as the starting year for data collection, and since the data on corporate 
governance for this study cover two years (the fraud year and the year prior to the 
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fraud year), the selection of fraudulent companies started from 2003. The Code was 
revised on 1st October, 2007, and in 2008 the global recession began to take effect; 
therefore, the cut-off period for the selection of fraudulent companies for this study 
was 2007. 
The Malaysian Securities Commission is responsible for ensuring that all companies 
that are subjected to the Malaysian Companies Act, Malaysian Securities Act and 
Bursa Malaysia listing rules and regulations do not breach any of the requirements. 
The MSC Enforcement Release deals with a wide range of offences, from share 
trading licences to fraudulent financial reporting. For the purpose of this study only 
those listed companies that were charged with accounting and auditing fraud, were 
listed in the Securities Commission Enforcement Release, were selected as fraudulent 
companies. 
5.1.2 Criteria for non-fraudulent companies 
The non-fraudulent companies that are the control companies in this research were 
selected from public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia. The companies were 
selected based on their similarity to the fraudulent companies in time period, industry 
type and size. It was important to make sure that the comparison between fraudulent 
companies and non-fraudulent companies is based on the similarity in the likelihood 
of financial statement fraud occurrence (Beasley, 1996) by selecting samples that met 
these three important criteria. Each fraudulent company was matched with the non-
fraudulent companies based on the following criteria: 
i. Industry: non-fraudulent companies were selected from the same industry as 
the fraudulent ones. 
ii. Time period: the first year of fraud, year (t) for non-fraudulent companies, was 
determined by the fraudulent companies‘ first year of fraud. 
iii. Company size: the non-fraudulent companies were selected based on their 
similarity in size to the fraudulent companies. There are a number of ways to 
measure a company‘s size, such as through total assets, market valuation and 
market capitalisation; this study used total assets as the size measurement. 
For the non-fraudulent company sample, the whole population was selected by 
excluding those with the following criteria: 
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i. The companies must not have any record of being investigated for commercial 
crime either by the Securities Commission or any other regulatory bodies.  
ii. The non-fraudulent companies must not be in financial distress (not listed in 
the PN410 or PN1711 listing). Distressed companies were excluded because of 
the statement made by Malaysian Securities Commission that many of the 
losses suffered by PN4 and PN17 companies are caused by mismanagement, 
fraud and other unethical practices (Anwar, 2006). 
In the event that the whole population (in any industry) was too big, stratified random 
sampling was used for that particular industry. Stratified random sampling is the most 
efficient sampling design for assessing different information regarding various strata 
within a population, which are different in their parameters (Sekaran, 2005). 
5.1.3 Sample size 
In 2002, Bursa Malaysia had 868 companies (562 on main board, 294 on second 
board and 12 MESDAQ companies) listed on its stock exchange. Bursa Malaysia is 
categorized into three groups, namely: main board, second board and the Malaysian 
Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation (MESDAQ).12 The sample 
size for each group is: 
i. Fraudulent companies: All companies that were charged with accounting and 
auditing fraud by the Malaysia Securities Commission (listed in the Securities 
Commission Enforcement Release) from 2003 to 2007. 
ii. Non-fraudulent companies: All companies in each sector that met the criteria 
for non-fraudulent companies were selected. Roscoe‘s (1975) rule of thumb is 
that a sample size larger than 30 and smaller than 500 is appropriate for most 
research. Therefore, for any particular industries where the total number of 
companies was too big, stratified random sampling was used to select an 
appropriate number for the sample. The following formula was used: 
                                                 
10 Practice Notes No. 4, also known as PN4 (PN4, 2001), are conditions where a company is facing 
financial difficulty (distress) and does not meet the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. Such 
companies are also known as financially distressed companies. 
11 In 2005, PN4 was replaced by Practice Notes No. 17, widely known as PN17 (PN17, 2005) in 
dealing with financially distressed companies. 
12 MESDAQ was launched on 6 October, 1997 as a separate market mostly for technology based 
companies. It is part of Bursa Malaysia. 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 111 
n
pqZeN
pqNZ
22
2
)1( 
 
Where: 
n = Sample size 
N = Population size 
Z
2 = Standard confidence interval (set at 1.96) 
e
2 = Tolerable error level 
pq = Sample proportion variance estimate 
5.1.4 Sample selected 
In determining the fraud sample, the Malaysia Securities Commission Enforcement 
Release (MSCER) for the period 2003 to 2007 was first analysed by taking into 
account the sampling criteria discussed in sections 5.1.1, 5.1.2 and 5.1.3. For this 
study, only those companies that were found to have committed accounting and 
auditing offences were selected for the fraud sample. Apart from analysing the 
MSCER list, this study also cross-checked the list with the Bursa Malaysia and 
Malaysian Company Commission enforcement section, as well as press releases, to 
determine the fraudulent company sample.  
The MSCER disclosed 84 fraud cases (from 2003 to 2007). Out of this total, 34 
companies were involved and charged with accounting and auditing offences by the 
Malaysia Securities Commission. From the 34 companies, 13 are no longer trading 
(bankrupt or liquidated). A final sample of 11 companies was used for this study as 
the other 10 companies either did not have complete sets of data or were not public 
companies. Private companies are not required to publish annual reports and therefore 
were excluded from this study. Out of the 11 companies selected, 5 were charged in 
2007, 2 in 2005, 1 in 2004 and 3 in 2003. None of the companies charged in 2006 
were selected for this study as they did not meet the necessary criteria. The year when 
the company was charged and listed in the MSCER is referred to as the first year of 
fraud or year t.  
The selection of non-fraudulent companies was based on the fraudulent companies. 
As explained earlier, the selection of non-fraudulent companies was bound to the 
criteria mentioned. Table 5-1 presents the distribution of the samples in terms of total 
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number of companies selected according to industry. A final sample of 149 non-
fraudulent companies and 11 fraudulent companies was used for this study. 
Table 5-1 Distribution of Non-Fraudulent and Fraudulent Companies by 
Industry 
Industry 
Non-
fraudulent 
Fraudulent Total 
Trading and 
services 
35 3 38 
Industrial product 48 2 50 
Technology 5 1 6 
Consumer product 21 2 23 
Construction 32 1 33 
Property 8 2 10 
Total 149 11 160 
 
The small number of fraudulent companies could be one of the limitations of this 
study. There are quite a number of opinions with respect to sample size. Roscoe 
(1975), as cited by Sekaran (2003) proposed that: 1) A sample size larger than 30 and 
smaller than 500 is appropriate for most research; 2) Where samples are divided into 
subsamples, a minimum of 30 for each sample is necessary; 3) For multivariate 
research, sample size should be several times more than the number or variables; and 
4) For simple experimental research with tight experimental controls, e.g. matched 
pairs, successful research is possible with a sample as small as 10 to 20. Hart and 
Clark (1999) carried out a study exploring the effect of a small-sized sample on the 
behaviour of maximum likelihood estimators and found that the risk of making Type I 
errors does not change as the sample size decreases. However, the risk of making 
Type II errors increases when size decreases. A study by Bergtold, Yeager and 
Featherstone (2011) indicates that the effect of small-size bias depends on the type of 
model estimate, the nature of the data and inference conducted. They conclude that 
sample size (even though it is still important) is not a big issue when the objective of 
the study is to obtain meaningful and interpretable marginal effects. Sekaran (2003) 
states that the determination of sample size depends on the objective and nature of the 
study. The very strict criteria for selecting the fraudulent sample have caused this 
sample to be small. Caution has to be taken in determining a company that is proven 
to have committed fraud. This is to ensure valid fraudulent data are used. Having 
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about 32% of total fraudulent companies (11 out of 34), though small if compared 
with the total number of listed companies on Bursa Malaysia, is considered 
representative enough for Malaysia.  
5.2 Data 
The financial data required for this study are the earnings management variables, 
which can be obtained from the financial information in the company‘s financial 
statements. The non-financial data required are the corporate governance 
characteristics, which can be obtained from corporate governance reports, analyses of 
companies‘ shareholdings and director profiles. Therefore, the most appropriate 
method for data capture is content analysis. Financial data were also obtained from 
the Datastream system.  
5.2.1 Corporate governance data 
The corporate governance characteristics or variables were obtained from companies‘ 
corporate governance reports, director profiles and analyses of shareholdings. The 
corporate governance characteristics analysed in this study are divided into four areas. 
The first area is characteristics of the board of directors, namely: independence of 
board (INBOD), total number of board members (TBOD), number of board meetings 
(BODMEET) and percentage of director shareholdings in the company (DIROWN). 
The independence of the board of directors is measured as a percentage of the number 
of board members that are not employed by the companies or their subsidiaries over 
the total number of board members. The frequency of board meetings is measured by 
obtaining the total number of meetings during a year. Percentage of director 
shareholdings is measured by taking the total percentage of shareholdings owned by 
all of the directors. All of this information will be extracted from the companies‘ 
corporate governance and directors‘ reports. 
The second area of corporate governance variables relates to the characteristics of the 
board‘s chairman, namely: duality (DUALITY), chairman‘s ethnicity (ETHNIC) and 
chairman‘s tenure (TENURE). Duality is measured by determining whether the board 
chairman is also the CEO of the same company. A dichotomous variable is used 
indicating 1 for companies that have the company‘s CEO as the board chairman and 0 
indicating otherwise. The ethnicity of the board‘s chairman is measured as a 
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dichotomous variable where 1 indicates that the chairman is Malay and 0 otherwise. 
Even though Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country, the majority of the population are 
Malays, followed by Chinese, Indians and others. However, the major players in the 
Malaysian economy are Chinese and Malay; therefore, this study used a dichotomous 
variable to indicate Malay or non-Malay. The tenure of the board‘s chairman is 
measured by taking the number of years the chairman has sat on the board. These sets 
of information were gathered from director profiles and corporate governance reports.  
The next corporate governance variables are the audit committee characteristics. 
Three characteristics of audit committees were selected for this study. They are: the 
independence of the audit committee members (INDAC), the proportion of audit 
committee members having at least one additional directorship in another company to 
total number of audit committee member (OUTDIR) and the frequency of audit 
committee meetings (ACMEET). Consistent with the definition and measurement 
used for the independence of board members, the independence of audit committee 
members is measured as a percentage of the number of audit committee members that 
are not employees of the company or its subsidiaries, over the total number of audit 
committee members. Outside directorships are measured by taking the number of 
audit committee members that hold directorships in other companies. The frequencies 
of audit committee meeting are measured by the number of meetings held by the audit 
committee members in a year. This information was extracted from audit committees‘ 
reports and director profiles. 
The last area of corporate governance variables used in this study is the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings or blockholder stock ownership, which is measured by 
taking the total percentage of blockholders (institutional) that own more than 5% of 
shares in the company (direct shareholdings). This information was gathered from an 
analysis of the companies‘ top 30 shareholdings. Table 5-2 presents a summary of the 
operationalisation or measurement of the variables and the source from which the data 
were obtained. The table also indicates how each of the variables will be measured. 
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Table 5-2 Operationalisation of Corporate Governance Variables and the 
Sources of Information 
Variables Acronym Operationalisation/measurement of 
variables 
 
Source of 
information 
Independence of 
board members 
INBOD The proportion of independent 
directors to total number of directors 
on the board (percentage). 
Company annual 
reports, corporate 
governance reports 
and director profiles. 
 
CEO/chairman 
duality  
DUALITY Dichotomous: 1 for dual role and 0 for 
otherwise. 
Company annual 
reports, corporate 
governance reports 
and director profiles. 
 
Tenure of board‘s 
chairman  
TENURE The number of years the board‘s 
chairman has held the post. 
 
Company annual 
reports and director 
profiles. 
 
Frequency of 
board meetings 
BODMEET The number of board meeting in a year. Company annual 
reports and corporate 
governance reports. 
 
Size of 
board/Total 
number of board 
members 
TBOD The total number of board members. 
 
Company annual 
reports and corporate 
governance reports. 
Chairman‘s 
ethnicity 
ETHNIC Dichotomous: 1 for Malay chairman 
and 0 for non-Malay.  
 
Company annual 
reports and director 
profiles. 
 
 
 
Directors‘ share 
ownership 
DIROWN Percentage of company shares retained 
or owned by the directors. 
Company annual 
reports and director 
reports in financial 
statements. 
 
Independence of 
audit committee 
members 
INDAC Proportion of independent audit 
committee members to total number of 
audit committee members. 
Company annual 
reports and audit 
committee reports. 
 
 
Outside 
directorships held 
by audit 
committee 
members 
OUTDIR The proportion of audit committee 
member having at least one additional 
directorship in another company to 
total number of members. 
 
Company annual 
reports and director 
profiles. 
Frequency of 
audit committee 
meetings 
ACMEET The number of audit committee 
meeting held in a year. 
Company annual 
reports and audit 
committee reports. 
 
Blockholders‘ 
stock ownership 
BLOCK Percentage of company‘s shares 
retained or owned by institutional 
shareholders (independent 
blockholders). 
Company annual 
reports and an 
analysis of 
shareholdings. 
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5.2.2 Earnings management data 
The earnings management data were gathered from the Datastream system and 
corporate financial statements. Two types of financial data not available in the 
Datastream system are tax payable and plant, and property and equipment, so these 
data were obtained from financial statements. Other financial data used for this study 
include receivables, sales, costs of sales, current assets, current liabilities, total assets, 
total cash and bank balances, depreciation and amortization, current maturity of long-
term debt (the current portion of long-term debt or liabilities for the year), and 
inventories. The calculations for each of the ratios or indexes used for this study are 
presented in Table 5-3. The table also presents the variables‘ acronyms and the 
sources of data. 
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Table 5-3 Operationalisation of Earnings Management Variables and the 
Source of Information 
 
Variable 
 
Acronym 
 
Operationalization/measurement of variable 
 
Source of 
information 
 
Days‘ sales in 
receivable 
index 
DSRI 
11 /Re
/Re
 tt
tt
Salesceivables
Salesceivables
 
Datastream 
database and 
financial 
statements 
Gross margin 
index 
GMI 
ttt
ttt
SalessSoldCostofGoodSales
SalessSoldCostofGoodSales
/)(
/)( 111

 
 
Datastream 
database and 
financial 
statements 
Asset quality 
index 
AQI 
111 /)(1
/)(1
 

ttt
ttt
sTotalAssetPPEetsCurrentAss
sTotalAssetPPEetsCurrentAss
 
Datastream 
database and 
financial 
statements 
Sales growth 
index 
SGI 
1t
t
Sales
Sales
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Where PPE is the gross/net of property, plant and equipment for the year; LTD is long-term debt. 
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5.3 Reliability of Data Collection Procedure 
It is vital for every study that uses content analysis to ensure that the data captured are 
reliable and valid, and this requires a reliable and valid data collection procedure 
(Krippendorff, 1980). It is therefore very important to be consistent with the 
measurement used for each variable. The definition and measurement for each 
variable was explained in the data collection section. To ensure the data are valid and 
reliable a second coder was appointed to extract the same corporate governance 
variables according to the definitions and measurements as explained. The second 
coder was someone familiar with Malaysian financial reporting and corporate 
governance reports. The second coder randomly selected a sample of companies‘ 
corporate governance reports and extracted data on the 11 characteristics chosen for 
this study. The second coder then compared the data collected with the data collected 
by the first coder to check if there was any discrepancy. Since the definitions and 
measurements for the corporate governance variables are clear, there was no 
discrepancy in either set of data extracted by the two coders. Data for earnings 
management variables were obtained directly from the Datastream system, except for 
tax payable and plant, property and equipment, which were extracted from financial 
statements. For the two types of data, the same second coder was assigned to extract 
the data and the same procedures were applied with this set of data as the corporate 
governance data. 
5.4 Time Period for Data Collection 
As it is difficult to determine exactly when fraud was committed, the fraud year is 
defined as the year in which the companies were charged for fraud or were listed in 
the Securities Enforcement Release. This is consistent with other studies conducted in 
this area (e.g. Beasley, 1999; Rosner, 2003). Therefore, data were collected for the 
first year of fraud (year t) and the year prior to the first year of fraud (year t-1). For 
non-fraudulent companies, the determinant of years (t) and (t-1) for data collection 
depends on the fraudulent sample‘s year. This definition of fraud year is applied to the 
earnings management time period for data collection as well.  
There are two sets of time periods for data collection in this study. First is the time 
period for corporate governance data, which is two years: the first year of fraud and 
the year prior to the first year of fraud. For corporate governance variables, this study 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 119 
analyses and compares the corporate governance characteristics for the first year of 
fraud for both groups as well as the year prior to the first year of fraud. Since the exact 
occurrence of fraud is not known, it is appropriate to analyse the year prior to the first 
year of fraud as well. 
Second is the time period for the earnings management data, which is six years for 
five years of analysis. Therefore, data were analysed for year t, year t-1, year t-2, year 
t-3 and year t-4. This enables us to see the trends in earnings management over the 
five years. Again, as the exact occurrences of earnings manipulation are not known, a 
trend analysis for the earnings management indices is significant for the study. The 
data for both groups were analysed to identify any significant differences between the 
groups‘ earnings management indices that could indicate if any of the companies are 
at risk of fraud. 
5.5 Data Analysis 
Data were analysed using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences version 17. The 
tests used were descriptive statistics, univariate analysis (nonparametric test), 
correlation analysis and logistic regression analysis.  
5.5.1 Descriptive analysis 
Descriptive analysis was carried out to answer research questions one. The corporate 
governance variables and earnings management variables of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent companies were analysed to determine the corporate governance and 
earnings management practices of both samples for each year or specified period. 
Before the data were analysed, their normality was tested using frequency tabulations. 
Bryman and Cramer (1990) indicate that frequency tabulations are usually the first 
step in statistical analysis used in summarizing data. By using frequency tabulations, 
variables are ‗cleaned-up‘. This is where error can be detected and corrections can be 
made before further analyses are carried out. Norusis (1998) notes that if the data are 
not ‗cleaned-up‘, all analysis conducted will be inaccurate.  
When testing hypotheses, a particular statistical test is adopted and each statistical test 
has certain assumptions. These assumptions guide users in understanding the 
appropriateness of or reason to perform the statistical test and these assumptions must 
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be met in order to ensure accurate results (Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner & Barrett, 
2007). Basically, there are two types of statistical test: parametric tests and 
nonparametric tests. The most common statistical test assumptions are: independence 
of observations, homogeneity of variance, normality and linearity. Parametric tests 
require all these assumptions to be met, in particular the normality assumption. For 
sets of data that do not meet or violate the normality and linearity assumptions, 
nonparametric tests are more appropriate. The normality test assumes that the 
distribution of the variables is approximately normally distributed, having most of the 
values in the middle range and a few in the lower or higher ranges (Morgan et al., 
2007). Normality can be assessed by obtaining the skewness and kurtosis values as 
well as using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) procedure (Pallant, 2007). A normality 
test was performed on both sets of data using the K-S procedure and the normal 
probability plot indicated that the data in this study are not normally distributed. 
However, when a sample is big, a lack of normality is common. With the not 
normally distributed data and corporate governance consisting of categorical and 
continuous data, as well as the sample being matched (non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies), it is appropriate to use a nonparametric (Chi-square, Mann-Whitney U or 
Wilcoxon) test for this study. 
The corporate governance data comprise both categorical (dichotomous) and 
continuous data, while all the earnings management data are continuous. Descriptive 
analysis for continuous data is mean and median, while frequencies analysis is carried 
out for categorical data. 
5.5.2 Inferential analysis 
Univariate analysis was carried out to determine the differences in corporate 
governance characteristics and earnings management variables between the fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies. For continuous data the test was done through 
analysing the variables‘ means and medians using the Wilcoxon Sum Rank test and 
Mann-Whitney U test, which are both nonparametric tests. Nonparametric statistics 
are appropriate when the data is categorical or ordinal and when the data do not meet 
the parametric statistical assumptions (Pallant, 2007). The Wilcoxon Sum Rank test is 
designed for repeated measures of data either under two occasions or two different 
conditions to test the difference between the times studied. This is a nonparametric 
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alternative to the repeated measures t-test, where it compares the converted scores‘ 
ranks between time one and time two. The Mann-Whitney U test is used in testing the 
differences between two groups by comparing the medians instead of the means. For 
the categorical data, chi-square tests for independence were used to examine the 
relationship between the variables and fraud occurrences. This test is used to explore 
relationships between categorical variables and their significance. The test compares 
the frequency of cases in one variable with another variable (Pallant, 2007). These 
univariate tests examined whether there were significant differences in the corporate 
governance characteristics and earnings management variables between the fraudulent 
and non-fraudulent companies on a univariate basis.  
Correlation analysis was performed on the data to identify general associations 
between dependent variables and independent variables and as well as associations 
among the independent variables. This analysis helps in identifying any significant 
collinearity problems that could affect the logistic regression analysis.  
To further determine the multivariate relationships between the corporate governance 
characteristics, earnings management variables and corporate fraud, logistic cross-
sectional regression analysis was carried out using the proposed models for the 
corporate governance and earnings management variables. The corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings management variables of fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies were tested using logistic regression analysis to examine the relationship 
of each variable with fraud occurrences. This will answer question three.  
Logistic regression analysis was used in this study due to the disproportionate sample 
groups (Maddala, 1991). Maddala also states that the coefficients of explanatory 
variables are not affected due to disproportionate sampling, but the constant term is 
affected. However, it is only necessary to correct the constant term if the objective of 
the study is to develop a predictive model (Palepu, 1986). Logistic regression also 
allows the predictors to be discrete, continuous, and dichotomous or a mix (Tabachnik 
& Fidell, 2007), which is suitable for this study. Logistic regression is appropriate for 
studies where the dependent variable data are dichotomous (Morgan et al., 2007; 
Pallant, 2007; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Multiple regression or ordinary linear 
regression is not suitable for a study that has categorical dependent variables and a not 
normal distribution (Pallant, 2007). Furthermore, logistic regression does answer the 
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same questions as discriminant analysis and multiple regressions, with the exception 
of dichotomous dependent variables, and it is relaxed on the assumptions for the 
predictor (independent variables), namely normality, linearity and equal variances 
(Hair Jr, Balck, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). 
Logistic regression analysis attempts to correctly predict the outcome from a set of 
predictors, which is the aim of this study. Also, the use of logistic regression in 
analysing the data is consistent with many other studies in the same area as this study 
(Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000; Beneish, 1997, 1999a; Bradbury et al., 2006; 
Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Grove & Basilico, 2008; Hasnan et al., 2008; Persons, 1995). 
The goal of logistic regression is the same as other statistical techniques of regression, 
that is ‗to find the best fitting and most parsimonious, yet biologically reasonable 
model to describe the relationship between an outcome (dependent or response model) 
and a set of independent (predictor or explanatory) variables‘ (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 
2000, p. 1). Logistic regression was adopted for this study to explore whether certain 
sets of predictors could indicate if a company is at-risk of fraud, where the dependent 
variables are dichotomous, taking the values 0 for non-fraudulent companies and 1 for 
fraudulent ones. The independent variables or predictors for corporate governance and 
earnings management were discussed in chapter four. The analysis was performed 
separately for corporate governance characteristics and earnings management 
variables. The models used to analyse the data will now be explained. 
To analyse and test the relationships between the corporate governance variables and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrence, the following models (consistent with 
Beasley, 1996; Uzun et al. 2004; Persons, 2005) were used for the logistic regression 
analysis: 
FRAUD i  =   + 1 INDBOD i  + 2 DUALITY + 3 TENURE i  + 4 BODMEET i  
+ 5 TBOD i  + 6 ETHNIC i  + 7 DIROWN i  + 8 INDAC i  + 9 OUTDIR i + 
10 ACMEET i  + 11 BLOCK i  + i  
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Where: 
FRAUD = A dummy variable with a value of 1 when a firm is alleged to have 
experienced financial statement fraud and a value of 0 otherwise. 
INDBOD = The percentage of board members who are not the companies‘ 
managing directors (not currently officers or employees of the 
companies). 
DUALITY = The CEO is also the chairman of the board. 
TENURE = The number of years the chairman has served as a director. 
BODMEET = The frequency or number of board meetings in a year. 
TBOD  = The number of members on the board. 
ETHNIC = The chairman‘s ethnicity; Malay or other. 
DIROWN = The percentage of manager (insider) ownership of company shares. 
INDAC = The proportion of independent audit committee members to total 
number of audit committee members. 
OUTDIR = The proportion of audit committee member having at least one 
additional directorship in another company to total number of 
members. 
ACMEET = The number of audit committee meetings held in a year. 
BLOCK = The percentage of individual blockholders in the companies. 
i  = The firms. 
   = The residual. 
   = The slope coefficient. 
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To analyse and test the earnings management variables, the same model was used: 
FRAUD i  =   + 1 DSRI i  + 2 GMI i  + 3 AQI i  + 4 SGI i  + 5 TATA i  + 6
DEPI i  + 7 LVI i  + 8 INVR i  + 9 INVSR i + i  
Where: 
DSRI = Days‘ sales in receivables index   
GMI = Gross margin index 
AQI = Asset quality index    
SGI = Sales growth index  
TATA = Total accruals to total assets index 
DEPI = Depreciation index 
LVI = Leverage index 
INVR = Inventories ratio 
INVSR= Inventories growth over sales growth ratio 
Before the logistic regression was carried out, multicollinearity analysis was 
performed on all variables. It is important to check for high inter-correlations among 
the predictor or dependent variables. There should not be high correlations among the 
dependent variables, and there should be some correlation, ideally high correlation, 
between the dependent variables and the independent variables. There is no formal or 
particular way to address this issue under logistic regression; therefore, multiple 
regression analysis was carried out to obtain the collinearity statistics‘ results. The 
tolerance value and VIF value for the collinearity statistics‘ results indicate whether 
there is a multicollinearity problem with the variables. A tolerance value under 0.1 
indicates that there are high correlations between the variables and a VIF value of 
more than 10 indicates there is a possibility of multicollinearity among the variables 
(Pallant, 2007). A correlation analysis was also conducted on all variables to see 
whether any (independent) variables were highly correlated, which could indicate the 
presence of a multicollonearity problem.  
According to Hair Jr. et al. (2006) there are three approaches to assessing the overall 
fit of a logistic regression model namely; Statistical measures of overall model fit, 
Pseudo R
2
 and Classification accuracy. The first is statistical measures of overall 
model fit The first approach have two test that are Omnibus Test of Model 
Coefficients, and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test. The chi-square (Omnibus 
Test of Model Coefficients) test for the change in the log-likelihood (-2LL) value 
from the base model which is comparable to the F-test in multiple regression analysis. 
Logistic regression is estimated much like multiple regression in that a base (null) 
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model is first estimated to provide a standard for comparison (Hair Jr. et al., 2006). 
The null model (Block 0) only has a constant included (Field, 2009; Hair Jr. et al., 
2006) and is generated as the first step of the regression model development. 
Independent variables are added to the null model so as to improve its predictability. 
Multiple regression uses the mean to set the base model and calculate the total sums 
of squares meanwhile, logistic regression uses the mean to set the log likelihood value 
(Hair Jr. et al., 2006).The log likelihood indicates the improvement in the likelihood 
of data observed (Block 1) in the hypothesised model with the model without the data 
observed (Block 0). The base model is the Block 0 (a model without entering the 
variables/data), which will be the baseline to compare the predictors‘ model (Block 1- 
model when variables/data is entered) with. The significant value for the chi-square 
test should be less than 0.05 for the predictors‘ model in Block 1, which means the 
model with the predictors is better than the base model. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test 
is another statistical measure of the overall fit of the analysis. For this test, a 
significant value of more than 0.05 indicates that the model is good (Tabachnik & 
Fidell, 2007). 
Second, the Pseudo R
2
in logistic regression (R
2
 in multiple regressions) is another 
indicator of the usefulness of a model. This is shown by the Cox and Snell R 2  and 
Nagelkerke R
2
 values, which indicate the amount of variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the model (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). The third is 
Classification Table which indicates how well the model predicts the category to be 
correct. The Classification Table in the base model is compared with the predictors‘ 
inclusion model to see the improvement as a result of the inclusion of the predictors 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). A higher percentage of accuracy in the predictors‘ model 
means the model is useable as it is better than the base model.  
The Wald test is used to test the significance of each coefficient in a model 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Logistic regression focused on the Wald test, coefficients 
and odds ratios for interpretation of the results (Hair Jr. et al., 2006; Morgan et al., 
2007; Pallant, 2007; Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). A predictor with a significant value 
of less than 0.05 indicates a significant predictor for the model. The β values provided 
in the variables in the equation table are equivalent to the B values in multiple 
regressions (Pallant, 2007), and these values indicate the direction of the relationship 
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(positive or negative). Thus negative values indicate an increase in independent 
variables will result in a decrease in the dependent variable or the other way round 
with positive values (Pallant, 2007).  
The odd ratios in logistic regression are presented by the Exp(β). Kleinbaum, Kupper, 
Muller and Nizam (1998, p. 658) define odds as ‗the ratio of the probability that some 
event (e.g. developing lung cancer) will occur divided by the probability that the event 
will not occur (e.g. not developing lung cancer)‘. Tabachnik and Fidell (2007, p. 461) 
state that odds ratios indicate ‗the change in odds of being in one of the categories of 
outcome when the value of a predictor increases by one unit‘. Odd ratios indicate an 
increase/decrease of the odds for each unit, increase the predictor variables.  Hosmer 
and Lemeshow (2000) define odd ratios as the ratios of the odds for y = 1 to the odds 
for y = 0. If the odds value is more than one, the odd of the outcome of 1 occurring 
increase as the predictors increases (Field, 2009; Pallant, 2007). 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology adopted in this study and gave reasons for the 
methods adopted. It also explained the measurement of the variables and the sources 
of information from which the data were gathered. Even though financial data can be 
obtained from financial statements, most of the data in this study were obtained from 
the Datastream database. This was to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data 
used. A discussion on the sampling method used, which is a vital part of this study, 
was also presented in this chapter.  
The results of the data analyses and hypotheses testing are presented in the next 
chapter. 
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    Chapter 6                                                               
Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the results of the various tests carried out on the data for this 
study. The chapter starts with a general discussion of the overall characteristics of the 
sample. The following sections present the results of the descriptive and inferential 
analyses of the data for the corporate governance and earnings management variables. 
The inferential analyses performed on both sets of data were univariate analysis, 
correlation and collinearity analyses, and logistic regression analysis. Univariate 
analysis was performed on the corporate governance and earnings management 
variables using the chi-square and Mann-Whitney U tests in order to determine 
differences between the two independent groups (non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies) in continuous measures for all years studied. The correlation and 
collinearity analysis was performed to determine if there was a multicollinearity 
problem for the data before the logistic regression was performed. Logistic regression 
was performed to determine the relationships between the variables and the likelihood 
of fraud, which will highlight significant predictors of the likelihood of fraud 
occurrences. The presentation of the results is divided into three sections. The first 
section gives a brief overview of the sample. The second presents the results for the 
corporate governance variables, and the third presents the results for the earnings 
management variables. A summary of the results is presented at the end of the 
chapter. 
6.1 Descriptive Overview of the Sample 
Data were collected from both samples—non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies, as 
determined in Chapter Four, section 4.2. Descriptive analysis was carried out to 
determine the frequency of certain phenomena in both sets of data; this included 
corporate governance variables and earnings management variables. Descriptive 
analysis of the total assets (in millions of RM13) of non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies, as well as the statistical test of differences between the two groups‘ total 
assets, is presented in Table 6-1. Both nonparametric tests, Wilcoxon and Mann-
                                                 
13 The Malaysian currency is the ringgit, with the currency sign RM. 
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Whitney U, were performed on the data and the result indicates that the difference 
between the two groups is not significant. This is consistent with the selection criteria 
of the samples, where both groups were matched according to their industry, time 
period and company size (measured by total assets).  
Table 6-1 Comparison of sample companies’ total assets of both groups 
 (RM Million) 
 
Non-
fraudulent 
(Total assets) 
Fraudulent 
(Total assets) 
Mean  399,307 542,436 
Max 1,187,353 1,724,590 
Min  47,138 55,917 
Wilcoxon Test (p) 0.859 
Mann-Whitney U test (p) 0.095 
6.2 Corporate Governance Analyses and Results 
This section presents the analyses and results of the corporate governance variables. 
The section starts with the results from the descriptive analysis of the first year of 
fraud. In this study, the first year of fraud refers to the year the company was first 
charged with fraud by the Malaysian Securities Commission (MSC) and listed in the 
MSC Enforcement Release (hereafter referred to as year t). The year prior to the first 
year of fraud is referred to as year t-1. The second part of the section presents the 
inferential (univariate and logistic regression) analyses and results for year t, followed 
by a discussion of the analyses and results for year t-1. As discussed in Chapter four 
(section 4.2.1), the corporate governance variables analysed were: independence of 
board of directors (INBOD), size of board (TBOD), frequency of board meetings 
(BODMEET), director shareholdings (DIROWN), chairman‘s duality (DUALITY), 
chairman‘s tenure (TENURE), chairman‘s ethnicity (ETHNIC), independence of 
audit committee members (INDAC), percentage of audit committee members holding 
outside directorships (OUTDIR), frequency of audit committee meetings (ACMEET) 
and institutional shareholding (BLOCK). The descriptive results will now be 
presented. 
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6.2.1 Descriptive analyses and results of corporate governance 
variables 
This section presents the descriptive analyses and results of the corporate governance 
variables for year t and t-1. The descriptive analyses for the corporate governance 
variables were carried out separately for the categorical (dichotomous) and continuous 
variables. The categorical/dichotomous variables (DUALITY and ETHNIC) are 
described using frequencies analysis, while the continuous variables are described 
using the variables‘ means. To analyse the differences in both dichotomous variables 
between year‘s t and t-1, the chi-square test was performed, while the Wilcoxon Sign 
Ranks test was performed to test the differences in the continuous variables between 
year‘s t and t-1 for each group. The results for the dichotomous variables are 
presented in Table 6-2.  
Analysis of both years indicated that chairman duality (DUALTIY) and ethnicity 
(ETHNIC) for non-fraudulent companies were not significantly different. In year t 
(first year of fraud), out of 149 non-fraudulent companies, 16% of the companies‘ 
board chairmen were also CEO, and this is consistent with the year prior to the first 
year of fraud (year t-1). On the other hand, the fraudulent companies‘ descriptive 
analysis indicated that there were differences in the percentages of duality and 
ethnicity between the two years. The descriptive analysis showed that 28% of 
fraudulent companies had dual roles in year t, an increase from 9% in year t-1. The 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2001) stresses the importance of 
the separation of chairman and CEO, as this helps prevent the CEO from 
overpowering the board. However, the MCCG (2001) does not make separation of the 
roles mandatory. The results show that a majority of the companies followed the 
MCCG best practices, which stress the need to separate the roles of CEO and 
chairman. A detailed investigation into this variable for the fraudulent group 
suggested a troubling scenario where at least three of the companies had changes in 
directors or directors resigning within a year of appointment leading up to year t. This 
could indicate that the board might have been aware of fraudulent activities before 
they were made public. Nevertheless, the chi-square test for both groups indicated no 
significant difference in DUALITY between year t and t-1. The insignificant 
difference between both groups may be due to a majority of companies complying 
with the MCCG best practices. One might question if the separation of these two roles 
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is a good practice in Malaysian companies. But nevertheless, the MCCG 2012 
recommends these roles be separated and the chairman is a non-executive member of 
the board. 
For the second dichotomous variable, ETHNIC, 46% of non-fraudulent companies‘ 
chairmen were Malay for year t, which is a slight decrease from 49% in year t-1. For 
the fraudulent companies, 27% of the chairmen were Malay for year t and 18% for 
year t-1. Again the chi-square test did not reveal any significant difference in 
ETHNIC for both groups of companies between the two years studied. With respect to 
these two dichotomous variables, the results indicate that there is no difference 
between the two years for both groups of companies. The fact that Chinese are the 
major players in the capital market and own a significant number of public companies 
could contribute to the high number of Chinese chairmen in Malaysian companies. 
Table 6-2 Frequency distribution for duality and ethnicity of non-fraudulent 
and fraudulent companies for year’s t and t-1 
Variables 
Non-fraudulent companies Fraudulent companies 
Year t Year t-1 Z Year t Year t-1 Z 
DUALITY 
YES 
24 
(16%) 
24 (16%) 
-0.000 
2 (28%) 1 (9%)  
-1.000 
NO 
125 
(84%) 
125 
(84%) 
9 (72%) 
10 
(91%) 
Total  149 149 11 11 
ETHNIC 
MALAY 
69 
(46%) 
73 (49%) 
-1.265 
3 (27%) 2 (18%) 
-1.000 
OTHERS 
80 
(54%) 
76 (51%) 8 (73%) 9 (72%) 
Total  149 149 11 11 
 
Table 6-3 presents the continuous variables‘ means for both groups of companies for 
the two years. For the non-fraudulent companies, the means for each of the variables 
did not show obvious differences between year‘s t and t-1. There are small differences 
in percentage of INBOD, INDAC and OUTDIR of the two years for non-fraudulent 
companies. On the other hand, for the fraudulent companies there were quite obvious 
differences in the means for almost all the variables between the two years. However, 
it cannot be said that there was any significant difference in the practices of both 
groups for the two years. Further analysis was carried out to investigate whether there 
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was a significant difference in the practices of both groups for the two years using the 
Wilcoxon Sign Rank test. 
Table 6-3 Discriptive analysis of corporate governance continous variables of 
non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies for year’s t and t-1 
Variables 
No-fraud/Year t No-fraud/Year t-1 Fraud/Year t Fraud/Year t-1 
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min 
INBOD                                                                                        
(%) 
42.35 67 29 40.44 67 27 43.83 71 33 37.35 67 25 
TBOD 
 
7.9 15 4 7.9 15 4 7.27 12 4 7.2 9 5 
BODMEET 
 
5.1 17 2 5.1 14 2 8.8 30 5 6.35 16 3 
DIROWN 
(%) 
10.24 82 0 10.34 95 0 9.07 52 0 10.4 52 0 
TENURE 
 
9.8 40 1 9.8 39 1 4.5 12 1 8.4 41 1 
INDAC 
(%) 
75.58 100 40 73.42 100 60 71.47 100 50 74.3 100 .3567 
OUTDIR 
(%) 
60.44 100 0 58.34 100 0 43.15 100 0 50.15 100 0 
ACMEET 
 
4.79 17 3 4.8 16 3 6.44 13 4 5.4 7 2 
BLOCK 
(%) 
41.35 89 0 41.4 86 0 21.15 58 0 21.15 58 0 
 
In order to compare the corporate governance practices over the two years, the 
Wilcoxon Sign Rank test was carried out. This test, also known as the Wilcoxon 
Matched Pairs Signed Rank test, is designed for use with repeated measures, which in 
this study refers to the corporate governance variables in year‘s t and t-1. This test is 
also appropriate when samples are matched on specific criteria (Pallant, 2007). The 
results are presented in Table 6-4. 
 
The test revealed that for the non-fraudulent group, three corporate governance 
variables were significantly different between the two years. These variables are the 
percentage of independent board members (INBOD), chairman tenure on the board 
(TENURE) and the percentage of independent audit committee members (INDAC). 
All three variables (INBOD, TENURE and INDAC) were significantly different at the 
5% significance level (p < 0.05). The results show that the percentages of INBOD, 
TENURE of chairman and percentage of INDAC were higher in year t than year t-1. 
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The effect size of the differences for INBOD was medium (0.24) and INDAC was 
small (0.19); however, the effect size of TENURE was large (0.65). The reason could 
be it was time to change the directors/chairman. On the other hand, the fraudulent 
group‘s result indicates only the frequency of audit committee meetings (ACMEET) 
was significantly different between the two years, at the 10% significance level and 
with a small effect size (0.14). The effect size (r) makes clear the strength of the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables while statistical 
significance provides information on whether any relationship exists between the 
dependent variables and independent variables (Cohen, Cohen, West & Aiken, 2003). 
Cohen (1988) indicates that an effect size of 0.1 is small, 0.3 is medium and 0.5 is 
large.  
Table 6-4 Wilcoxon Sign Rant Test of differences of Corporate Governance 
Continous Variables for Non-fraudulent and Fraudulent Companies 
across years 
Variables 
Non-fraudulent companies Fraudulent companies 
z p r z p r 
INBOD (%) 
-2.993
a
 0.003*** 
0.24 
-1.334
a
 0.182 
- 
TBOD 
-0.734
a
 0.463 
- 
-0.740
c
 0.459 
- 
BODMEET 
-0.191
a
 0.849 
- 
-0.851
a
 0.395 
- 
DIROWN 
(%) -0.071
a
 0.943 
- 
-0.507
c
 0.612 
- 
TENURE 
-8.227
a
 0.000*** 
0.65 
-1.069
a
 0.285 
- 
INDAC (%) -2.386
a
 0.017** 
0.19 
-0.184
a
 0.854 
- 
OUTDIR 
(%) -1.479
a
 0.139 
- 
-1.604
c
 0.109 
- 
ACMEET -0.787
c
 0.431 
- 
-1.802
a
 0.072* 
0.14 
BLOCK 
(%) -1.273
a
 0.203 
- 
-1.214
a
 0.225 
- 
a, b and c denote the sum based on positive rank, negative ranks equal to positive ranks and positive 
ranks, respectively.                                                                                                                            
*,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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6.2.2 Inferential analyses of corporate governance variables 
This section presents the results of the inferential analyses and hypotheses testing for 
the corporate governance variables. The inferential analyses and results are divided 
into three parts: first is the univariate analysis and hypotheses testing of differences; 
the second part is the results of the correlation and collinearity analyses; and the third 
part presents the results of the logistic regression analysis and hypotheses testing of 
relationships. 
6.2.2.1 Differences in corporate governance variables between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies 
This section presents the results of the univariate analysis and hypotheses testing of 
differences (Ha) for the corporate governance variables (which answers research 
question one) for years t and t-1. Univariate analysis and the chi-square and Mann-
Whitney U tests were performed to test the corporate governance variables‘ 
hypotheses for both years. The results are divided into four sections according to the 
corporate governance characteristic, namely: board of directors‘ characteristics, board 
chairman‘s characteristics, audit committee‘s characteristics and institutional 
shareholders. A summary of the results is presented in Table 6-5. 
Table 6-5 Mann-Whitney U Test of differences of corporate governance 
variables of non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies for both years 
Variable 
Year t Year t-1 
Z p r Z p r 
INBOD -0.296 0.768 - -1.200 0.230 - 
TBOD -2.781 0.005** 0.22 -2.053 0.040** 0.16 
BODMEET -2.946 0.003** 0.21 -0.944 0.345 - 
DIROWN -1.228 0.219 - -0.526 0.599 - 
TENURE -2.139 0.032* 0.17 -1.461 0.144 - 
INDAC -1.222 0.222 - -0.787 0.431 - 
OUTDIR -2.312 0.021* 0.18 -1.311 0.190 - 
ACMEET -3.062 0.002** 0.24 -0.386 0.700 - 
BLOCK -2.540 0.011* 0.20 -2.797 0.005* 0.22 
DUALITY 1.000 0.562 - 1.000 0.462  
ETHNIC 0.347 0.182 - 2.766 0.096***  
*, **,*** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Board of directors’ characteristics 
Univariate analysis was carried out on the board of directors‘ characteristics, which 
were: percentage of independent board directors (INBOD), size of board (TBOD), 
frequency of board meetings (BODMEET) and percentage of directors‘ shareholding 
ownerships (DIROWN). The analysis was carried out to test the null hypotheses (for 
differences between groups) of all four corporate governance characteristics. The 
results are presented in Table 6-5. 
The univariate result shows that there was no significant difference between the non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to the percentage of INBOD for 
both years. Therefore, the null hypothesis 1a is not rejected for both years. This result 
indicates that there is no difference in the independence of board members between 
the two groups. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance requires companies to 
have at least a third of the board members be independent. This could be one of the 
reasons why there is no difference between the two groups in this variable. This result 
is consistent with the findings of Hasnan et al. (2008) that the independence of the 
board has no significant relationship with fraudulent financial reporting in Malaysia. 
The MCCG (2012) recommends reassessment of directors‘ independence every year 
to ensure that they are genuinely independent from the company. Perhaps a suggestion 
by Ahrens, Filatotchev and Thomsen (2011) in their discussion on the new frontier of 
corporate governance should be taken into consideration. They suggest going beyond 
just assessing directors‘ independence and looking at their competency as well. 
The size of the board (TBOD) was found to be significantly different between the 
non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies in both years. In year t, TBOD was 
significant at the 1% significance level (p = 0.005). The results show that the strength 
of the relationship ranged from small to medium (r = 0.22) in the differences between 
non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to TBOD. While in year t-1 
TBOD was significant at the 5% significance level (p = 0.040) with a small strength (r 
= 0.16) in the differences of TBOD between the two groups. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis 2a is rejected for both years. These results show that there is a significant 
difference in the size of the board (TBOD) between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies for both years. The analysis of the mean ranks showed that the board size 
for the non-fraudulent companies is significantly larger than the fraudulent companies 
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for both years, which indicates that non-fraudulent companies have more directors on 
their boards than fraudulent companies. This result shows that having at least eight 
members on the board can influence (reduce) the likelihood of corporate fraud. The 
effectiveness of a TBOD of at least eight members in this study is consistent with the 
suggestions by Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), so it can be concluded 
that the minimum number of board members suggested by these authors is applicable 
and effective in the Malaysian environment. This result is consistent with Hasnan et 
al. (2008) and the recommendation of the MCCG Blueprint (2011). Also, having a 
large number of directors did not increase the effectiveness of board monitoring and 
control. This finding is consistent with Chen et al. (2007) and Samili and Labelle 
(2009). 
Univariate analysis of the frequency of board meetings (BODMEET) showed that 
there was a significant relationship between the frequency of board meetings of non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies for year t, with a significance value of 0.003 at 
the 1% significance level. Therefore, null hypothesis 3a is rejected. This result 
indicates that there was a significant difference between the non-fraudulent and 
fraudulent companies with respect to BODMEET. The strength of the relationship is 
0.21, which is a small-to-medium strength of association in the differences in 
BODMEET between the two groups. The mean ranks showed that the fraudulent 
companies‘ means were higher than the non-fraudulent companies‘. This shows that 
fraudulent companies tend to have more meetings in the first year of fraud than the 
non-fraudulent companies. This result suggests the possibility that having more 
meetings is a distress sign for a company, perhaps due to fraudulent activities being 
uncovered. And most probably it is uncovered in year t. This result is not consistent 
with Abbott et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2007), who found the more frequent the 
board meets the better, as they can control and monitor management activities. But it 
is consistent with Uzun et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004), who found that frequent 
board meetings do not necessarily lead to effective monitoring and control.  
However, the same null hypothesis (H3) is rejected for year t-1. The result indicated 
that there was no significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies with respect to the number of board meetings (BODMEET) for year t-1. A 
detailed investigation showed that the average number of board meetings held by non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies for that year did not vary widely; between 5 and 
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6 meetings, respectively. This could contribute to the result not being significantly 
different between the two groups. The reason could be that the directors were not 
aware of any fraudulent activities yet in this year and therefore only had the minimum 
number of meetings. 
Analysis of the directors‘ shareholdings (DIROWN) indicated that there was no 
significant difference between the two groups with respect to the percentage of 
directors with shareholdings for both years; therefore, null hypothesis 4a is not 
rejected. This result is in contrast with the findings of Owens-Jackson et al. (2009), 
who discovered that a higher percentage of director ownership in companies reduces 
the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting. The insignificant differences in 
directors‘ shareholdings between the groups in Malaysia may be due to the fact that 
companies in Malaysia are often family owned. Thus, a majority of companies have 
the owner‘s family members on the board; this is true for both non-fraudulent 
companies and fraudulent ones. 
Chairman’s characteristics 
This section presents the results of the univariate analyses and null hypotheses testing 
of the chairman‘s characteristics, namely: chairman‘s duality (DUALITY), ethnicity 
(ETHNIC) and number of years as chairman of the board (TENURE). The results are 
presented in Table 6-5. 
Testing of hypothesis 5a proved that that there was no significant difference in 
chairman‘s duality (DUALITY) between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies for both years; therefore, H5 is not rejected. Upon investigation of this 
variable, the descriptive analysis (Table 5-2) showed that for both years studied 84% 
of non-fraudulent companies‘ CEOs were not board chairman. A similar result was 
found for fraudulent companies, where in year t, 72% of the fraudulent companies‘ 
CEOs were not board chairman, and 91% in year t-1. This result indicates that the 
separation of CEO and board chairman for both groups was not statistically different. 
The Malaysia Corporate Governance Code (MCCG) does not require companies to 
keep these roles separate; however, it does encourage their separation and requires 
companies to states the existence of dual roles in their reports. Even though the 
separation is not mandatory, both groups of companies did have quite a high 
percentage of board chairmen who were not CEO. This may have contributed to the 
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in Malaysia 
 137 
insignificant results for this variable. This shows that Malaysian companies adhere to 
the MCCG best practices and separate the roles of CEO and chairman. 
Null hypothesis 6a is not rejected as the result showed that there was no significant 
difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to the 
ethnicity of board chairman (ETHNIC) for year t. However, for year t-1 the result did 
not support null hypothesis 6a, as it indicated that there was a significant difference in 
chairman‘s ethnicity between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies, with a 
significance value of 0.0.096 (significant at 10% significance level). Therefore, null 
hypothesis 6a for ETHNIC is rejected; there was a significant difference between the 
non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to chairman‘s ethnicity. The r 
value was 0.16, indicating that the strength of the difference was small. The 
frequencies distribution analysis (Table 6-3) clearly shows that 9 out of 11 companies 
had non-Malay‘s chairmen in the fraudulent group, while in the non-fraudulent group 
the distribution was almost even (almost 50 were Malay).  
The result of the analysis did not support null hypothesis 7a for year t as it was found 
that there was a significant difference in chairman‘s tenure (TENURE) between non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies, with a significance value of 0.03 (significant at 
5% significance level). The r value was 0.17, indicating that the strength of the 
difference is small. The mean ranks analysis showed that the non-fraudulent 
companies‘ chairmen‘s tenure was higher than the fraudulent companies‘. Null 
hypothesis 7a for year t-1 is not rejected as the result showed that there was no 
significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with 
respect to the tenure of the board chairman in year t-1. The result for TENURE 
indicated that only in year t was TENURE significantly different between the two 
groups of companies, with a small strength of association in the differences. Upon 
investigation of the mean ranks, the result indicated that non-fraudulent companies 
having a chairman with a longer tenure reduces the likelihood of fraud. This may be 
due to the fact that the length of time increases the chairman‘s knowledge and 
expertise in monitoring the company. This result is consistent with the findings of 
Chen et al. (2006), who note that longer tenure reduces the likelihood of fraud. Liew, 
Alfan and Devi (2015) in their study on the relationship of director‘s tenure, related 
party transaction expropriation and firm value conclude that the longer the tenure the 
more effective in controlling and monitoring. Higher tenure increases the firm value. 
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The MCCG 2012 has limited the tenure to 9 years, of which an independent director 
may continue; 
- Subject to director‘s re-designation as a non-independent director; 
- Board must make justification  
- Obtain the approval of shareholders if the directors retains as independent 
director. 
The proposed MCCG 2016 continues to emphasize on the 9 years tenure of 
directorship. This emphasized could be due to the notion that the longer the tenure 
increases the influence of directors over the board decision (Hill and Phan, 1991; 
Mace, 1986; Paton and Baker, 1987; Hermalin, 2005). This study found that (on 
univariate analysis result) that the non-fraudulent companies have higher chairman‘s 
tenure as compared to fraudulent companies. Upon investigation on the data, the non-
fraudulent companies‘ average tenure is 9.8 while fraudulent companies were less 
than that (4 – 8.4). One possible explanation could be, the director become more 
experienced and knowledgeable with respect to the company‘s activities and thus 
increases the effectiveness in monitoring and controlling the company‘s activities. 
The differences in the institutional setting could have impacted on the result.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Audit committee characteristics 
This section presents the results of the univariate analysis and null hypotheses testing 
of the audit committee characteristics, namely: the independence of the audit 
committee (INDAC), proportion of audit committee members holding more than one 
outside directorship (OUTDIR) and frequency of audit committee meetings 
(ACMEET). The results are presented in Table 6-5. 
Null hypothesis 8a for the percentage of INDAC is not rejected as the univariate 
analysis showed that there was no significant difference in the percentage of 
independent audit committee members (INDAC) between the two groups for both 
years. This result is not consistent with the findings of Owens-Jackson et al. (2009). A 
further investigation into this variable made it clear that almost all companies in both 
groups had three members on their audit committees, and this is as per the 
requirement of Bursa Malaysia (Listing Requirement, paragraph 15.10). The Listing 
Requirement also requires a majority of the audit committee members to be 
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independent (at least 2/3). For both groups and in both years the percentage of 
independent audit committee members was more than 70%. This could be the reason 
why there is no significant difference between the two groups with respect to INDAC. 
Again, this shows that companies in Malaysia fulfilled the requirements of Bursa 
Malaysia and the MCCG recommendations. The same argument applies here with the 
independence of the board members. The level or integrity of these ‗independent 
members‘ can be questioned in cases where they failed to uphold their role.  
For year t, hypothesis 9a is rejected as the analysis indicated that there was a 
significant difference in the percentage of audit committee members that held outside 
directorships (OUTDIR) between the two groups. The significance value was 0.021, 
significant at the 5% significance level. The r value was 0.18, noting a small effect 
size. The mean ranks analysis showed that more audit committee members in the non-
fraudulent companies held outside directorship than those in the fraudulent 
companies. Having more directorships could enhance directors‘ knowledge and 
understanding of a wider range of business environments and activities, which could 
benefit the companies as directors will be more effective and efficient in carrying out 
their duties. In particular, this applies to monitoring companies‘ financial reporting 
and activities. This results show that having directors with multiple directorship could 
benefit the company which is consistent with the findings or Ferris et al. (2003). 
However, H9a is not rejected for year t-1 as no significant difference was detected 
between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to the percentage 
of OUTDIR.  
Null hypothesis 10a is rejected as the analysis indicated that there was a significant 
difference in the number of audit committee meetings (ACMEET) between the two 
types of company in year t. It was significant at the 1% significance level, with a p 
value of 0.002 and an r value of 0.24, meaning the effect size ranged between small 
and medium strength. Consistent with the number of board meetings, the number of 
audit committee meetings for fraudulent companies was higher than non-fraudulent 
companies; this showed in the analysis of mean ranks (where fraudulent companies‘ 
mean ranks were higher than non-fraudulent companies‘). More frequent board or 
audit committee meetings could signal that companies are in distress, as this study 
shows that fraudulent companies tend to have more meetings than non-fraudulent 
ones. This result is consistent with the result for hypothesis 3a. The result is not 
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consistent with the findings of Abbot et al. (2004) and Uzun et al. (2004). However, 
null hypothesis 10a for year t-1 is not rejected as the result indicated that there was no 
significant difference between the two groups with respect to the number of audit 
committee meetings held in a year (ACMEET). This could suggest that any problem 
that might occur is only detected in year t. 
Institutional shareholding ownership (blockholders) 
This section presents the results for the univariate analysis and null hypothesis testing 
on the percentage of institutional shareholding ownership (BLOCK). The result is 
presented in Table 6-5. 
For both years studied, null hypothesis 11a is rejected as the result of the analysis 
showed that there was a significant difference in the percentage of institutional 
ownership (BLOCK) between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent groups. The result 
for year t indicated a significance value of 0.011 (at 5% significance level) with an r 
value of 0.20 (effect size ranged from small to medium). While for year t-1, BLOCK 
was significant at the 1% level with p = 0.005 and r = 0.23 (small to medium effect). 
The analysis of mean ranks showed that non-fraudulent companies had higher mean 
ranks than the fraudulent companies, which means the percentage of institutional 
ownership was higher in non-fraudulent companies than fraudulent ones. This result 
suggests that having a higher percentage of institutional shareholdings (BLOCK) 
reduces the likelihood of fraud. This result is consistent with the findings of Burns 
(2003), Bange and De Bondt (1998), Gilson (1990), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). 
Table 6-6 shows the differences in the mean ranks for each variable that was found to 
be significant for year‘s t and t-1 for the two groups. The total number of board 
members (TBOD) in the non-fraudulent companies was significantly higher than the 
fraudulent companies, which was shown by the mean ranks of 83 for the non-
fraudulent companies and 44 for the fraudulent companies in year t. Year t-1 showed 
mean ranks for non-fraudulent companies of 83 and fraudulent companies of 53. The 
number of board meetings (BODMEET) for non-fraudulent companies was lower 
than the fraudulent companies, and this was shown in the mean ranks of 78 for non-
fraudulent companies and 119 for fraudulent ones. The analysis showed that for 
TENURE there was a significant difference between the non-fraudulent companies 
(mean ranks = 83) and the fraudulent companies (mean ranks = 52) where the tenure 
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of the chairman in the non-fraudulent companies was higher than the fraudulent ones. 
This indicates that for non-fraudulent companies the chairman is in office longer than 
the fraudulent companies. The percentage of outside directorships held by audit 
committee members (OUTDIR) for non-fraudulent companies was higher than for 
fraudulent companies, as seen in the mean ranks (non-fraudulent = 83 and fraudulent 
= 50). This could indicate that holding more directorships does indeed increase 
directors‘ abilities to control and monitor companies‘ financial situations. The results 
also showed consistency in the difference in board meetings, as the mean ranks of 
audit committee meetings (ACMEET) for the two groups were significantly different 
(non-fraudulent companies = 78, fraudulent companies = 119). The percentage of 
independent intuitional ownership, or blockholders, (BLOCK) in non- fraudulent 
companies for both years was higher than fraudulent companies (non-fraudulent = 83 
and fraudulent = 46 for year t; non-fraudulent = 83 and fraudulent = 43 for year t-1). 
This could mean that having more institutional ownership allows for better control 
and monitoring of companies‘ activities and decision making. The mean rank for 
ETHNIC, which was found to be significant in year t-1, showed that 51% of the non-
fraudulent companies had non-Malay chairmen, while 82% of the fraudulent 
companies had non-Malay chairmen. 
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Table 6-6 Comparison of mean ranks of significant corporate governance 
variables for both years 
Variable N 
Year t Year t-1 
Median 
Mean 
Rank 
Median 
Mean 
Rank 
TBOD 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 8 83 8 83 
Fraudulent 11 6 44 7 53 
BODMEET 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 5 78 - - 
Fraudulent 11 5 119 - - 
TENURE 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 7 83 - - 
Fraudulent 11 4 52 - - 
OUTDIR 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 67 83 - - 
Fraudulent 11 33 50 - - 
ACMEET 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 5 78 - - 
Fraudulent 11 5 119 - - 
BLOCK 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 46 83 45 83 
Fraudulent 11 21 46 21 43 
ETHNIC 
Non-
fraudulent 
149 - - 
Frequencies 
51% 
Fraudulent 11 - - 82% 
 
6.2.2.2 Corporate governance variables and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud occurrences 
This section presents the results of the logistic regression analysis. The main objective 
in using logistic regression analysis, apart from its suitability and appropriateness 
considering the sets of data in this study, is to examine the overall fit of a model that 
includes the variables of interest and to analyse the significance of the variables. This 
part of the analysis tested the relationship hypothesis (Hb), which answered research 
question two. The first logistic regression model was run for all 11 corporate 
governance variables (a full regression model), regardless of whether they were found 
to be significant of not in the univariate analysis. This direct logistic regression was 
performed to assess the impact of the corporate governance variables on the 
likelihood of fraud occurrences. The model used was described in Chapter Four 
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(section 5.5.2). Stepwise logistic regression was also performed to analyse the best fit 
model for this study. The full regression model was found to be the best fit model for 
both years. The following section presents the results of the logistic regression 
analysis. The results of this analysis can also be found in Table 6-7. Before the 
logistic regression analysis was performed the correlation and collinearity analysis 
was carried out to ensure there was no multicollinearity problem among the variables. 
The result for the correlation and collinearity analysis will be presented first, followed 
by the logistic regression results. 
Multicollinearity analysis 
Before undertaking a logistic regression analysis, a multicollinearity test needs to be 
performed. This test is important as the result will enable the identification of 
independent variables that are highly correlated with each other. Upon this 
identification, if there are any highly correlated independent variables, appropriate 
action needs to be taken to prevent this variable from distorting the results. For this 
purpose, correlation analysis was carried out. A collinearity analysis was carried out 
subsequently to confirm the existence of multicollinearity, which may not be evident 
in the correlation analysis. Appendix 2 presents the matrix of the Spearman rank order 
correlation coefficient for all 11 corporate governance variables for year‘s t and t-1. 
The analysis shows that for year t, out of the six variables that were found to be 
significant in section 6.4.2.1, only TENURE was not confirmed as significantly 
correlated with the non-fraudulent/fraudulent companies. However, for year t-1, all 
three variables found to be significant in the univariate analysis were also found to be 
significantly correlated with the non-fraudulent/fraudulent companies. The correlation 
matrix also showed that some significant correlations exist among the corporate 
governance variables; however, the correlation coefficient was not large enough to 
cause a multicollinearity problem (none of the correlation coefficients were larger 
than 0.80).  
Appendix 3 presents the collinearity analysis for both years. According to Pallant 
(2007), tolerance is an indicator of the variability of the specified independent 
variable not explained by the other independent variables in the model, while the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) is the inverse of the tolerance value. A tolerance value 
of less than 0.10 indicates that there are high multiple correlations among the 
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independent variables, which could mean there is a multicollinearity problem. On the 
other hand, a VIF value higher than 10 indicates that there is a multicollinearity 
problem. The result of the collinearity diagnostic showed that none of the corporate 
governance variables were highly correlated and the results of the tolerance and VIF 
analyses confirmed that multicollinearity is not an issue for the corporate governance 
variables studied. 
Goodness of fit test 
The goodness of fit test lets the researcher know how well their model performs over 
and above the results of the baseline model (Block 0). There are three ways to assess 
the goodness of fit of a model: the goodness of fit test (Omnibus Test of Model 
Coefficient and Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test), classification accuracy and 
Cox and Snell R Square, and Nagelkerke R Square values.  
The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficient for year t indicated a chi-square value of less 
than 0.05 (significance value < 0.05); this means that the model with the variables 
used as predictors is better than the baseline model (Block 0). The result of this 
analysis showed a chi-square with a p value of 0.000, which is less than 0.05 and 
therefore the model is good. The second test of goodness of fit is the Hosmer-
Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test. For the model to be good, the significance value in 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow table should be more than 0.05 (Pallant, 2007). The result 
showed that the Hosmer-Lemeshow test had a significant value of 0.955 with a chi-
square value of 2.640. For year t-1, the Omnibus Test of Model Coefficient indicated 
a chi-square p of 0.001, which is less than 0.05 and therefore the model is good. The 
second test of goodness of fit was the Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test. The 
result for Hosmer-Lemeshow test indicates a significant value of 0.793 with a chi-
square value of 4.664. Therefore, the results for both years showed that the model is 
good. 
The classification accuracy for year t showed how well the model can predict the 
correct category (in this study, non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies). The result 
for classification accuracy in Block 1 was compared with Block 0 to check for an 
improvement in the correct prediction after the predictors‘ variables were entered into 
the model. If the percentage of correct predictions increases in Block 1 over Block 0, 
there is an improvement and the model is good. For year t, the model correctly 
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classified 95% of cases overall, which is an improvement over the 93.1% for Block 0. 
Therefore, this model is an improvement over the baseline model. The Cox and Snell 
R Square and Nagelkerke R Square values indicate the amount of variation explained 
by the model (Pallant, 2007). The result for this analysis showed that the model has a 
Cox and Snell R Square value of 0.222 and a Negelkerke R Square value of 0.565. 
This suggests that the variability of fraud status explained by the variables is between 
22.2% and 56.5%. This means that the model does reasonably well in explaining the 
proportion of variation in the sample companies. Analysis of the goodness of fit of the 
model found that, overall, the full model containing all 11 predictors is statistically 
significant in predicting the likelihood of fraud occurrences, 2 = 40.25, df = 11, N = 
160, p < 0.001. 
For year t-1, the classification accuracy indicated that the model correctly classified 
94.4% of cases overall, which is an improvement over the 93.1% of  the null model. 
Therefore, this model is improved from the baseline model. The result for this 
analysis showed that the model had a Cox and Snell R Square value of 0.177 and 
Negelkerke R Square value of 0.449. This suggests that the variability of fraud status 
explained by the variables is between 17.7% and 44.9%, meaning the model is 
reasonably good at explaining the proportion of variation in the sample companies. 
Analysis on the goodness of fit of the model found that overall the full model 
containing all 11 predictors was statistically significant at predicting the likelihood of 
fraud occurrences, 2 = 31.17, df = 11, N = 160, p = < 0.001. 
Results of Wald Test of Logistic Regression for Years t and t-1 
This section discusses the results of the hypothesis testing on the relationship between 
the corporate governance variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. 
The results can be seen in Table 6-7. The Wald test was used to test the significant of 
each coefficient in a model (Tabachnik & Fidell, 2007). Logistic regression focused 
on the Wald test, coefficients and odds ratios for interpretations of results. The results 
are divided into four broad characteristics of corporate governance. 
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Table 6-7 Logistic Regression estimation of likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurences for both years 
Variables 
Year t Year t-1 
B (sign) 
Exp B (Odds 
ratio) 
p B (sign) 
Exp B (Odds 
ratio) 
p 
INBOD -0.062 0.940 0.276 -0.053 0.949 0.294 
TBOD -0.784 0.457 0.024** -0.608 0.544 0.065* 
BODMEET 1.045 2.842 0.038** 0.403 1.496 0.105 
DIROWN -0.049 0.952 0.171 -0.078 0.925 0.027** 
DUALITY -0.391 0.676 0.716 1.387 4.003 0.274 
TENURE -0.254 0.776 0.080* -0.050 0.951 0.308 
ETHNIC 1.458 4.296 0.175 1.936 6.931 0.075* 
INDAC 0.004 1.004 0.916 0.002 1.002 0.973 
OUTDIR -0.017 0.983 0.341 0.002 1.003 0.836 
ACMEET -0.598 0.550 0.194 -1.049 0.350 0.110 
BLOCK -0.078 0.925 0.009*** -0.093 0.911 0.003*** 
CONSTANT 5.407 4.349 0.214 9.804 5.649 0.83 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 2  40.25 31.17 
Hosmer-Lemeshow df 11 11 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Sig 0.001 0.001 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.222 0.177 
Negelkerke R Square 0.565 0.449 
a. Variable(s) entered at step 1: INBOD, TBOD, BODMEET, DIROWN, DUALITY, TENURE, 
ETHNIC, INDAC, OUTDIR, ACMEET, BLOCK                                                                                      
*, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
As shown in Table 6-7, only four corporate governance variables made a significant 
contribution (predictor) to the model for year t, namely: board size (TBOD), number 
of board meetings per year (BODMEET), chairman‘s tenure (TENURE) and 
percentage of institutional shareholdings (BLOCK). The outside directorships held by 
audit committee members (OUTDIR) and number of audit committee meetings in a 
year (ACMEET), which were found to be significant in the univariate analysis, were 
not significant in the regression model. The results for year t-1 indicated four 
corporate governance characteristics that made significant contributions to the model: 
board size (TBOD), percentage of directors‘ shareholdings (DIROWN), chairman‘s 
ethnicity (ETHNIC) and percentage of institutional shareholdings (BLOCK). The two 
corporate governance characteristics, TBOD and BLOCK, which were found to be 
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significant in the univariate analysis, were also significant in the regression model; 
however, DIROWN and ETHNIC were not significant in the univariate analysis but 
were significant in the logistic regression analysis. The results showed that only two 
corporate governance variables (TBOD and BLOCK) were consistent (significant) 
predictors of the likelihood of corporate fraud over the two-year period studied. The 
following section discusses the results in detail. 
Board of directors’ characteristics 
Analysis of the independence of the board of directors (INBOD) for both years 
evidenced that this factor is not a significant contributor to the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in fraud deterrence, as shown in both the univariate and logistic 
regression analyses. This suggests that independent board directors do not reduce the 
likelihood of fraud occurrences. The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement (Paragraph 
15.02) requires companies to have at least two directors, or 1/3, on the board that are 
independent (whichever is higher). Upon investigation of this variable, the mean 
INBOD for both groups of companies were above the required percentage, showing 
that compliance with the requirement by both groups of companies was high. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Hasnan et al.(2008) on fraudulent financial 
reporting in Malaysia. Other studies on the role of board independence with respect to 
its effectiveness in monitoring company activities and performance in a Malaysian 
setting also found that the independence of board member is not significant (Abdul 
Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2008; Bradbury et al., 2006; Hashim & Devi, 2008; Li & 
Ang, 2000). On the other hand, this result is in contrast with Beasley (1996), Xie et al. 
(2003), and Lipton and Lorsch (1992), who found that the higher the percentage of 
independent board members, the better the control. However, these studies were not 
conducted in Malaysia. This study shows that on average the percentage of 
independent board members is 37% to 43%, which is above the required percentage. 
Therefore, null hypothesis 1b is accepted for both years, indicating that INBOD is not 
a significant predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud. This result highlights the 
ineffectiveness of INBOD at monitoring and controlling company activities and 
reporting. Perhaps a more in-depth study could be carried out to examine this variable 
in order to understand why it is weak; is it due to the number of independent members 
or the members themselves not being competent in carrying out their duties? Perhaps 
the suggestion by Ahrens et al. (2011) to look beyond directors‘ independence could 
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be further investigated, e.g. the competency of the directors in terms of knowledge 
and experience could be studied.  
For year t, size of the board (TBOD) was a significant predictor variable in the 
logistic regression results, and this was consistent with the univariate analysis. TBOD 
was significant at the 5% significance level, with a p value of 0.024. The result 
indicated a negative B value of -0.784, which means that an increase in the number of 
board members reduces the likelihood of fraud occurring. The odds ratio (0.457) was 
less than 1, so for every additional person on the board, fraud will be 0.457 times less 
likely to occur, controlling other factors in the model. The non-fraudulent companies 
had a higher number of members on their boards than the fraudulent ones. The results 
indicated that a higher number of members on the board reduced the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. The size of the board (TBOD) was also a significant predictor in the 
logistic regression result, which was consistent (significant) with the univariate 
analysis for year t-1. TBOD was significant at the 10% significance level, with a p 
value of 0.065. The result showed a negative B value of -0.065, which means that an 
increase in the number of board members reduces the likelihood of fraud occurrences. 
The odds ratio (0.544) was less than 1, indicating that for every additional person on 
the board, fraud will be 0.544 time less likely to occur, controlling other factors in the 
model. This result shows that having at least eight members on the board could 
influence (reduce) the likelihood of corporate fraud. The effectiveness of a TBOD of 
at least eight members in this study is consistent with the suggestion by Jensen (1993) 
and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). Beasley (1996) found that a larger-sized board 
increases the likelihood of fraud. This result is consistent with the findings of Hasnan 
et al. (2008) as well as the recommendation of the MCCG Blueprint (2011). The 
findings of Beasley are in contrast with the result of this study, which found that on 
average fraudulent companies have a lower number of board members than non-
fraudulent companies, suggesting that a larger board is more effective at reducing the 
likelihood of fraud. So, it can be said that in a different cultural and legal environment 
(e.g. Malaysia), more members on the board increases the effectiveness of a 
company‘s governance and as a result reduces the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Therefore, null hypothesis 2b is rejected for both years; there is a significant 
relationship between size of board and the likelihood of corporate fraud in Malaysia. 
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For year t, the number of board meetings in a year (BODMEET) was also a 
significant predictor variable in the logistic regression results, and was consistent with 
the univariate analysis; therefore, null hypothesis 3b is rejected. The results showed 
that there is a significant relationship between the frequency of board meetings and 
the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. BODMEET was significant at the 5% 
significance level, with a p value of 0.038. There was a positive B value of 1.045, 
which means that frequent board meetings are unlikely to reduce the likelihood of 
fraud. The odds ratio (2.842) was more than 1, so for every additional board meeting, 
fraud will be 2.842 times more likely to occur, controlling other factors in the model. 
While frequent board meetings may not reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud, this 
factor could possibly highlight that a company is in distress and at risk of fraud. This 
result is consistent with Uzun et al. (2004) and Bedard et al. (2004), who found that 
frequent board meetings do not necessarily lead to effective monitoring and control. 
However, BODMEET was found not to be significant in year t-1 and therefore for 
year t-1 null hypothesis 3b is accepted. One possible reason for this inconsistent result 
is that the average number of board meetings in year t-1 was six for fraudulent 
companies and five for non-fraudulent companies, so there was little difference 
between the groups.  
Directors‘ shareholding (DIROWN) was not a significant contributor to reducing the 
likelihood of corporate fraud, as shown by both the univariate and logistic regression 
analyses for year t. This indicates that the percentage of directors‘ shareholdings did 
not reduce the likelihood of fraud in year t; therefore, null hypothesis 4b is accepted. 
Directors‘ shareholdings (DIROWN) appeared to be a significant predictor in the 
regression model for year t-1 but not in the univariate analysis. DIROWN was 
significant at the 5% level, with a p value of 0.027. There was a negative B value of -
0.078, meaning an increase in the percentage of directors‘ shareholdings reduces the 
likelihood of fraud. The odds ratio (0.925) of less than 1 indicated that for every 
additional 1% of directors‘ shareholding, fraud will be 0.925 times less likely to 
occur. This result is in contrast with the findings of Owens-Jackson (2009). For both 
groups of companies, on average about 10% of directors held shares in the company, 
which is relatively low. The average directors‘ shareholding for fraudulent companies 
in year t was 9%, and for non-fraudulent companies it was 11%. One possible 
explanation for this predictor being significant in year t-1 is that having 10% or more 
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directors‘ shareholding could reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. 
Therefore, for year t-1 null hypothesis 4b is not supported. 
Chairman’s characteristics 
Chairman‘s duality (DUALITY) was not a significant contributor to the weaknesses 
of corporate governance in fraud deterrence, as shown in both the univariate and 
logistic regression analyses for both years studied. This implies that the chairman‘s 
dual role does not increase the likelihood of fraud. This result is consistent with the 
findings of Chen et al. (2006). Upon investigation of DUALITY in both groups, only 
16% and 16% respectively of the non-fraudulent companies, and 18% and 9% 
respectively of fraudulent companies had a CEO who was also the board chairman for 
year‘s t and t-1. This shows that there was a low percentage of DUALITY in both 
groups of companies and the separation of CEO and chairman did not reduce the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. Therefore, null hypothesis 5b is accepted for both years. 
Even though Bursa Malaysia does not make it mandatory to separate the roles of 
board chairman and CEO, the majority of the companies in both groups did not have 
dual roles. Since this practice was somewhat the same in both groups, it could be a 
reason why no significant relationship was found. This could also indicate that the 
separation of board chairman and CEO is not effective in reducing the likelihood of 
corporate fraud in Malaysia. Perhaps having the CEO as the board chairman increases 
the governance over the company‘s activities and reporting due to the knowledge and 
experience that the CEO has of the company. 
The results for year t indicated that chairman‘s tenure (TENURE) was another 
significant predictor variable in the logistic regression, and this was consistent with 
the univariate analysis; but it was not a significant predictor for year t-1. Therefore, 
null hypothesis 6b is rejected for year t and accepted for year t-1. TENURE was 
significant (at the 10% significance level), with a p value of 0.080. The result gave a 
negative B value of -0.254, which means that an increase in chairman‘s tenure reduces 
the likelihood of fraud occurrences. The odds ratio (0.776) was less than 1, indicating 
that for every additional year the chairman is on the board, fraud is 0.776 time less 
likely to occur, controlling the other factors in the model. The mean rank of 
chairman‘s tenure for the non-fraudulent companies was higher than for the fraudulent 
companies, which could indicate that longer chairman‘s tenure may possibly reduce 
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the likelihood of corporate fraud. The longer the tenure of the chairman the more 
knowledge and experience they have, which could contribute to reducing the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. Also, these chairmen are reluctant to take risks that 
could destroy their reputations, such as unlawful activities. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Chen et al. (2006) and Hill and Phan (1991).  
Chairman‘s ethnicity (ETHNIC) was also not a significant contributor to the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in fraud deterrence, as shown in both the 
univariate and logistic regression analyses for year t; therefore, null hypothesis 7b is 
accepted. This shows that the chairman‘s ethnicity did not contribute to the likelihood 
of fraud occurrences. However, this variable was a significant predictor for year t-1. 
ETHNIC was a significant predictor in the regression model, but not in the univariate 
analysis. ETHNIC was significant at the 10% significance level, with a p value of 
0.075. The result gave a positive B value of 1.936, which means an increase in non-
Malay chairmen increases the likelihood of fraud. The odds ratio (6.931) was more 
than 1, indicating that having a non-Malay chairman increased the likelihood of 
corporate fraud occurrences by 6.931 times in year t-1. For year t-1, null hypothesis 
7b is rejected, suggesting there is a significant relationship between the chairman‘s 
ethnicity and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. The inconsistency in the 
results between the two years may be due to changes in board chairmen, as in year t-1 
only two Malay chairmen were recorded in the fraudulent sample, which increased to 
three in year t. This variable needs to be further examined to include cultural factors 
and practices that could contribute to the effectiveness of having more Malay 
chairmen.  
Audit committee characteristics 
Percentage of independent audit committee members (INDAC) was not a significant 
contributor to the effectiveness of corporate governance in fraud deterrence, as shown 
in both the univariate and logistic regression analyses for both years. Therefore, null 
hypothesis 8b is accepted for both years, which means that there is no significant 
relationship between the percentage of independent audit committee members and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. This indicates that the percentage of independent audit 
committee members will not reduce the likelihood of fraud. This is consistent with the 
result for INBOD. An investigation into this variable showed that all of the companies 
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complied with the minimum requirements of Bursa Malaysia. Independence of audit 
committee members ranged between 72% and 74%; the minimum requirement is 
66.67%. This could suggest that the minimum requirement is not effective in fraud 
deterrence. Perhaps the minimum number of audit committee members needs to be 
increased, as more members could increase the effectiveness of its role in governance, 
as can be seen from the size of the board. 
Null hypothesis 9b is also accepted for both years as the same result was obtained for 
ACMEET. The number of audit committee meetings in a year (ACMEET) was not a 
significant contributor to the effectiveness of corporate governance in fraud 
deterrence, as shown by the logistic regression analyses for both years. However, 
ACMEET was significant in the univariate analysis for year t. This means that more 
audit committee meetings do not reduce the likelihood of fraud. An increase in audit 
committee meetings could possibly indicate that companies are in trouble. The Listing 
Requirement calls for audit committee to have at least four meetings a year. Both 
groups complied with this requirement; on average five to six meetings were held per 
year. Could it be this number of meetings is not sufficient for properly discussing and 
analysing financial reports? Or perhaps the meetings are not set up to critically assess 
financial matters? An in-depth analysis of this variable could help in understanding 
the effect of the meetings and how to improve their effectiveness. The results for 
INDAC and ACMEET are not consistent with the findings of Abbott et al. (2000), 
Uzun et al. (2004) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009), who found a significant negative 
relationship between INDAC and ACMEET and the likelihood of fraud. Again, 
differences in culture and legal environment could contribute to the inconsistency 
between the results of this study and the studies mentioned above. 
Outside directorships held by audit committee members (OUTDIR) were also found 
to be not a significant contributor to the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
fraud deterrence, as shown in the logistic regression analysis. However, this variable 
was found to be significant in the univariate analysis for both years. The analysis for 
both years on univariate level shows that there is significant difference for this 
variable between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies where non-fraudulent 
companies were found to have higher percentage of directors with multiple 
directorships (holding directorship in other companies) which indicates that the 
number of outside directorships held by audit committee members is significantly 
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difference between groups of companies. However, the result is not significant with 
respect to its relationship to fraud. The univariate result is in contrast with the findings 
of Bedard et al. (2004) and Persons (2005), who suggest that when audit committee 
members hold more outside directorships, it reduces their effectiveness in carrying out 
their duties. Therefore, null hypothesis 10b is accepted for both years, meaning that 
there is no significant relationship between OUTDIR and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. Holding many directorships, one could argue, increases the directors‘ 
knowledge and experience, which in turn improves their abilities and expertise. On 
the other hand, holding many directorships could become a problem as the director 
may struggle to concentrate on the matters at hand. Analysing and monitoring 
financial activities and reports is not easy and requires a lot of time. The high 
percentage of directors holding many directorships in this study (for both groups) was 
not beneficial to company governance as it did not reduce the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. The regulations do not impose any specific restrictions, but do require directors 
to disclose their multiple directorships. Further investigation could be carried out to 
determine how many is too many when it comes to effective governance. This could 
help regulators formulate more effective requirements for Malaysian companies. 
Institutional shareholding ownership (blockholders) 
Institutional shareholding (BLOCK) was the strongest significant predictor in the 
logistic regression analysis and was consistent with the univariate analysis. BLOCK 
was significant at the 1% level, with a p value of 0.009. There was a negative B value 
of -0.078, which means that an increase in the percentage of institutional shareholding 
reduces the likelihood of fraud occurrences. The odds ratio (0.925) was less than 1, 
indicating that for every additional percentage of institutional shareholdings, fraud is 
less likely to occur, controlling other factors in the model. Institutional shareholding 
(BLOCK) was another significant predictor in the regression model, but not in the 
univariate analysis. BLOCK was significant at the 1% level, with a p value of 0.003. 
There was a negative B value of -0.093, meaning an increase in the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings reduces the likelihood of fraud occurrences. The odds ratio 
(0.911) was less than 1, indicating that for every additional 1% of institutional 
shareholdings, it will be less likely for companies to commit fraud. Therefore, null 
hypothesis 11b is rejected for both years as this study shows that there is significant 
relationship between BLOCK and the likelihood of corporate fraud. Having a higher 
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percentage of institutional shareholding, subjects companies to more detailed scrutiny 
by institutions thus increase the effectiveness of institutional shareholdings. These 
institutions have the resources to monitor the companies‘ activities and reporting, 
which individual shareholders do not have. Institutions are more rigorous in 
monitoring, as they themselves have to answer to their investors if anything goes 
wrong. 
 Table 6-8 presents a summary of the means of the significant predictors of the non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies for both years. For the two years analysed, 
TBOD and BLOCK were the consistent significant predictors that influenced the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. Analysis of TBOD for both years showed that on 
average the fraudulent companies had a lower number of board member than the non-
fraudulent ones (7 out of 11 fraudulent companies had less than 8 members on the 
board). This consistent result shows that the size of the board does play a role in 
reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud. Analysis of BLOCK for both years showed 
that out of 11 fraudulent companies, 9 companies‘ institutional shareholdings were 
lower than the mean for the non-fraudulent companies (41%). This result indicates 
that having at least 41% of company shares held by other institutions may influence 
(reduce) the likelihood of corporate fraud. This may be due to the companies facing 
more scrutiny from the institutional shareholders, which results in better monitoring 
of company activities. The MCCG Blueprint (2011) recommends that institutional 
shareholders to play a more proactive role in ensuring the investment they made are 
fruitful. They should be more effective in their monitoring role and increase the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in the company they invest in. Among others 
the MCCG Blueprint recommends that institutional shareholders to be transparent in 
their investment and include corporate governance in their investment analysis. 
Table 6-8 Summary of significant (consistent) corporate governance predictors 
for both years 
Variables 
Year t Year t-1 
NF F NF F 
TBOD 8 7 8 7 
BLOCK 41% 21% 41% 21% 
NF = non-fraudulent companies, F = fraudulent companies 
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6.3 Earnings Management Analyses and Results 
This section of the chapter presents the analyses (hypothesis testing of differences) 
and results for the earnings management variables. The first part presents the 
descriptive analyses and results for all five years analysed. The section then continues 
with the inferential analyses (univariate and logistic regression analyses) and results 
for the earnings management variables for all five years.  
6.3.1 Descriptive analyses and results for earnings management 
Table 6-9 shows the variables‘ means for non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies 
for the five years analysed, from the first year of fraud to four years prior. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the variables are: days‘ sales receivables index (DSRI), 
gross margin index (GMI), assets quality index (AQI), sales growth index (SGI), total 
accruals (TATA), depreciation index (DEPI), leverage index (LVI), inventories ratio 
(INVR) and inventories growth over sales growth ratio (INVSR). Analysis was 
carried out to investigate whether there was any significant difference among the 
variables for each group across the five years using the Friedman test. The Friedman 
test made it clear that for the fraudulent companies; only AQI was found to be 
significantly difference across the period studied. The AQI for year t-3 is found to be 
very low as compared to other years. Having very low AQI shoes that income has 
decrease significantly from year t-4. This could have contributed to the significant 
result. Upon investigation of the data did not show any significant fluctuation in 
companies‘ current assets and PPE (plant property and equipment). Other fraudulent 
companies‘ earnings management variables did not show any significant difference 
across the five years. For the non-fraudulent group, on the other hand, there were 
significant differences in GMI, AQI, DEPI, LVI and INVR. 
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Table 6-9 Comparison of earnings management variables’ means for non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies across years 
Variable 
Non-fraudulent companies (median) Fraudulent companies (median) 
Year t Year t-1 Year t-2 Year t-3 Year t-4 p Year t Year t-1 Year t-2 Year t-3 Year t-4 p 
DSRI 0.938 0.977 0.977 0.999 0.959 0.398 0.931 1.052 0.867 1.007 0.774 0.493 
GMI 1.015 1.014 1.029 1.011 1.000 0.062* 0.769 0.941 0.000 0.969 0.794 0.203 
AQI 0.964 1.049 0.946 0.071 0.420 0.000*** 0.920 0.434 0.755 0.872 0.457 0.070* 
SGI 1.119 1.092 1.099 1.096 1.086 0.329 0.940 0.858 0.779 0.953 1.080 0.561 
TATA -0.025 -0.029 -0.017 -0.063 0.011 0.283 -0.065 -0.148 0.012 -0.000 -0.109 0.513 
DEPI 0.984 0.946 0.982 0.993 0.980 0.056* 0.948 0.966 0.934 1.023 0.937 0.937 
LVI 0.989 1.014 1.008 1.012 0.959 0.099* 1.069 1.149 1.095 1.029 1.017 0.742 
INVR 0.078 0.101 0.084 0.101 0.053 0.048** 0.000 -0.099 -0.035 0.000 0.022 0.717 
INVSR -0.059 0.000 -0.009 0.005 -0.014 0.219 0.003 -0.129 0.000 0.047 0.076 0.617 
   *, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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6.3.2 Inferential analyses and results for earnings management 
The inferential analyses are divided into three parts: the first part presents the 
univariate analysis (hypotheses testing of difference). This answers research question 
three. The second part covers the correlation and collinearity analysis, and the third 
part presents the logistic regression analysis, to test the relationship hypotheses and 
answer research question four. Univariate analysis was carried out on the earnings 
management variables (as discussed in Chapters Three and Four) using the 
nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test in order to determine the differences between the 
two independent groups on continuous measures. This analysis was carried out for all 
five years of data (years t to t-4) to find any differences in the earnings management 
variables between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent groups across the period under 
study. The discussions are presented in sections 6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2. 
6.3.2.1 Differences in earnings management variables between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies 
This section presents the univariate analysis and results for the earnings management 
variables for the five-year period. The Mann-Whitney U test was performed on the 
earnings management data for year‘s t, t-1, t-2,t-3 and t-4. The results of the analysis 
are presented according to variable. The analysis used to test the null hypotheses is as 
per discussed in Chapter Five, section 5.3.1. The results for the Mann-Whitney U test 
are presented in Table 6-10, while the results of the mean ranks for significant 
variables are presented in Table 6-11. 
This study tested all nine earnings management variables‘ hypotheses for each year. 
The hypothesis is: There is no difference between fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
companies with respect to the earnings management indices/ratios (DSRI, GMI, AQI, 
SGI, TATA, DEPI, LVI, INVR and INVSR). 
Days’ sales receivable index (DSRI) 
The null hypothesis for DSRI (H12a) is not rejected for year‘s t, t-1, t-3 and t-4, as the 
univariate result revealed that there was no significant difference in DSRI between the 
two types of company for those four years. However, H12a is rejected for year t-2. 
The univariate analysis of DSRI for year t-2 pointed out a significant difference 
between the two groups at the 5% significance level, with a p value of 0.026 and r 
value of 0.18 (small effect size). The mean ranks analysis for DSRI showed the non-
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fraudulent group had higher mean ranks than the fraudulent group. Studies carried out 
in this field indicate differences in this index between the two groups; fraudulent 
companies are expected to have a higher DSRI (Rosner, 2003; Beneish, 1999). 
However, this notion does not seem to be applicable in the Malaysian setting, as no 
significant difference was found between the two groups with respect to DSRI, except 
for year t-2. Even so, fraudulent companies were found to have a lower DSRI 
compared to non-fraudulent ones. The fraudulent companies could be practicing 
income decreasing (reducing sales or receivables) during year t-2, as there is a high 
possibility that the companies were facing financial difficulties during that year.  
Gross margin index (GMI) 
The results for the univariate analysis (Table 6-9) of GMI for year‘s t, t-1, t-2 and t-3 
indicated a significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies. The p-values for year‘s t and t-1 were less than 0.05, while the p-values 
for year‘s t-2 and t-3 were less than 0.01 and 0.10, respectively. Therefore, null 
hypothesis 13a is rejected for all these four years. The results noted that the strength 
of association for the four years was small to medium in size. For all four years, the 
analysis of mean ranks (Table 6-10) indicated that the non-fraudulent group had 
higher mean ranks than the fraudulent group. GMI was consistently significant for the 
four years under analysis. However, H13a is not rejected for year t-4 since the 
univariate analysis showed that there was no significant difference between the two 
types of company with respect to GMI. 
A GMI of more than one shows that the gross margin of the company decreased. And 
companies with a GMI of more than one are expected to have manipulated earnings 
(Beneish, 1999). However, this study found that the fraudulent companies‘ GMI over 
the five years analysed were less than 1 (where the non-fraudulent companies‘ GMI 
were more than 1). This reveals that the fraudulent companies could possibly have 
been practising income-increasing acts. This result is in contrast with the findings by 
Beneish (1999), Bell and Carcello (2008), and Rosner (2003). This result is also 
inconsistent with a study conducted in Singapore on the choices of earnings 
management during the Asian financial crisis (Ming Chia, Lapsley and Lee; 2007). 
The study found that service-oriented companies engage in income decreasing method 
during the time of crisis. Differences in business environment and cultural 
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background could have contributed to this contrasting result, as the aforementioned 
studies were based in the US and Singapore. 
Assets quality index (AQI) 
The results of the univariate analyses (Table 6-9) for years t, t-1, t-2 and t-3 showed 
that there was a significant difference in AQI between the non-fraudulent and 
fraudulent companies at the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. The results 
also indicated that the strength of association ranged from small to medium. 
Therefore, null hypothesis 14a is rejected for all four years as the univariate analysis 
found there was a significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies with respect to AQI. In the mean ranks analysis (Table 6-10) for AQI, for 
year‘s t, t-1 and t-2 the mean index of AQI for the non-fraudulent companies was 
higher than for the fraudulent companies. However, for year t-3, the AQI mean ranks 
for non-fraudulent companies were lower than for the fraudulent companies. For year 
t-4, null hypothesis 14a is not rejected, as the univariate analysis indicated that there 
was no significant difference between the two groups with respect to AQI. 
An AQI higher than 1 means that the company tended to engage in cost deferral, 
where it increased cost capitalization to defer cost. Upon investigation of this index, it 
was revealed that the fraudulent companies‘ AQI was lower than 1 for all years 
analysed—in fact quite low compared to the non-fraudulent companies‘. This 
suggests that the fraudulent companies did not defer costs, which increased expenses 
and reduced income. Thus, it can be concluded that fraudulent companies tend to be 
involved in income-decreasing acts. 
Sales growth index (SGI) 
Null hypothesis 15a is rejected for year‘s t, t-1, t-2 and t-3 as the analysis showed that 
there was a significant difference in the SGI between the two groups for all four years. 
Results for all four years (Table 6-9) indicated that SGI was significant at 10%, 1% 
and 5%, respectively. The results also showed that the strength of association ranged 
from small to medium. Again, consistent with the GMI and AQI, the analysis of mean 
ranks (Table 6-10) for SGI proved that the non-fraudulent companies had higher mean 
ranks than the fraudulent ones. The null hypothesis for SGI (H15a) for year t-4 is not 
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rejected as the univariate analysis indicated that there was no significant difference 
between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to SGI. 
The SGI of the fraudulent companies from year t-3 to t were less than 1 and lower 
than the SGI for the non-fraudulent companies. Generally, it was expected that 
companies would avoid showing decreasing income in their financial statements due 
to the desire to prevent the shareholders and investors from thinking that company 
growth was decelerating, as this could have a negative impact on the companies‘ 
share prices. In Western countries, in particular the US, this seems to be the practice. 
The results of this study showed that the fraudulent companies‘ SGI was less than 1, 
which could indicate that the companies‘ engaged in income decreasing by lowering 
their sales or increasing their expenses. These companies could possibly have been in 
financially distress, which motivated them to manipulate earnings. 
Total assets over total accrual index (TATA) 
Null hypothesis 16a for TATA is not rejected for all five years studied as the 
univariate results (Table 6-10) showed that there was no significant difference 
between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to TATA for all 
five years. This result is consistent with the findings for AQI. Fraudulent companies‘ 
TATA was on average slightly higher than that for non-fraudulent companies. The 
calculation of this index, which acted as a proxy for the extent to which cash underlay 
reported earnings, indicated that companies with less cash are highly likely to be 
involved in fraud. A higher positive TATA will indicate this. Since no significant 
result was found in assessing the difference in TATA between the two groups, it can 
be said that earnings manipulation is highly unlikely to happen with respect to TATA. 
Depreciation index (DEPI) 
The univariate analysis (Table 6-10) of DEPI did not detect a significant difference 
between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies for all five years studied. 
Therefore, null hypothesis 17a is not rejected. A DEPI greater than 1 indicates that the 
company‘s depreciation rate was reduced, which could possibly be due to a change in 
depreciation method (adopting income-increasing methods) (Beneish, 1999). The 
results on DEPI for both groups showed that on average the DEPI was less than 1, 
indicating that those companies did not adopt income-increasing methods to manage 
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earnings. The results also showed that there was no significant changes in DEPI over 
the five years studied for both groups. 
Leverage index (LVI) 
The null hypothesis for LVI (H18a) is not rejected for year‘s t, t-2, t-3 and t-4, as the 
univariate results (Table 6-10) indicated that there was no significant difference 
between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to this index for those 
four years. However, H18 is rejected for year t-1. Univariate analysis of LVI 
discovered that there was a significant difference between the two groups, at the 10% 
significance level with a p value of 0.092 and r value of 0.13 (small effect size). The 
mean ranks analysis (Table 6-11) of LVI indicated that the non-fraudulent group had 
lower mean ranks than the other group. An LVI greater than 1 signals an increase in 
leverage, which shows that debt increased. The LVI, on average, was slightly higher 
for fraudulent companies, which could indicate that the companies had high debt. 
Only in year t-1 was this index significantly different between the two groups (where 
the fraudulent companies were high in leverage/debt). 
Inventories ratio (INVR) 
The null hypothesis for INVR (H19a) is not rejected for year‘s t, t-2, t-3 and t-4, as 
the univariate result (Table 6-10) revealed no significant difference between the non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to INVR for those four years. Null 
hypothesis H19 is rejected for year t-1 as the analysis showed that there was a 
significant difference in the INVR between the two groups at the 5% significance 
level, with a p value of 0.030 and r value of 0.17, indicating a small to medium effect 
size. The mean ranks analysis (Table 6-11) of INVR showed that the non-fraudulent 
group had higher mean ranks than the fraudulent group. On average, the INVR 
depicted that the fraudulent companies had lower ratios than the non-fraudulent ones, 
indicating that the fraudulent companies did not inflate their inventory figures. In fact, 
they may have been deflating their inventory values, which is an income-decreasing 
method in earnings management.  
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Inventories growth over sales growth ratio (INVSR) 
The univariate analysis (Table 6-10) for year t showed no significant difference 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies with respect to the INVSR for all 
five years studied. Therefore, null hypothesis 20a is not rejected for all five years. 
Upon investigation of this ratio, it was found that the INVSR for non-fraudulent 
companies was slightly lower and had a negative value (except for year t-3 at 0.005) 
compared to the fraudulent group. A positive ratio indicates that inventory is growing 
at a faster rate than sales, which could potentially be a sign of fraud (Schilit, 1993). 
The INVSR for fraudulent companies showed positive ratio figures except for year t-
1. While the ratios for both groups did not significantly differ, it would be worth 
investigating this method of valuation for inventory in those companies. 
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Table 6-10 Mann-WhitneyU Test for earnings management variables of non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies for five years 
Variables DSRI GMI AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVR INVSR 
Year t 
Z -0.233 -2.350** -2.303** -1.939* -0.988 -0.711 -1.076 -1.015 -0.246 
p 0.816 0.019 0.021 0.053 0.323 0.477 0.282 0.310 0.806 
r  - 0.19 0.18 0.15 - - - - - 
Year t-1 
Z -0.624 -2.559** -3.552*** -2.708* -0.442 -0.057 -1.683* -2.175** -1.062 
p 0.533 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.659 0.954 0.092 0.030 0.288 
r - 0.20 0.28 0.21 - - 0.13 0.17 - 
Year t-2 
Z -2.229** -4.360*** -2.135** 
-
2.741*** 
-1.001 -0.954 -0.664 -0.786 -0.361 
p 0.026 0.000 0.033 0.006 0.317 0.340 0.507 0.432 0.718 
r 0.18 0.35 0.17 0.22 - - - - - 
Year t-3 
Z -0.421 -1.716* -2.945*** -2.283** -0.145 -0.725 -0.131 -1.615 -0.017 
p 0.673 0.086 0.003 0.022 0.885 0.468 0.895 0.106 0.987 
r - 0.14 0.23 0.18 - - - - - 
Year t-4 
Z -1.318 -1.531 -0.462 -0.111 -1.575 -0.705 -0.529 -0.125 -0.145 
p 0.187 0.126 0.644 0.911 0.115 0.481 0.597 0.901 0.885 
r  - - - - - - - - - 
a. Grouping variable: Fraudulent/non-fraudulent 
*, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6-11 Mean ranks of earnings management significant variables for five 
years 
Variables Companies N Mean Ranks 
Year t 
GMI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.84 
Fraudulent 11 48.82 
AQI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.79 
Fraudulent 11 49.45 
SGI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.43 
Fraudulent 11 54.36 
Year t-1 
GMI 
Non-fraudulent 149 83.05 
Fraudulent 11 46.00 
AQI 
Non-fraudulent 149 84.03 
Fraudulent 11 32.64 
SGI 
Non-fraudulent 149 83.19 
Fraudulent 11 44.00 
LVI 
Non-fraudulent 149 78.83 
Fraudulent 11 103.18 
INVR 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.66 
Fraudulent 11 51.18 
Year t-2 
DSRI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.72 
Fraudulent 11 50.45 
GMI 
Non-fraudulent 149 84.84 
Fraudulent 11 21.73 
AQI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.62 
Fraudulent 11 51.73 
SGI 
Non-fraudulent 149 83.23 
Fraudulent 11 43.55 
Year t-3 
GMI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.21 
Fraudulent 11 57.36 
AQI 
Non-fraudulent 149 77.57 
Fraudulent 11 120.18 
SGI 
Non-fraudulent 149 82.77 
Fraudulent 11 49.73 
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To sum up, GMI, AQI and SGI were found to be significantly different between the 
non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies for year‘s t, t-1, t-2 and t-3. These results 
are consistent with the findings of Beneish (1999), Rosner (2003), and Grove and 
Basilico (2008), except that in those studies fraudulent failing companies tended to 
use income-increasing actions, but this study revealed that fraudulent companies 
preferred to adopt income-decreasing methods to manage earnings, consistent with the 
study by Ming Chia et al.(2007). A more comprehensive analysis of the relationship 
of these indices with the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences can be found in the 
next section.  
6.3.2.2 Earnings management variables and the likelihood of corporate 
fraud occurrences 
The earnings management variables were further analysed. This analysis was carried 
out to test the null hypotheses (Hb) on the relationship between earnings management 
variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences, which answered question 
four. The first logistic regression model (as discussed in Chapter Five, section 5.5.2) 
was used on the eight (full model) earnings management variables for every year, 
regardless of whether they were found to be significant in the univariate analysis or 
not, to assess the impact of the earnings management variables on the likelihood of 
fraud occurrences. The analyses and results are presented according to year. The 
results of the correlation and collinearity analysis will be presented first, followed by 
those for the logistic regression. Table 6-12 presents the results of the goodness of fit 
test for the logistic regression model and Table 6-13 show the results for the logistic 
regression Wald test.  
Multicollinearity analysis 
Appendix 4 presents the correlation matrix of the Spearman rank order correlation 
coefficient for all nine earnings management variables for each of the five years. The 
analysis showed that all of the significant variables that were found to be significant 
in section 6.5.2.1 (the univariate analysis) were also found significant by the 
correlation matrix for all five years. The correlation matrix also showed that some 
significant correlations exist among the earnings management variables; however, the 
correlation coefficient was not large enough to cause a multicollinearity problem 
(none of the correlation coefficients were larger than 0.80), except for INVR. INVR 
was found to have a correlation coefficient of more 0.80 with INVSR for year t-3. 
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To further confirm that there would be no problem with multicollinearity, tolerance 
and VIF analyses were carried out (see Appendix 5) The collinearity diagnostic 
showed that eight of the earnings management variables (DSRI, GMI, AQI, SGI, 
TATA, DEPI, LVI and INVSR) were not highly correlated and the tolerance and VIF 
indicated that there was no multicollinearity problem for these variables. One variable 
was found to have a high correlation with another, and that was INVR, which was 
highly correlated with INVSR. This was due to some of the data used to calculate the 
ratio being the same (inventories); therefore, INVSR was excluded from the logistic 
regression model for all five years‘ analyses since this ratio was found to be not 
significant across all years in the univariate analysis. 
Goodness of fit test 
The results of the goodness of fits test for all five years can be seen in Table 6-12. The 
Omnibus goodness of fit chi-square tests for all five years indicated that the variables 
in the models provided significant information about the incidence of corporate fraud 
(year t = chi-square 19.35, p-value < 0.000; year t-1 = 40.49, p-value < 0.000; year t-2 
= chi-square 62.24, p-value < 0.000; year t-3 = chi-square 17.05, p-value < 0.030; and 
year t-4 = chi-square 18.86, p-value < 0.016). The Cox and Snell R Square and 
Nagelkerke R Square determined the variance of likelihood of fraud occurrences that 
can be predicted from the model (as presented in Table 6-12). Overall, the results 
indicated that the full model containing all eight predictors was statistically significant 
in predicting the likelihood of fraud occurrences for all five years, with year t, X
2
 = 
19.35, df = 8, N = 160, p = < 0.05; year t-1, X
2
 = 40.49, df = 8, N = 160, p = < 0.01; 
year t-2, X
2
 = 62.24, df = 8, N = 160, p = < 0.01; year t-3, X
2
 = 17.05, df = 8, N = 
160, p = < 0.05; and year t-4, X
2
 = 18.86, df = 8, N = 160, p = < 0.05.  
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Table 6-12 Logistic Regression (goodness of fit) of earnings management 
variables for five years 
Goodness of fit test Year t Year t-1 Year t-2 Year t-3 Year t-4 
Hosmer-Lemeshow 2  19.35 40.49 62.24 17.05 18.86 
Hosmer-Lemeshow df 8 8 8 8 8 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 
Cox & Snell R Square 0.114 0.224 0.322 0.101 0.111 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.289 0.568 0.818 0.257 0.282 
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Results for logistic regression Wald test of earnings management for year’s t, t-1, t-
2, t-3 and t-4 
The results of the Wald test on the earnings management variables for the five-year 
study period are presented below in Table 6-13. The Wald test was used to test the 
significance of each variable in the model. 
Table 6-13 Logistic Regression (Wald Test) of significance of earnings 
management variables for year t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 
Variables DSRI GMI AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVR Constant 
Y
ear t 
B 0.276 -2.799 0.305 -0.921 1.710 0.250 -0.117 -0.696 0.003 
Exp B 1.318 0.061* 1.356 0.398 5.529 1.284 0.889 0.498 1.003 
p 0.722 0.083 0.391 0.529 0.122 0.855 0.907 0.616 0.999 
Y
ear t-1 
B -2.722 -2.054 -0.221 -5.399 -5.399 0.109 -0.046 -0.114 6.906 
Exp B 0.066 0.128*** 0.802 0.005** 0.005* 1.116 0.955 0.892 998.376 
p 0.170 0.001 0.288 0.023 0.081 0.907 0.974 0.848 0.114 
Y
ear t-2 
B -2.172 -10.554 -0.255 1.191 1.964 -0.011 0.575 -0.095 6.027 
Exp B 0.114 0.000*** 0.775 3.290 7.128 0.989 1.778 0.909 414.634 
p 0.505 0.003 0.728 0.330 0.695 0.862 0.989 0.876 0.275 
Y
ear t-3 
B -0.247 0.381 0.321 -3.953 -0.328 -0.421 1.703 -1.303 -0.223 
Exp B 0.781 1.464* 1.378** 0.019*** 0.720 0.656 5.490 0.272 0.873 
p 0.772 0.089 0.028 0.003 0.727 0.549 0.103 0.224 0.800 
Y
ear t-4 
B 0.019 -1.182 0.001 0.314 -1.700 -0.729 -0.178 -1.133 -1.382 
Exp B 1.019 0.307** 1.001 1.370 0.183 0.482 0.837 0.339 0.530 
p 0.718 0.038 0.929 0.842 0.157 0.574 0.892 0.339 0.251 
a. Variable(s) entered at step 1: DSRI, GMI, AQI, SGI, TATA, DEPI, LVI and INVSR                     
b. *, **, *** denote significances at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
A discussion of these results by earnings management variable follows. 
Days’ sales receivable index (DSRI) 
Null hypothesis 12b is not rejected for year t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 as the logistic 
regression analysis showed that there was no significant relationship between DSRI 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences for all five years analysed. The 
result for this index is consistent with the univariate analysis result, where there was 
no significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent groups with 
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respect to DSRI, except for year t-2. DSRI was found to be significantly different 
between the two groups in year t-2 at the 5% significance level; however, the r value 
was small (indicating a small effect size).  
Gross margin index (GMI) 
The significance of each coefficient in the model is presented in Table 6-13. Only one 
earnings management variable made a significant contribution to the model for the 
first year of fraud, and that was GMI. GMI was also found to be significant in the 
univariate analysis for this year. GMI was found to be significant at the 10% 
significance level, with a p-value of 0.083. There was a negative B value of -2.799, 
meaning a decrease in the GMI could highlight an increase in a company‘s risk of 
fraud. Therefore, null hypothesis 13b is rejected as the results showed that there was a 
significant relationship between GMI and the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences.  
The same null hypothesis (H13b) is also rejected for year t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 as the 
logistic regression analysis showed a significant relationship between GMI and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud for all four years. GMI was found to be significant at the 
1% significance level, with a p value of 0.000 in year t-1. The result indicated a 
negative B value of -2.054, meaning a decrease in the GMI could suggest an increase 
in a company‘s risk of fraud. The odds ratio for these years is less than 0.5 (Table 6-
13), meaning that companies with lower GMI is likely to engage in fraud.  
In year t-2 GMI was found to be significant at the 1% significance level, with a p 
value of 0.003. There was a negative B value of -10.554, which means a decrease in 
the GMI could signify an increase in a company‘s risk of fraud. Again the B value is 
less than one which indicates that fraudulent companies‘ tend to have lower GMI. 
In the three years prior to the first year of fraud (year t-3), GMI was found to be 
significant at the 10% significance level, with a p value of 0.089. The result gave a 
positive B value of 0.381, which means an increase in the GMI could highlight an 
increase in a company‘s risk of fraud, which is not consistent with the results for 
year‘s t, t-1 and t-2. The odds ratio of 1.464 was higher than 1, indicating that for 
every percentage of increase in GMI, fraud will be 1.464 times less likely to occur. 
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Only one earnings management variable/index made a significant contribution to the 
model for the four years prior to the first year of fraud (year t-4); that was GMI. The B 
value was -1.182, so a decrease in the GMI could portend an increase in a company‘s 
risk of fraud. The odds ratio (0.307) was less than 1, so for every percentage of 
decrease in the GMI, fraud will be 0.307 times more likely to occur. This index was 
found not to be significant in the univariate analysis for this year. GMI was revealed 
to be the strongest significant predictor for all five years studied. These results show 
that fraudulent companies are more involved in income increasing method of 
managing earning, which could be the reason to cover poor performance. 
Assets quality index (AQI) 
AQI, which was found to be significant in the univariate analysis for year t, t-1 and t-
2, was found to be not significant in the logistic regression analysis. Therefore, for 
these three years null hypothesis 14b is not rejected as the logistic regression result 
revealed no significant relationship between AQI and the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrence for the three years mentioned. The small effect size in the univariate 
analysis could have contributed to this result. The null hypothesis (H14b) was also not 
rejected for year t-4, and this is consistent with the result of the univariate analysis. 
Null hypothesis 14b is rejected for year t-3, where AQI was found to be significant at 
the 5% level, with a p value of 0.028. There was a negative B value of -0.321, which 
means a decrease in the AQI could highlight an increase in a company‘s risk of fraud. 
The odds ratio of 1.378 was more than 1, indicating that for every percentage of 
decrease in AQI, fraud will be 1.378 times more likely to occur. AQI was found to be 
a strongest significant predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud. This index was 
also found to be significant in the univariate analysis, with a p value of 0.003.  
Sales growth index (SGI) 
Null hypothesis 15b is rejected for year t-1 and t-3, as the logistic regression analysis 
showed that for these two years, SGI was a significant predictor of the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. This means there was a significant relationship between SGI and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences in year t-1 and t-3. These results are 
consistent with the results of the univariate analysis.  
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For year t-1, SGI was found to be significant at the 5% level, with a p value of 0.023. 
The B value was -5.399, so a decrease in the SGI could suggest an increase in a 
company‘s risk of fraud. SGI for year t-3 was a significant predictor at the 1% 
significance level, with a p value of 0.003. The result gave a negative B value of -
3.953, meaning a decrease in the SGI could highlight an increase in a company‘s risk 
of fraud. The odds ratio for the two years was less than 1, indicating that for every 
percentage of decrease in the SGI, fraud is more likely to occur. Again this index 
indicates that fraudulent companies tend to engage in income decreasing as a decrease 
in the index shows a decrease in sales. With respect to this finding, there is the 
possibility that poor growth performance is a sign of fraud.  
On the contrary, the null hypothesis for this index (H15b) is not rejected for the year t, 
t-2 and t-4 as the results revealed that for these three years no significant relationship 
was found between SGI and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. The results 
for year t-4 were consistent with the univariate analysis; there was no significant 
difference between the two groups with respect to SGI. However, the results for year t 
and t-2 were not consistent with the univariate analysis result. SGI was found to be 
significantly different in the two years between the two groups with respect to SGI. 
The effect size for both years was small, which could possibly be the reason for the 
not significant results in the relationship hypothesis testing.  
Total accruals over total assets index (TATA) 
For the five years studied, TATA was found to be a significant predictor only in year 
t-1, at 10% significance level with a p value of 0.081. Therefore, for year t-1 null 
hypothesis 16b is rejected; there was significant relationship between TATA and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud in year t-1. The B value was -5.318, so a decrease in the 
TATA could suggest an increase in a company‘s risk of fraud. The odds ratio (0.005) 
was less than 1, so for every percentage of decrease in TATA increases the risk of 
fraud occurrences. This revealed that there is a high possibility that fraudulent 
companies face cash problems, which increase the risk of manipulating earnings. This 
result was not consistent with the univariate analysis, where no significant difference 
was found between the two groups with respect to TATA. On the other hand, H16b is 
not rejected for year t, t-2, t-3 and t-4, where TATA was found to not be a significant 
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predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud; this was consistent with the univariate 
analysis result.  
Depreciation index (DEPI) 
Null hypothesis 17b is not rejected for years t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4, as the logistic 
regression analysis showed no significant relationship between DEPI and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences for all five years analysed. The result for 
this index was consistent with the univariate analysis result, where there was no 
significant difference between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with 
respect to DEPI for all years analysed. Upon further investigation, it was found that 
the DEPI for both groups did not fluctuate significantly over the five years studied. 
With no significant changes or differences between the two groups with respect to this 
index, it can be concluded that there was no significant relationship between DEPI 
and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Leverage index (LVI) 
Null hypothesis 18b is not rejected for year t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 as the logistic 
regression analysis depicted no significant relationship between LVI and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences for all five years analysed. The result for 
this index was consistent with the univariate analysis result, which detected no 
significant difference between the two types of company with respect to LVI. The not 
significant result for LVI for years t, t-2, t-3 and t-4 was consistent with the univariate 
analysis, which indicated no significant different between non-fraudulent and 
fraudulent companies with respect to LVI. However, the logistic regression result for 
year t-1 was in contra to the result of the univariate analysis of the same year. LVI 
was found to be significantly different between the two groups at the 10% 
significance level, with a small-sized effect (r = 0.13). The small effect could have 
influenced the result of the logistic regression.  
Inventories ratio (INVR) 
Null hypothesis 19b is not rejected for year t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4, as the logistic 
regression analysis found no significant relationship between INVR and the likelihood 
of corporate fraud occurrences for all five years analysed. The result for this index 
was consistent with the univariate analysis result, where no significant difference 
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between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies was detected for INVR, except 
for year t-1. INVR was found to be significantly different between the two groups in 
year t-1 at the 5% significance level; however, the r value was quite low (0.17), 
indicating a small effect size. Again, the small effect size could be the reason that this 
index was not a significant predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Overall, the results made it clear that GMI was a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of corporate fraud consistently over the five years studied. This was consistent with 
the findings of Beneish (1999), Rosner (2003), and Grove and Basilico (2008). DSRI, 
TATA, DEPI and LVI were not significant contributors for all five years studied, 
which is in contrast with Beneish (1999) and Grove and Basilico (2008). SGI was a 
significant predictor only for year t-1 and t-3, while AQI was significant for year t-3 
and TATA for year t-1.  
Table 6-14 shows the comparison results for GMI between the mean benchmark 
(mean for non-fraudulent companies) and each of the fraudulent companies for the 
five-year period. The mean benchmark is the mean of the non-fraudulent companies. 
This mean was compared to the individual means of the 11 fraudulent companies. 
Analysis of the GMI for year t showed that for 9 out of 11 fraudulent companies GMI 
was lower than the mean benchmark. This result was consistent for year t-1, t-2 and t-
3. For year t-4, 6 out of 11 companies‘ GMI indices were lower than the mean 
benchmark. This analysis indicated that fraudulent companies‘ GMI was lower than 
the non-fraudulent companies‘. Beneish (1999a) states that fraud is more likely to 
occur when there is a decrease in the company‘s gross margin (GMI larger than 1). 
However, this study found that the mean GMI for fraudulent companies was less than 
1 for year t, t-1, t-2 and t-4. Only year t-3 showed a GMI larger that 1 (1.350). This 
could signify that the fraudulent companies practised income-increasing earnings 
management. The significant predictor (of earnings management variables) is in 
contrast with the aforementioned studies with respect to the methods of managing 
earnings. For GMI, Beneish (1999a) shows that companies with decrease gross 
margin (GMI more than 1) is highly likely to engage in manipulation, but this study 
indicate that fraudulent companies GMI is less than 1, which mean that the gross 
margin increase. For other indices (SGI and AQI), this study found that fraudulent 
companies engaged in income-decreasing method of managing earnings which the 
other study in the US setting found that manipulators tend to engaged in income-
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increasing method. The difference in countries‘ culture, legal system and environment 
could be the reason for this contrast (Ming Chia, 2007) 
Table 6-14 Descriptive analysis of GMI by cases for year’s t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 
Year 
Mean 
Benchmark  
Mean 
(Fraudulent 
companies) 
Year t 1.010 -15.178 
Year t-1 1.026 -0.011 
Year t-2 0.986 -0.209 
Year t-3 1.064 1.350 
Year t-4 0.993 0.384 
 
Figure 6-1 shows the trend analysis of the GMI for non-fraudulent and fraudulent 
companies over the years studied. The GMI of the fraudulent companies fluctuated 
more over the period, especially from year t-1 to year t, compared to the non-
fraudulent group. There is the possibility that in an effort to present a favourable 
financial statement, companies tried to report higher income to cover any major losses 
incurred, which would explain the high fluctuation in GMI from year t-1 to year t.  
Figure 6-1 Trend analysis of non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies’ GMI 
across years 
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6.4 Additional Analysis 
This section of the chapter extended the result of this study by applying the significant 
variables to four new companies that was charged with corporate fraud after 2007. 
Effort has been made to get feedback from the fraudulent companies in order to 
understand more regarding the company governance system, unfortunately, 
companies in Malaysia are not comfortable or willing to disclose such information 
especially when their companies has been charged with fraud. Lai (2007) states that 
Malaysian Chinese control firms are not open to interviews or studies regarding the 
companies affair especially the boardroom affair. This poses as a big obstacle in 
conducting such study in Malaysia as non-Chinese own companies‘ have the same 
attitude. The regulatory agencies are also not ready to disclose more than what has 
been published in their websites or the news. This part of additional analysis will be 
more to descriptive or interpretative view. Table 6-15 presents the descriptive analysis 
of the additional companies with respect to the significant variables found in this 
study. 
Table 6-15 Descriptive analysis of significant variables of additional new fraud 
companies 
Variables/ 
Company 
Benchmark (result of 
the study) 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
TBOD 8 5 6 10 6 
BODMEET 5 7 9 8 7 
TENURE 10 5 5 4 7 
BLOCK 41% 23% 25% 22% 20% 
GMI (year t) 1.010 -0.231 -0.145 -0.023 0.312 
 
The analysis presented in table 6-15 shows the mean of the five variables of non-
fraudulent companies found in this study and the data for 4 new fraud cases from year 
2008 to 2010 published on the SC enforcement release. The number of board 
members is lower than the benchmark of 8 for three of the company and higher for 
one company. With respect to TBOD, this analysis indicates that the appropriate 
number of board members is important to ensure the effectiveness company‘s 
governance. Too few members could indicate that the board did not have enough 
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members to monitor the company‘ activities. Too many members could means there 
are free rider on the board and the board is difficult to coordinate. The number of 
board meeting (BODMEET) for the four companies is more than 5 could indicate that 
company or the board has discovered fraud and more meetings is held to discuss 
about the problem. Institutional shareholdings (BLOCK) show that the four fraud 
companies have lower percentage of intuitional shareholding as compared to mean 
benchmark of non-fraud companies in study. This shows that the role of BLOCK is 
important in governing companies‘ activities. The important role of institutional 
shareholding was emphasis in the MCCG 2012. Consistent with the findings for 
earnings management indices, the analysis shows that the fraudulent companies GMI 
index is lower than the benchmark or GMI mean for non-fraudulent companies. This 
shows that the fraudulent company adopted income decreasing method to mellow 
down the effect of earnings manipulation. This additional analysis indicates that the 
significant variables highlighted in this study do have some merits and can be used in 
assessing the effectiveness of companies‘ governance. 
6.5 Summary 
Both univariate and logistic regression analyses were used in this study to examine the 
relationships between corporate governance characteristics, earnings management 
variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. Various corporate 
governance characteristics and earnings management variables were measured and 
analysed; a complete discussion of the findings can be found in Chapter Seven. 
The univariate analysis of the corporate governance variables for the first year of 
fraud (year t) indicated that there were significant differences in TBOD, BODMEET, 
TENURE, OUTDIR, ACMEET and BLOCK between the non-fraudulent and 
fraudulent companies. This part of the analysis answers research questions one and 
three. The results for the year prior to the first year of fraud (year t-1), however, 
indicated that only TBOD, ETHNIC and BLOCK were significantly different between 
the two groups. This study found that there was a difference in certain corporate 
governance characteristics between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies, 
namely: TBOD, BODMEET, TENURE and BLOCK for the first year of fraud and 
TBOD, ETHNIC and BLOCK for the year prior to the first year of fraud. TBOD and 
BLOCK showed consistency for two consecutive years. Regarding these 
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characteristics, the non-fraudulent companies had higher numbers of board members 
as well as higher percentages of institutional shareholdings than the fraudulent 
companies. The inconsistency of these results with prior studies may relate to the 
institutional setting. The ownership structure and way things are done in Malaysia are 
not the same as other countries, and therefore may have influenced the outcome of the 
study. 
While the results for the earnings management variables were not overwhelming, 
there was some suggestion on the univariate basis that certain earnings management 
variables could indicate if a company was at risk of corporate fraud. For the five years 
studied, GMI, AQI and SGI were consistently significant over the first four years 
(year‘s t, t-1, t-2 and t-3) in the univariate hypotheses testing. The univariate analysis 
for year t-1 also indicated that LVI and INVR were significantly different between the 
two groups, while the univariate analysis for year t-2 showed DSRI was significantly 
different between the two types of company. Therefore, on a univariate basis, GMI, 
AQI and SGI of both groups of companies were significantly different where the non-
fraudulent companies‘ mean indices for GMI and AQI were higher that the fraudulent 
companies‘ for the years t, t-1, t-2 and t-4. However, for year t-3, the GMI and AQI 
mean indices for the non-fraudulent companies were lower than for the fraudulent 
companies. The SGI mean index for the non-fraudulent companies for years t, t-1, t-3 
and t-4 was higher than for the fraud group, but not for year t-2. These results did 
show some consistency on a univariate basis.  
To answer research questions two and four, logistic regression analysis was 
performed to indicate if there were any relationships between the corporate 
governance and earnings management variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
The logistic regression analysis for year t found that TBOD, BODMEET, TENURE 
and BLOCK were significant indicators in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
Analysis of the relationship between corporate governance characteristics, earnings 
management variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud through logistic 
regression for year t-1 indicated TBOD, DIROWN, ETHNIC and BLOCK were 
significant indicators in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud. TBOD and 
BLOCK were the two consistently significant corporate governance characteristics in 
reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud for the two years studied. The results 
suggested that a higher number of board members (eight at least) contributes to better 
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control and monitoring of management activities and reduces the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. This study indicated that a higher the percentage of institutional 
shareholdings in a company contributes to improved monitoring of companies‘ 
activities and could reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud. The logistic regression 
analysis for the earnings management variables indicated that GMI was consistently a 
significant predictor for all five years analysed, where the mean index of GMI for the 
non-fraudulent companies was higher than the fraudulent companies. This could 
signify that fraudulent companies are highly likely to manipulate their earnings using 
income-increasing methods. Other studies in this area in other countries have found 
that fraudulent companies tend to adopt income-decreasing methods in manipulating 
gross margin. Differences in culture, business practices and legal environment could 
be contributing factors to this contradictory result. The results of this study 
highlighted fraudulent Malaysian companies‘ tendency to adopt income-decreasing 
methods in manipulating/managing earnings with respect to SGI and AQI is 
consistent with the findings of Kamarudin et al. (2012) and Ming Chia et al. (2007). 
The result clearly shows that institutional settings have significant influence over how 
things are being done. One possible reason for the tendency of company to adopt 
income decreasing method is to reduce the effect of earnings management in time of 
distress. During this period of distress normally companies are subject to more 
scrutiny by regulators. 
The last part; the additional analysis on the four new cases shows consistent results 
for the five variables (TBOD, BODMEET, TENURE, BLOCK and GMI) that was 
found to have significant with the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. Now that 
the results have been presented, Chapter Seven will summarise and integrate the 
findings, discuss the implications and limitations of the study, and give some ideas for 
future research and improvements. 
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    Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This final chapter discusses and integrates the findings of the study. This work 
assessed the usefulness of corporate-published information (e.g. annual reports) in 
detecting the likelihood of corporate fraud by analysing non-financial (corporate 
governance characteristics) and financial information (earnings management 
variables) and their relationship with the likelihood of corporate fraud. The increasing 
concern over the number of fraud cases in Malaysia has caused doubts about the 
effectiveness of company governance systems and the reliability of financial reporting 
(especially in earnings). Hence, this study was carried out to analyse usefulness of 
published data in highlighting if company is at risk of fraud through analysing the 
effectiveness of corporate governance variables in reducing the likelihood of 
corporate fraud and the ability of earnings management indices to indicate if company 
is at risk of corporate fraud.  
The selection of the fraudulent and non-fraudulent samples was a vital part of this 
study. The samples were selected and matched based on the criteria mentioned in 
Chapter Five. A sample of fraudulent companies (those that were charged with fraud 
by the Malaysia Securities Commission between 2003 and 2007) was compared with 
a control sample (healthy/non-fraudulent companies) to determine if there was any 
significant difference between the two groups with respect to corporate governance 
variables. This answered research questions one and three. A further analysis was 
carried out to determine the significant relationships between the variables and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. A significant relationship indicated the 
corporate governance variable‘s likelihood to deter corporate fraud, which answered 
research question two. The same comparison analysis was carried out with respect to 
the earnings management data to determine the significant differences between the 
two groups, answering research question three. The earnings management indices 
were regressed using logistic regression to determine search for any significant 
relationships with the likelihood of corporate fraud; this answered research question 
four.  
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Both univariate and multivariate (logistic regression) analyses were performed to 
determine the relationships between the dependent (non-fraudulent and fraud 
companies) and independent variables (corporate governance characteristics and 
earnings management indices/ratios). Before further analyses were carried out, the 
data were checked regarding the basic underlying assumptions of logistic regression 
to ensure that none were violated. Firstly, this chapter summarized the major 
findings/results. Secondly, the implications of the study are discussed, followed by the 
limitations and suggestion for future research. The chapter ends with some concluding 
thoughts on the study. 
7.1 Major Findings 
This section covers the major findings and results for this research. The main 
objective of this study was to determine the usefulness of published information in 
indicating if a company is at risk of corporate fraud. Therefore, this study analysed the 
corporate governance characteristics and earnings management indices of non-
fraudulent and fraudulent companies to look for differences between the two groups 
and the relationships between the variables and the likelihood of corporate fraud. The 
discussion of the findings is divided into two sections: the results for the corporate 
governance variables, and those for the earnings management variables. 
7.1.1 Corporate governance variables 
Based on the literature review and the Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance best 
practice 2000, 11 corporate governance hypotheses were developed from 4 corporate 
governance areas: board of directors‘ characteristics, chairman‘s characteristics, audit 
committee‘s characteristics and institutional shareholding. The univariate test of 
differences and logistic regression analysis were used to test the hypotheses and to 
answer research questions one and three. Analysis and testing covered two years (first 
year of fraud, called year t, and the year prior to the first year of fraud, called year t-1) 
separately. 
Research question one was answered by the hypotheses testing for differences for 
both years. For the first year of fraud, the results provide support for 6 of the 11 
corporate governance hypotheses; there were significant differences between the two 
groups of companies with respect to size of board, frequency of board meetings, 
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tenure of board chairman, percentage of audit committee members holding outside 
directorships, frequency of audit committee meetings and institutional shareholdings. 
Out of these six variables, only frequency of audit committee meetings was 
significantly different (at the 10% significance level) from year t to year t-1, where the 
mean of meetings increased by 1 from 5 in year t-1. The slight increase in the number 
of meetings held by the audit committee could possible indicate that the audit 
committees had concerns about the companies‘ financial reporting.  
On average, the non-fraudulent companies had a slightly higher number of board 
members than the fraudulent companies; this could indicate that having at least eight 
members on the board enhances the governance process. Consistent with the increase 
in the frequency of audit committee meetings, the fraudulent companies were also 
found to hold more board meetings in year t, which could possibly indicate that they 
had concerns over the companies‘ activities or reporting. The average tenure of board 
chairmen was higher for the non-fraudulent companies, perhaps suggesting that 
having longer tenure, more experience and better understanding of the company 
contributes to better governance. The same could be argued with respect to the 
percentage of institutional shareholdings, where the non-fraudulent companies had a 
higher percentage of institutional shareholdings than the fraudulent ones.  
On the other hand, the results for year t-1 showed support for only 3 out of 11 
corporate governance variables; this indicates that there were significant differences 
between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to size of board, 
chairman‘s ethnicity and institutional shareholdings. The results for size of board and 
institutional shareholdings indicated that having more members on the board and a 
higher percentage of institutional ownership could improve governance and control. 
For the two years analysed, only the size of the board and the percentage of 
institutional shareholdings remained consistently significant. A detailed investigation 
into ethnicity showed that the fraudulent companies had fewer Malay chairmen (18%) 
compared to the non-fraudulent companies (49%). However, it is not fair to say that 
having a Malay board chairman strengthens company governance. Further 
investigation needs to be carried out to better understand this variable and its role in 
effective governance. 
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To determine the relationships between the corporate governance variables and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences, hypothesis testing of relationships was 
carried out using logistic regression analysis. Only four of the variables were 
significant predictors of the likelihood of corporate fraud for year‘s t and t-1. The 
significant predictors for year t were: size of board, number of board meetings, 
chairman‘s tenure and percentage of institutional shareholdings. These four variables 
were also found to be significantly different in the univariate analysis. The significant 
predictors for year t-1 were: size of board, percentage of directors‘ shareholdings, 
chairman‘s ethnicity and percentage of institutional shareholdings. Except for 
percentage of directors‘ shareholdings, these variables were also significant in the 
univariate analysis. However, only size of board and percentage of institutional 
shareholdings were found to be constantly significant predictors of the likelihood of 
corporate fraud for the two years studied. 
Size of board was found to have a negative relationship with the likelihood of 
corporate fraud, where an increase in the size of the board would likely reduce the risk 
of corporate fraud. On average, having eight members on the board was shown to be 
effective in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud, which is consistent with Jensen 
(1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). In this case, size does matter. Having more 
people on the board may increase efficiency in monitoring and controlling, hence 
reducing the opportunity for fraudulent activities and increasing the ability to detect 
any irregularities in the company‘s reporting.  
Frequency of board meetings was found to be positively related to corporate fraud 
incidences. The logistic regression result indicated that a high frequency of board 
meetings does not reduce the risk of corporate fraud. The Bursa Malaysia Corporate 
Governance Guide suggests a minimum of six to eight meetings per year for the board 
to be effective in monitoring company activities. Surprisingly, this does not seem to 
be effective. On average the non-fraudulent companies had five meetings a year for 
both years studied, while the fraudulent companies had nine meetings in year t and six 
in year t-1. This higher frequency of board meetings could possibly signal that a 
company is in distress. This result is consistent with Uzun et al. (2004) and Bedard 
(2004). The more meetings held in year t could also have been due to the fraud 
charges against the companies by the Malaysia Securities Commission. 
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This study indicated that the length of the chairmen‘s tenure may have reduced the 
likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences in year t. The average tenure for non-
fraudulent companies in year t was 10 years, and for fraudulent companies it was 5 
years. This evidences a negative relationship between tenure and the likelihood of 
corporate fraud occurrences; longer tenure reduces the likelihood of corporate fraud. 
One possible reason for this is that as tenure increases, so does the chairman‘s 
knowledge and experience of the company‘s affairs, which could lead to better 
oversight. 
The percentage of institutional shareholdings was the strongest predictor of corporate 
fraud and was consistently significant over the two years. The result showed a 
negative relationship with corporate incidences, which means a higher percentage of 
institutional shareholdings likely, reduces the risk of corporate fraud. The average of 
41% of institutional shareholding in the non-fraudulent companies (20% more than 
the average for the fraudulent ones) reduced the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences. A higher percentage of institutional shareholding subjects the company 
to more scrutiny (by the institutional shareholders), which leads to better control and 
monitoring of company and manager activities.  
The result for year t-1 indicated that percentage of directors‘ shareholdings was a 
significant predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. The result 
showed that an increase in the percentage of directors‘ shareholdings could reduce the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. One reason for this could be that directors are more 
effective in monitoring company activities when they have more interest in the 
company.  
Analysis of year t-1 also indicated that ethnicity was a significant predictor of 
corporate fraud, where the risk of corporate fraud was higher when the chairman was 
non-Malay. However, this finding needs to be investigated further before a firm 
conclusion can be made. Perhaps a future study could use the case study approach to 
investigate organizational culture with respect to ethnicity and corporate fraud. 
The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement paragraph 15.02 states that at least two, or 
1/3 (whichever is higher), of the board members should be independent directors. 
Independent board members play an essential role in ensuring the interests of the 
minority shareholders are protected. However, on the contrary, this study found that 
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for both years analysed there was no significant difference in the percentage of 
independent board members between the non-fraudulent and fraudulent groups. This 
study also found that the independence of board members was not a significant 
predictor of corporate fraud, which means that the existence of independent directors 
does not reduce the likelihood of corporate fraud. On average, both groups of 
companies complied with the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirement, having at least 
40% independent directors on the company‘s board. This study also found the same 
results for percentage of independent audit committee members. Both groups of 
companies had at least two thirds independent audit committee members. The Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirement paragraph 5.10 states that there should be at least three 
members on the audit committee and the majority should be independent directors. On 
average, both groups had three audit committee members and two thirds of them were 
independent directors. Again, in terms of independence, both groups complied with 
the requirement and corporate governance guidelines. Unfortunately, the requirement 
and guidelines proved to be ineffective in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud in 
Malaysia. Perhaps the required percentage of independent members should be 
increased in order for this variable to be effective.  
The Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance does not make the separation of CEO 
and chairman mandatory. However, companies are encouraged to separate the two 
roles, and in the event that the roles are combined, companies must make sure that 
there is a strong independent element on the board and the decisions to combine the 
role must be publicly explained. Upon investigation of this dual role, this study 
determined that more than 80% of companies in both groups separated the roles of 
CEO and board chairman. It was noted that the separation of these two roles did not 
increase the effectiveness of corporate governance in corporate fraud deterrence. On 
average, the percentage of audit committee members holding outside directorships 
was slightly lower for the fraudulent companies, but the difference was not 
statistically significant. It seems that holding more outside directorships did not 
reduce the effectiveness of audit committee members is exercising their duties. It was 
found that the level of corporate governance compliance was high for both groups of 
companies. One cannot help but wonder if the suggested corporate governance 
requirements are really effective in monitoring companies‘ activities, or is the high 
degree of compliance among companies just a practice of ‗ticking the box‘? This 
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leads to the question of the usefulness of information published by corporations when 
a number of key corporate governance characteristics were unable to reduce the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. The additional findings in section 6.4 indicate that the 
four corporate governance characteristics (TBOD, BODMEET, TENURE and 
BLOCK) that were found to have significant relationships with corporate fraud 
occurrences were consistent in the four additional cases. From the results of this 
study, it can be concluded that company-published information can still be reliable, 
but users have to be very careful when digesting the information. 
The MCCG 2012‘s new recommendations on every aspect of governance are 
continued in the proposed draft of MCCG 2016. However, the recommendations do 
stress strengthening governance practices. Rather than just following the UK Code of 
Corporate Governance, it would be effective if the responsible agencies factored in 
the influence of Malaysian culture and practices to enhance the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in Malaysian institutions. This is one of the emphasized in the 
MCCG 2016 draft proposal. 
7.1.2 Earnings management variables 
In this study, nine earnings management variables‘ hypotheses were developed and 
tested. The earnings management variables were the most used indices and ratios 
based on the most common financial information used in assessing company 
performance. Nine indices and ratios were calculated and analysed for both groups of 
companies for five years.  
Three of the nine hypotheses tested were found to be consistently significant for the 
four-year period (years t, t-1, t-2 and t-3), which means that there was a significant 
difference between non-fraudulent and fraudulent companies with respect to the three 
variables. The variables were: gross margin index, assets quality index and sales 
growth index. This result shows that the fraudulent company tended to engage in 
income-decreasing method in earnings manipulation, which is in contrast with a 
number of other studies, e.g. Beneish (1999), Bell and Carcello (2000), and Rosner 
(2003). The contrast is likely due to the differences in culture, business and legal 
environment between this study‘s setting and the settings of the other studies. 
However, this finding is consistent with the results of Kamarudin et al. (2012), who 
carried out their study in Malaysia. In year t-4, none of the earnings management 
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hypotheses were supported. One could assume that during this year earnings had not 
yet been manipulated as the companies still had no financial or performance 
problems.  
These indices can be used as tools for users of financial reports to assess companies‘ 
performance, even though being significantly different is not necessarily a signal of 
fraud. But, being prudent with their investment could save them from a more 
devastating loss in the future. This study also revealed that earnings had been 
manipulated one to two years before the fraud was discovered. Thus, it is wise for 
users to also analyse up to two years‘ worth of financial information before the 
current year, to detect any manipulation. In the year when the fraud was discovered or 
the company was charged with fraud, companies normally would take corrective 
actions to lessen the effect of the manipulation, or to some extend cover up the 
manipulation. For this reason, analysing only one year of company financial data is 
not sufficient. 
Further analysis was carried out to determine the earnings management variables that 
had significant relationships with the likelihood of corporate fraud occurrences. Only 
one earnings management variable (gross margin index) was found to be a 
consistently significant predictor of the likelihood of corporate fraud for the five-year 
period analysed. This result was consistent with the results of the univariate analysis, 
where GMI was also found to be significantly different over the period studied, except 
for year t-4. The GMI for fraudulent companies was smaller (lower than 1 index 
indicates company is practicing income increasing) than non-fraudulent companies, 
which indicates that company gross profits increase from the year before. The reason 
for this could be that the company was facing financial problems where sales were 
increased. Companies could also have engaged in income-increasing actions where 
cost of sales was decreased. This data or information on the changes of sales and cost 
of sales should be important to users in monitoring financial information.  
AQI and SGI were also significant predictors of the likelihood of corporate fraud 
occurrences in year‘s t-1 and t-3, which was consistent with the results of the 
univariate analysis. As stated earlier, earnings are usually not just manipulated in the 
year the manipulation is discovered, but this activity starts a year or more before year 
t. Therefore, AQI and SGI are two other indices that could help in assessing the health 
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of a company. For these two indices, income-decreasing method were adopted to 
manipulate earnings; hence, any negative changes in sales and current assets should 
ring an alarm warning users to be extra careful in their assessments of a company‘s 
financial information. TATA was found to be a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of corporate fraud occurrences in year t, but was not significantly different between 
the two groups studied for all five years. Nevertheless, this index deserves to be taken 
seriously as a predictor of fraud. There is no harm in being overcautious with one‘s 
money. A company‘s working capital should be the centre of attention for this index, 
as well as their leverage. Lower or negative accruals indicate it is highly likely fraud 
has been committed. In other studies, a higher index signalled a company was 
employing income-increasing methods to manage earnings. Per contra, in Malaysia it 
was the other way round: lower indices were associated with the likelihood of 
corporate fraud. To conclude this section, this study revealed that GMI, AQI, SGI, 
TATA and LVI could be good predictors of the likelihood of corporate fraud, and 
analyses of financial information should incorporate data from at least a three-year 
period. To some extent, company-published financial information is useful for 
indicating if a company is at risk of corporate fraud. 
Institutional setting without doubt had a significant impact on this study. Being a 
multicultural society, the ways Malaysian businesses operate is different from other 
countries. Differences in cultural values and beliefs, legal requirements and 
environment definitely influence the way things are done and business are managed. 
The level of transparency among the ethnicities in Malaysia could have an effect on 
the method of earnings management used. Income-decreasing methods are adopted 
because companies try to hide the manipulation by lowering earnings gradually.  
7.2 Implications 
This section explores the potential implications of this study. This topic can be 
divided into four categories: public policy, corporate policy, accounting policy and 
potential for future research. 
Corporate fraud has severe financial and non-financial consequences. A long battle 
has been waged against fraud, especially by the MSC, who is responsible for ensuring 
the integrity of corporate financial reporting in Malaysia. The establishment of the 
Code of Corporate Governance was designed for this purpose. However, the 
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effectiveness of corporate governance structures in curbing the incidence of corporate 
fraud in Malaysia is still not well known. The results of this study shed some light on 
this. Since corporate governance was established as a control and monitoring 
mechanism for corporate behaviour, the public at large relies on its ability to be 
effective. This study proves an empirical relation between certain corporate 
governance characteristics and the likelihood of corporate fraud.  
This study also shows that certain corporate governance characteristics that should be 
effective in curbing corporate fraud are in fact not effective in Malaysia, namely: the 
independence of the board of directors. Therefore, more emphasis should be put on 
improving corporate governance structures. The role of institutional shareholders 
should be highlighted and they should play more important role in company‘s 
governance. Multiple directorship of board member seems to be beneficial to 
company‘s governance in Malaysia. The contribution of knowledge gained from 
holding multiple directorships could increase director expertise apart from formal 
training. A more in-depth analysis on the role of institutional theory in the 
development on corporate governance is valuable for the development of governance 
policy.  
The limitation of director‘s tenure to 9 years is appropriate as knowledge and 
experience is important apart from formal education and training. This is consistent 
with the effectiveness of having multiple directorships that reduces the likelihood of 
corporate fraud occurrences. This shows that the formal education and training is not 
enough which perhaps could be suggested to the education sector to increase students 
understanding in financial reporting. The multiracial factor that brought with it culture 
and values into how business is manage could be one of the reason that directors need 
experience and knowledge to help them carrying out their duties effectively. The 
results of this study suggest that it is difficult to gauge the likelihood of fraud by 
analysing a company‘s financial statements. The results empirically showed that only 
one index highlighted the relationship between earnings management and the 
likelihood of corporate fraud. Therefore, the regulatory agencies need to be more 
rigorous in monitoring the practice of earnings management in Malaysian companies. 
For corporations, having a sound and effective corporate governance structure that 
minimizes the likelihood of corporate fraud will increase shareholder trust and 
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improve control over management. The results of this study provide useful 
information for developing corporate governance structures and company policies. 
For example, rather than just sticking to the Code of Corporate Governance‘s 
suggested structure, companies might want to consider the role of an independent 
board of directors in effective monitoring and control. Corporations might also want 
to improve their audit committee to ensure their effectiveness. Corporate culture and 
ways things are done need to be more transparent, the top management need to set the 
tone of good governance. This will be followed by the subordinates which eventually 
will be a good and ethical culture. 
Investors, shareholders and the public at large rely on companies‘ financial 
information for investment purposes as well as evaluating companies‘ performance. 
This study produced some empirical evidence that the reliability of corporate financial 
reporting is jeopardized when earnings are managed to cover financial 
difficulties/distress. The results indicated that there were only very small differences 
in the earnings management indices between the two groups studied. Investors and 
other stakeholders should analyse the institutional setting of the company, to 
understand how works are being done. Hence this could help in evaluating company‘s 
financial performance and the reliability of information published. 
The empirical results of this study only represent one of many areas of corporate 
governance structures and earnings management practices. Future research should 
consider a broader investigation on governance attributes and earnings management 
indices and how they relate to the likelihood of corporate fraud. This study analysed 
earnings management indices based on yearly financial information; thus, for future 
research it might be wise to analyse financial information based on quarterly financial 
reports. Even though quarterly reports are not audited, they are a source of financial 
information that can be used to see trends, in particular earnings management trends. 
This could give some insight into when earnings started being managed or 
manipulated. Future research should also consider analysing corporate fraud using a 
case study approach to give a more in-depth understanding of this issue. This could 
offer a better view on company governance. Apart from adopting a positivist 
paradigm (as this study did), future researchers could analyse or study this issue from 
a more critical perspective or from an interpretative view. This could produce more 
in-depth explanations and understanding of the problems of governance and fraud.  
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7.3 Limitations 
This study had several limitations. Firstly, motivations to commit corporate fraud can 
be influenced by factors that were beyond control in this study. While careful 
measurements were taken during the sample matching process (size, industry and time 
period), other factors such as management style and corporate culture are difficult to 
measure and could not be controlled. Therefore, it is not the intention of this study to 
provide a complete and definite explanation of the factors that contribute to corporate 
fraud. Instead, the intention is to provide information on the effectiveness of certain 
corporate governance characteristics in reducing the likelihood of corporate fraud and 
which earnings management indices could highlight the likelihood of corporate fraud 
in Malaysia. Management style and corporate culture could have influence over the 
corporate fraud. Perhaps, a further study could be carried out examining the influence 
of these other factors on fraud. 
Secondly, the hidden or secretive nature of fraud itself may have created some sample 
bias; whereby a fraudulent company that has yet to be uncovered might have 
unknowingly been included in the non-fraudulent company sample. Although great 
care was taken to screen the non-fraudulent companies, there is still the possibility of 
bias in the sample. The possibility that some of the information collected from the 
fraudulent companies was not completely accurate could also contribute to the 
problem of bias in the sample. This limitation is noted, however it is not deemed to 
have had a significant impact on the results. 
Also, due to the nature of fraud, the fraudulent sample in this study was indeed in 
financial distress and therefore there was a high incidence of missing data. This 
caused the number in the sample to be small. As a result, caution needs to be 
exercised in generalizing the results of this study. Since the main focus of this study 
was to determine the usefulness of published information, the source of information 
focused on was published annual reports. Even though the general notion is that it is 
easy to access such published information, the fact is this is not true when dealing 
with a troubled company, including fraudulent companies and financially distressed 
companies. This issue became a major obstacle that reduced the number in the fraud 
sample. The unique nature of Malaysia‘s culture and legal environment makes the 
level of secrecy and confidentiality very high, which also contributed to the small 
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fraud sample. Nevertheless, corporate fraud is an important issue to be studied in the 
Malaysian context; therefore, having a small sample does not mean the issue of 
corporate fraud cannot be examined in Malaysia. The result could become part of the 
basic understanding of corporate fraud in Malaysia.  
Caution should also be taken regarding corporate governance‘s effectiveness and 
earnings management patterns. There is the possibility that the effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness of companies‘ corporate governance structures, which lead to better or 
worse control of earnings management, may not be due to the effectiveness of the 
governance, but the integrity of the management themselves. Management can be 
very ethical, resulting in strong and effective governance, or it can be otherwise. 
Having the perfect code of corporate governance does not ensure the effectiveness of 
company governance if the people on board themselves do not have strong ethical 
values. 
Manipulation of earnings and acts of fraud are not one-off acts, but rather exhibit a 
snowball effect. One manipulation/act of fraud leads to another and the impact is 
brought forward to another period. In many cases the manipulation/fraud is only 
detected after a few years, when the effect is too big to hide. This is another limitation 
of this study that should be noted. The study paid much attention to the year fraud was 
discovered. However, studying the data from a few years before the fraud year could 
be important and provide more in-depth understanding of this issue.  
7.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The effectiveness of corporate governance in fraud deterrence is quite complex and 
not easy to quantify. Effective corporate governance will result in better (if not 
effective) monitoring and controlling over management activities and corporate 
reporting. Sound corporate reporting increases the usefulness of published 
information in decision making. Therefore, more effective corporate governance 
would give users assurance of the published information‘s usefulness and reliability. 
The practice of earnings management is difficult to quantify, and it is hard to define 
the boundaries between managing earnings within the GAAP and violations of 
GAAP. This study, therefore, only focused on the effectiveness of certain corporate 
governance characteristics and ability of earnings management variables to highlight 
if a company is at risk of corporate fraud. The results suggested that many of the 
  192 
strong corporate governance characteristics put forward were not able to detect 
corporate fraud occurrences. The results also showed that the practice of earnings 
management in fraudulent and non-fraudulent companies is almost the same, which 
suggests that the reliability of financial numbers could be questionable. The findings 
suggested that the development of corporate governance should be tailored to the 
company‘s unique needs and environment, and should not just focus on meeting the 
regulatory requirements. In particular, board and audit committee members should be 
more effective in assessing and evaluating financial reports. This study also suggests 
that other corporate governance characteristics and earnings management indices 
should be investigated to determine their relationships with the likelihood of corporate 
fraud. Companies‘ published information, to a certain extent, is useful provided that 
users exercise caution in digesting it, and know what to look for and how to interpret 
the information. Some of the variables that were found to be significant in this study 
could provide guidance for users in assessing companies‘ published information and 
performance. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Earnings management models based on earnings accruals 
 Earnings Management Models 
Model Measurement 
Healy Model Healy (1985) tests earnings management by comparing mean total 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets across the earnings 
management partitioning variable. The different in his study from 
the others is he predicts that systematic earnings management 
occurs in every period. He divides the sample into three groups, 
with one group of earnings predicted to be managed upwards (as 
estimation period) and two groups of earnings predicted to be 
managed downwards (as event period). Inferences are then made 
through pairwise comparisons of the mean total accruals in the 
estimation period group to the mean total accruals for each of the 
event period groups. The mean total accruals from the estimation 
period then represent the measure of nondiscretionary accruals. The 
model for nondiscretionary accruals is: 
NDA

= 
T
TA
t
t
 
Where:  
NDA = estimated nondiscretionary accruals; 
TA     = total accruals scaled by lagged total assets; 
t        = 1, 2, …T is a year subscript for years included in the 
estimation period; and 
       = a year subscript indicating a year in the event period. 
 
 
De Angelo 
Model 
 
De Angelo tests for earnings management by computing first 
differences in total accruals and by assuming that the first 
differences have an expected value of zero under the null hypothesis 
of no earnings management. The model uses last period‘s total 
accruals (scaled by lagged total assets) as the measure of 
nondiscretionary accruals. The model for nondiscretionary accruals 
is: 
NDA

= TA 1  
The model can be viewed as a special form of the Healy Model, 
where estimation period for nondiscretionary accruals is restricted 
to the previous year's observation. A common feature of the Healy 
and DeAngelo models is that they both use total accruals from the 
estimation period as proxy for expected nondiscretionary accruals. 
If nondiscretionary accruals are constant over time and discretionary 
accruals have a mean of zero in the estimation period, then both the 
Healy and DeAngelo models will measure nondiscretionary 
accruals without error. If, however, nondiscretionary accruals 
change from period to period, then both models will tend to measure 
nondiscretionary accruals with error. 
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Jones Model 
 
Jones‘ (1991) model relaxes the assumption that nondiscretionary 
accruals are constant and attempts to control for the effect of 
changes in a firm‘s economic circumstances on nondiscretionary 
accruals. The Jones model for nondiscretionary accruals in the event 
year is: 
NDA

= 1 (1/A 1 ) + 2 (REV  ) + 3 (PPE  ), 
Where: 
REV

 = revenues in year   less revenues in year 1  scaled by 
total assets at 1 ; 
PPE

 = gross property, plant and equipment in year   scaled by 
total assets at 1 ; 
A
1
 = total assets at 1 ; and 
1 , 2 , 3  = firm-specific parameters. 
Estimates of the firm-specific parameters, 1 , 2 , 3  are generated 
using the following model in the estimation period: 
TA
t
= a
1
(1/A
1
) + a
2
(REV

) + a
3
(PPE

) + t  
Where a
1
, a
2
 and a
3
 denote the OLS estimates of 1 , 2  and 3  
and TA is total accruals scaled by lagged total assets.  
 
 
Modified 
Jones Model 
 
This modified model is designed to eliminate the conjectured 
tendency of the Jones model to measure discretionary accruals with 
error when discretion is exercised over revenues. The 
nondiscretionary accruals are estimated during the event period as: 
NDA

= 1 (1/A 1 ) + 2 (REV   - REC  ) + 3 (PPE  ), 
Where: 
REC

 = net receivables in year   less net receivables in year 
1  scaled by total assets at 1 . 
 
 
Industry 
Model 
 
The Industry model is similar to the Jones model in that it relaxes 
the assumption that nondiscretionary accruals are constant over 
time. Instead of attempting to directly model the determinants of the 
nondiscretionary accruals, the Industry model assumes that variation 
in the determinants of nondiscretionary accruals is common across 
firms in the same industry. The nondiscretionary accruals model is: 
NDA

= 1 + 2 median 1 (TA  ), 
Where: 
median
1
(TA

) = the median value of total accruals scaled by lagged 
assets for all non-sample firms in the same 2-digit SIC code. 
The firm-specific parameters 1  and 2  are estimated using OLS on 
the observations in the estimation period. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix of corporate governance variables 
Correlation Coefficient Analysis of Corporate Governance Variables for Year t 
Variable Spearman’s Rho  INBOD TBOD BODMEET DIROWN DUALITY TENURE ETHNIC INDAC OUTDIR ACMEET BLOCK NF/F 
INBOD 
Correlation 1.000            
Sig. (2-tailed)             
TBOD 
Correlation -0.273** 1.000           
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000            
BODMEET 
Correlation -0.056 0.014 1.000          
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.483 0.860           
DIROWN 
Correlation -0.034 0.051 -0.263** 1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.670 0.518 0.001          
DUALITY 
Correlation 0.011 -0.080 -0.078 0.173* 1.000        
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.886 0.313 0.325 0.029         
TENURE 
Correlation -0.236** 0.059 -0.164* 0.180* 0.105 1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.003 0.458 0.038 0.023 0.185        
ETHNIC 
Correlation 0.209** 0.051 0.023 -0.179* -0.296** -0.206** 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.522 0.774 0.024 0.000 0.009       
INDAC 
Correlation 0.254** 0.132 -0.003 0.029 -0.027 -0.032 0.247** 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.001 0.096 0.973 0.713 0.737 0.692 0.002      
OUTDIR 
Correlation 0.169* 0.038 -0.009 -0.116 -0.026 -0.083 0.126 0.440** 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.032 0.637 0.908 0.145 0.743 0.299 0.112 0.000     
ACMEET 
Correlation -0.098 -0.145 0.559** -0.085 0.030 -0.093 -0.075 -0.137 0.026 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.217 0.67 0.000 0.282 0.709 0.244 0.346 0.085 0.747    
BLOCK 
Correlation -0.066 0.074 0.177* 0.651** -0.137 -0.013 0.133 -0.142 0.075 0.042 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.404 0.349 0.025 0.000 0.084 0.867 0.092 0.072 0.348 0.595   
NF/F 
Correlation 0.023 -0.221** 0.234** -0.097 0.014 -0.097 -0.097 -0.097 -0.183* 0.243** -0.201* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.769 0.005 0.003 0.220 0.858 0.223 0.223 0.223 0.020 0.002 0.011  
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Correlation Coefficient Analysis of Corporate Governance Variables for Year t-1 
Variable Spearman’s Rho  INBOD TBOD BODMEET DIROWN DUALITY TENURE ETHNIC INDAC OUTDIR ACMEET BLOCK NF/F 
INBOD 
Correlation 1.000            
Sig. (2-tailed)             
TBOD 
Correlation -0.290** 1.000           
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000            
BODMEET 
Correlation -0.146 0.000 1.000          
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.066 0.999           
DIROWN 
Correlation -0.011 0.040 -0.247** 1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.893 0.617 0.002          
DUALITY 
Correlation 0.091 -0.137 -0.084 0.214** 1.000        
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.254 0.084 0.289 0.007         
TENURE 
Correlation -0.218** 0.048 -0.126 0.136 0.141 1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.006 0.549 0.113 0.086 0.076        
ETHNIC 
Correlation 0.209** 0.040 0.143 -0.196* -0.301** -0.126 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.008 0.620 0.072 0.013 0.000 0.113       
INDAC 
Correlation 0.137 0.245** -0.044 0.003 -0.098 -0.154 0.090 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.084 0.002 0.577 0.971 0.218 0.051 0.256      
OUTDIR 
Correlation 0.059 0.156* -0.055 -0.239** -0.037 -0.120 0.016 0.316** 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.456 0.049 0.488 0.002 0.642 0.130 0.843 0.000     
ACMEET 
Correlation -0.126 -0.110 0.529** -0.114 0.005 -0.038 0.061 -0.016 -0.017 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.114 0.166 0.000 0.152 0.954 0.636 0.444 0.843 0.827    
BLOCK 
Correlation -0.074 0.051 0.195* 0.678** -0.199* -0.036 0.196* 0.049 0.208** 0.036 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.354 0.057 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.648 0.013 0.535 0.008 0.649   
NF/F 
Correlation 0.095 -0.163* 0.075 -0.042 0.049 -0.116 -0.156* -0.062 -0.104 0.031 -0.222* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.231 0.040 0.347 0.600 0.539 0.145 0.049 0.433 0.191 0.701 0.005  
*,** denote significances at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix 3: Tolerance and VIF results of corporate governance variables 
Tolerance and VIF Results of Corporate Governance Variables for Years t and t-1 
Variable 
Year t Year t-1 
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
INBOD 0.782 1.279 0.748 1.337 
TBOD 0.878 1.139 0.804 1.243 
BODMEET 0.428 2.337 0.683 1.465 
DIROWN 0.503 1.989 0.526 1.900 
DUALITY 0.888 1.127 0.837 1.195 
TENURE 0.861 1.161 0.924 1.082 
ETHNIC 0.782 1.279 0.799 1.252 
INDAC 0.670 1.493 0.863 1.158 
OUTDIR 0.762 1.313 0.888 1.127 
ACMEET 0.426 2.349 0.698 1.432 
BLOCK 0.490 2.040 0.507 1.974 
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix of earnings management variables 
Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management for Year t 
VARIABLES DSRI GMI  AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVI INVSI NF/F 
DSRI Correlation Coefficient 1.000          
 p           
GMI Correlation Coefficient -0.015 1.000         
 p 0.849          
AQI Correlation Coefficient -0.004 -0.029 1.000        
 p 0.960 0.712         
SGI Correlation Coefficient -0.258** 0.289** 0.253** 1.000       
 p 0.001 0.000 0.001        
TATA Correlation Coefficient 0.104 0.113 -0.133 -0.046 1.000      
 p 0.190 0.154 0.094 0.567       
DEPI Correlation Coefficient 0.010 0.170* 0.046 0.026 -0.045 1.000     
 p 0.898 0.032 0.566 -0.741 0.576      
LVI Correlation Coefficient 0.261** 0.080 -0.012 0.200* -0.395** 0.166* 1.000    
 p 0.001 0.313 0.882 0.011 0.000 0.036     
INVI Correlation Coefficient 0.058 0.106 -0.097 0.364** -0.015 0.097 0.264** 1.000   
 p 0.468 0.182 0.224 0.000 0.851 0.220 0.001    
INVSI Correlation Coefficient 0.245** -0.133 0.083 -0.335** 0.042 0.083 0.172* 0.670** 1.000  
 p 0.002 0.093 0.294 0.000 0.598 0.300 0.030 0.000   
NF/F Correlation Coefficient -0.018 -0.186* -0.020 -0.154 -0.078 -0.056 0.085 -0.080 0.020 1.000 
 p 0.817 0.018 0.801 0.052 0.325 0.479 0.284 0.312 0.806  
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Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management for Year t-1 
 
 
 
VARIABLES DSRI GMI  AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVI INVSI NF/F 
DSRI Correlation Coefficient 1.000          
 p           
GMI Correlation Coefficient -0.030 1.000         
 p 0.711          
AQI Correlation Coefficient -0.156* -0.043 1.000        
 p 0.050 0.594         
SGI Correlation Coefficient -0.224** 0.192* 0.090 1.000       
 p 0.004 0.015 0.256        
TATA Correlation Coefficient 0.180* -0.079 -0.141 -0.163* 1.000      
 p 0.023 0.320 0.076 0.039       
DEPI Correlation Coefficient 0.148 0.028 -0.195* 0.005 -0.105 1.000     
 p 0.61 0.723 0.013 0.946 0.186      
LVI Correlation Coefficient 0.000 0.177* -0.059 0.351** -0.460** 0.092 1.000    
 p 0.999 0.025 0.460 0.000 0.000 0.246     
INVI Correlation Coefficient 0.074 0.040 -0.021 0.257** 0.074 0.057 0.247** 1.000   
 p 0.353 0.613 0.792 0.001 0.353 0.472 0.002    
INVSI Correlation Coefficient 0.194* -0.117 -0.078 -0.362** 0.145 0.034 0.027 0.724** 1.000  
 p 0.014 0.139 0.327 0.000 0.068 0.669 0.737 0.000   
NF/F Correlation Coefficient -0.049 -0.110 -0.282** -0.215** -0.035 -0.005 0.133 -0.172* -0.084 1.000 
 p 0.534 0.167 0.000 0.006 0.660 0.955 0.093 0.029 0.290  
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Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management for Year t-2 
 
 
 
VARIABLES DSRI GMI  AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVI INVSI NF/F 
DSRI Correlation Coefficient 1.000          
 p           
GMI Correlation Coefficient 0.135 1.000         
 p 0.089          
AQI Correlation Coefficient -0.017 0.076 1.000        
 p 0.830 0.336         
SGI Correlation Coefficient -0.161* 0.232** -0.004 1.000       
 p 0.041 0.003 0.956        
TATA Correlation Coefficient 0.051 0.025 -0.045 -0.038 1.000      
 p 0.522 0.751 0.568 0.634       
DEPI Correlation Coefficient 0.169* 0.050 0.051 0.188* 0.116 1.000     
 p 0.033 0.533 0.524 0.017 0.144      
LVI Correlation Coefficient 0.193* -0.027 -0.073 0.193* 0.451** -0.054 1.000    
 p 0.015 0.739 0.362 0.001 0.000 0.500     
INVI Correlation Coefficient 0.157* -0.032 -0.012 0.268** 0.048 0.018 0.226** 1.000   
 p 0.047 0.689 0.882 0.001 0.550 0.818 0.004    
INVSI Correlation Coefficient 0.281** -0.191* 0.044 -0.318** 0.021 0.134 0.113 0.752** 1.000  
 p 0.000 0.016 0.584 0.000 0.788 0.091 0.154 0.000   
NF/F Correlation Coefficient 0.177* -0.346** -0.169* -0.217** 0.079 -0.076 0.053 -0.062 0.029 1.000 
 p 0.025 0.000 0.032 0.006 0.318 0.342 0.508 0.434 0.719  
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Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management for Year t-3 
 
 
 
VARIABLES DSRI GMI  AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVI INVSI NF/F 
DSRI Correlation Coefficient 1.000          
 p           
GMI Correlation Coefficient -0.034 1.000         
 p 0.666          
AQI Correlation Coefficient 0.053 0.083 1.000        
 p 0.506 0.298         
SGI Correlation Coefficient -0.342** 0.228** 0.097 1.000       
 p 0.000 0.004 0.221        
TATA Correlation Coefficient 0.077 0.117 0.425** -0.097 1.000      
 p 0.334 0.139 0.000 0.224       
DEPI Correlation Coefficient 0.014 0.097 0.083 0.038 0.127 1.000     
 p 0.858 0.224 0.297 0.631 0.109      
LVI Correlation Coefficient 0.008 0.137 -0.006 0.332** -0.207** 0.111 1.000    
 p 0.921 0.083 0.944 0.000 0.008 0.163     
INVI Correlation Coefficient 0.027 0.107 -0.055 0.267** -0.093 0.061 0.384** 1.000   
 p 0.738 0.180 0.492 0.001 0.241 0.440 0.000    
INVSI Correlation Coefficient 0.190* -0.022 -0.020 -0.305** 0.004 0.054 0.213** 0.731** 1.000  
 p 0.016 0.783 0.804 0.000 0.961 0.501 0.007 0.000   
NF/F Correlation Coefficient -0.033 -0.075 0.234** -0.123 0.011 0.057 0.010 -0.128 -0.001 1.000 
 p 0.675 0.348 0.003 0.122 0.885 0.470 0.896 0.107 0.987  
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Correlation Matrix for Earnings Management for Year t-4 
 
 
 
VARIABLES DSRI GMI  AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVI INVSI NF/F 
DSRI Correlation Coefficient 1.000          
 p           
GMI Correlation Coefficient 0.009 1.000         
 p 0.909          
AQI Correlation Coefficient -0.018 -0.015 1.000        
 p 0.821 0.848         
SGI Correlation Coefficient -0.267** 0.274** -0.091 1.000       
 p 0.001 0.000 0.254        
TATA Correlation Coefficient 0.026 0.145 -0.719** 0.142 1.000      
 p 0.745 0.067 0.000 0.074       
DEPI Correlation Coefficient 0.058 0.196* -0.038 0.028 0.042 1.000     
 p 0.466 0.013 0.630 0.728 0.598      
LVI Correlation Coefficient 0.204** 0.106 0.013 0.258** -0.190* 0.227** 1.000    
 p 0.010 0.183 0.866 0.001 0.16 0.004     
INVI Correlation Coefficient -0.009 -0.106 0.040 0.152 -0.053 -0.029 0.189* 1.000   
 p 0.909 0.181 0.613 0.055 0.505 0.720 0.17    
INVSI Correlation Coefficient 0.216** -0.281** 0.122 -0.505** -0.160 -0.002 0.017 0.687** 1.000  
 p 0.006 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.043 0.980 0.835 0.000   
NF/F Correlation Coefficient -0.105 -0.121 0.037 -0.009 -0.125 -0.056 0.042 0.010 0.011 1.000 
 p 0.188 0.126 0.645 0.912 0.116 0.483 0.598 0.901 0.885  
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 Appendix 5: Tolerance and VIF results for earnings management variables 
 
Tolerance and VIF Results for Years t, t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4 
Variables DSRI GMI AQI SGI TATA DEPI LVI INVR INVSR 
Y
ear t 
Tolerance 0.907 0.757 0.820 0.797 0.864 0.828 0.774 - 0.963 
VIF 1.103 1.320 1.219 1.254 1.157 1.208 1.293 - 1.039 
Y
ear t-1 
Tolerance 0.883 0.930 0.641 0.063 0.845 0.833 0.623 0.009 0.008 
VIF 1.133 1.076 1.560 15.869 1.183 1.200 1.606 109.138 119.382 
Y
ear t-2 
Tolerance 0.888 0.951 0.673 0.901 0.790 0.643 0.768 - 0.981 
VIF 1.127 1.052 1.486 1.110 1.266 1.556 1.303 - 1.019 
Y
ear t-3 
Tolerance 0.905 0.927 0.974 0.890 0.825 0.905 0.784 - 0.990 
VIF 1.105 1.079 1.027 1.123 1.212 1.105 1.275 - 1.010 
Y
ear t-4 
Tolerance 0.878 0.889 0.940 0.052 0.741 0.861 0.766 0.017 0.015 
VIF 1.139 1.125 1.064 19.358 1.349 1.162 1.305 59.479 66.559 
 
 
 
 
 
 
